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Chapter 1
Introduction and Tullock
Rent-Seeking Contest
1.1 Introduction
Contests are omnipresent in human society and they are a big issue in the lives of
everyone. A lobbyist inﬂuences the laws that are made by government and therefore
determines what we have to pay for health insurance, for example. An application
for a new job can be seen as a contest. The result of a football match or the deter-
mination of the football champion can also be seen as the outcome of a rent-seeking
contest. Wars or battles are also examples. Even ﬁnding a girlfriend or boyfriend
can be seen as a contest.
In all cases a prize is at stake and people that are interested in this prize will spend
irreversibly eﬀort to win it. Nearly every day it is possible to ﬁnd examples in the
news. The beginning of the crisis in the Ukraine in 2013 is a very good one. It ﬁrst
started with a contest between the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federa-
tion. In 2013 the president of the Ukraine, Janukowitsch, had the choice whether
to sign a contract with the EU or to cooperate with Russia. Both Russia and the
EU tried to convince Janukowitsch. In the end Russia won1 by oﬀering 15 billion
US-Dollars worth of credit (without demanding any reform) and reducing the prize
of gas for the Ukraine. Also the EU, the International Monetary Fund and the US
Government oﬀered credits, but they demanded the enactment of reforms.
Because of the importance of contests in everyday life, we want to examine contests
from a theoretical point of view. We will make use of the way how Tullock modeled
rent-seeking contests. A description of the model of Tullock is given at the end of
this section. But given that there has been and still is very much interest in contests
in the literature, we will concentrate on combining contests with another concept
1At least until the coup that overturned the government.
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that has only received little attention in that context. This concept is delegation.
As we will show subsequently, delegation and contests can ﬁt together. Because of
the complexity of international aﬀairs delegation is needed and used.
Shelling (1960) ﬁrst introduced strategic delegation to contests. He shows that del-
egating a decision, or only a part of it, to an agent can change the result in favor
of the delegating principal. One example he uses is a sadist in a prison. Everyone
knows that a sadist will always punish someone for misconduct. This may lead to a
reduction in the number of misconducts in the prison. Another famous result is the
result of Wa¨rneryd in 2000. He states that delegation is able to reduce investments
in rent-seeking contests and therefore reduces waste, if it is assumed that such eﬀorts
are not welfare enhancing. But on this point there are (at least) two opinions. On
the one hand, producing tanks, machine-guns or paying a lobbyist, a lawyer and
so forth increases gross national income and the military sector has always been
a driver in innovations. Also a tank has an afterlife. It is shown how a Russian
tank is used to produce a hammer in a German commercial for a hardware store for
example.
But on the other hand, in a symmetric situation no investment in a contest by both
sides would always be pareto optimal. Symmetric means that the prize valuation
and the technology of the players do not diﬀer. Technology determines how their
investment changes their probability of winning. If no one would invest, both would
have a chance to win and they would have no costs. In equilibrium the chance is
also one half, but both put in eﬀort. Although a tank, for example, has a positive
eﬀect the total eﬀect is negative because the money could have been spent elsewhere
where more people could beneﬁt from it.
Therefore the question arises whether wasteful investments in contests can be re-
duced. Wa¨rneryd shows that delegation could work. But in his study delegation has
to be mandatory. This is a serious problem, because every principal would beneﬁt
from mutual delegation, but not delegating is a dominant strategy. Accordingly,
they are kept in a kind of prisoners’ dilemma.
To incorporate the fact that the strategies used by an individual may change over
time, evolutionary game theory is introduced into the analysis. The biological con-
cept is mainly used for animal populations. To put it brieﬂy, in ﬁnite populations
an individual should always be concerned with the payoﬀs or ﬁtness, as it is called,
of all other opponents. That is, because evolutionary forces have a bias towards
individuals that behave that way. Only if an individual can ensure that his absolute
ﬁtness is highest, he will raise more oﬀspring and therefore his strategy will become
more frequent in the population. This fact makes hurting oneself to hurt others even
more a good idea. In this context we will use the term individualistic player. This
refers to a player that only cares for his utility and is not inﬂuenced by the utility of
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any other player. In game theory we are most of the time concerned with rational
agents. But in biology we are concerned with genes. Both concepts are used in the
indirect evolutionary approach as will be shown below. But let us ﬁrst concentrate
on the direct evolutionary approach.
In the direct evolutionary approach, evolution works on the level of strategies. Only
strategies that are more successful than other strategies will spread further in the
population. This may also lead to a situation where players do not behave ratio-
nally, i.e. they do not maximize their utility. This can lead to a deviation from
Nash equilibrium. In fact it was shown by Schaﬀer (1988), that one should act in a
non-altruistic way if one is to play a contest in a ﬁnite population. That means in
ﬁnite populations the more successful players are not playing the Nash equilibrium
strategy, i.e. they hurt themselves just to hurt the opponents even more. An exam-
ple that was spread in the news on July 31st, 2013 that sheds some light on that case
happened in the potash sector2. In this particular sector there are two cartels that
determine prices. Uralkali (a Russian potash ﬁrm) was part of one cartel. But this
particular ﬁrm decided to leave the cartel and to increase production and therefore
to reduce the price. In the potash sector it is common knowledge that Uralkali has
the lowest costs. This announcement destroyed 13 billion Dollars of stock exchange
capitalisation in a few hours. The stock of Uralkali lost more than 25 percent. Later
Uralkali stated that getting rid of some opponents in the sector is the aim of this
action3. One can see that Uralkali hurts itself to hurt other ﬁrms with higher costs
even more, just to gain some market share. If opponents that care for high prices
leave the market, then Uralkali is successful. But if Uralkali has to leave the market,
then collusion is better.
In the indirect evolutionary approach the individuals are rational in terms of max-
imizing their utility but their objective functions or preferences are determined by
nature (by their genes, for example). Accordingly, evolutionary forces work on the
level of preferences. Given the preference function of an individual, the individual
actively chooses a strategy that maximizes his utility. That means that the Nash
equilibrium strategy is played by the individuals. In human society one can think
of altruists, non-altruists and individualists. And only the preferences that lead to
the highest ﬁtness become more frequent and therefore the population may, in the
end, only consist of individuals with a certain preference function. In the direct
evolutionary approach individuals choose strategies that proved to be successful in
the past and the individuals that use the most successful strategy form the popu-
lation in the long run. But in the indirect evolutionary approach natural selection
2A summary is given in the following newspaper article:
http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/ks-unter-druck-russen-treiben-dax-
konzern-zur-verzweiﬂung/8579358.html.
3It is supposed that a Belarusian ﬁrm was the main target.
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leads to a population of individuals that choose the appropriate strategies rationally
because they have the genes that make them act this way. In nature, there are many
examples for species that care for their oﬀspring but there are also many examples
for species that do not do that. Let us consider a species that cares for their oﬀ-
spring. The direct evolutionary approach would argue that individuals that cared
were more successful because they had a higher ﬁtness. Although this behavior may
have reduced utility. But the indirect evolutionary approach argues that only these
individuals had a higher ﬁtness that have preferences that make them rationally
choose to care. There have also been individuals that did not care. But their ﬁtness
was lower and they became extinct.
In Chapter 2 we are concerned with this kind of problem. We will have a short
look at the direct and indirect evolutionary approach in context of a contest, and a
second kind of indirect evolutionary approach is introduced. Leininger (2009) used a
Tullock rent-seeking contest to ﬁnd out whether it is advantageous to be an altruist,
an individualist or a non-altruist. That means he was concerned with whether or
not interdependent preferences can enhance the ﬁtness. He states that negatively
interdependent preferences yield an advantage in ﬁnite populations.
We will show that also the perception of the value of the contested prize can be
used in an indirect evolutionary approach and that this leads to the same result.
I.e. an agent is willing to exert more eﬀort in order to win the prize than he should
do objectively. A good example is the intrinsic motivation to be better than the
opponents or that somebody wants to be the winner. Winning gives an individual
an extra utility. That also makes cheating worthwhile. The opponents are hurt just
to have a higher probability of being the ﬁrst. In any case the eﬀorts spent are
increased compared to individualistic preferences.
On the one hand, eﬀorts exerted in a contest could be used elsewhere to increase
welfare. And on the other hand, evolutionary forces even lead to more eﬀorts ex-
erted in contests. Maybe sending delegates could be a good idea to decrease eﬀorts
made. A delegate wants to get paid and also a principle wants to get a share of the
contested prize. There has to be some kind of split up of the prize. Accordingly, the
prize for a delegate is smaller. Therefore, he will invest less compared to a principal.
In a situation with negatively interdependent preferences sending a delegate that is
not concerned with the payoﬀ of the enemy of the principal can reduce eﬀorts spent.
With negatively interdependent preferences an agent is concerned with his payoﬀ
and the wish that the other should lose. But a delegate in this situation may only
be concerned with his material payoﬀ. A divorce can be a good example. The term
“can” refers to the fact that not all divorces are consensual divorces. If we are in a
non-consensual divorce, we are clearly confronted with interdependent preferences
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and overvaluation of things that may have an additional personal value to one party.
In this situation a neutral lawyer who acts as a delegate could reduce eﬀorts spent,
because he is only interested in the objective value of things and has no disutility if
the other party gets something.
The question of contracting an agent is the question of how to split up the contested
prize. Splitting up in this particular context means that the principal gets the whole
prize if the contest is won, but he has to pay the agent. It is assumed that the pay-
ment to the agent is made conditional on the value of the contested prize. The share
the delegate gets is therefore money that represents a share of the monetary beneﬁt
for the principal and not a share of the indivisible prize of the contest. In Chapter
3 we want to have a look at how much to oﬀer in order to contract an agent. So
far Baik (2007) answered the question, but only for a limited set of contracts. Baik
comes to the conclusion that no-win-no-pay contracts should be used, because in
such contracts the diﬀerence between winning and losing is greatest and therefore
the delegate has the greatest incentive to win. But it is shown that this is not true
in all cases. Baik assumes that a principal cannot punish the agent for a defeat. Be-
cause of that assumption his set of contracts is limited. Why shouldn’t it be possible
to punish a delegate? Such contracts are quiet common in non-legal sectors. The
Yakuza4 are a good example: An agent has to amputate a part of his ﬁnger if the
principal is dissatisﬁed with his performance. Another example was spread in the
news on 21st of december 20145. Some eyewitnesses claim that after having lost a
battle, the Islamic State executed 45 of its own ﬁghters for this defeat. The Islamic
State shares the resources conquered with his soldiers but also punishes them for a
defeat. One example for sharing the resources is the sad destiny of displaced women.
Some were sold but some were also given to the ﬁghters6.
Instead of assuming non-legal sectors, we could also have a look at a situation with-
out enforceable (property) rights. Agents may be forced to act for a principal and
they may be forced to sign extreme contracts. Young men may be forced to ﬁght for
the Islamic State and to pay with their lifes for a lost battle, for example. Whereas
in functioning states those contracts are not allowed under the rule of law.
But there are also examples in legal sectors. One could think of contractual penal-
ties that become eﬀective if determined goals were not reached by the agent. Also
soccer is an example, if the outcome of a match is interpreted as a contest and it
is assumed that both coaches are delegates of the management. The prize is given
by winning the match. Both coaches invest eﬀort to win the match, but in most of
4I.e. the japanese maﬁa.
5http://www.n-tv.de/politik/IS-Miliz-toetet-noch-mehr-eigene-Kaempfer-article14199261.html
6As stated in a notable German newspaper on 11/10/2014:
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/naher-osten/is-dschihadisten-verkauften-yezidische-
frauen-als-sklavinnen-13256836.html.
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the cases only one coach succeeds. The loser may be ﬁred if losing happens to of-
ten. Therefore, he is unemployed and also his future earnings are decreased because
other clubs could refrain from hiring a “loser coach”. The coach of the losing team is
therefore punished. Also managers are ﬁred if they are not able to stop competitors
from increasing their market share at the expense of his own ﬁrm.
When penalties are introduced, the diﬀerence in payment for the delegate between
winning and losing may be expanded. Accordingly, contracts might incentivize dele-
gates to a greater extent than a no-win-no-pay contract. A reduction in eﬀorts spent
might therefore be smaller compared to Wa¨rneryd (2000). We will also be concerned
with this topic in Chapter 3. Baik uses principals with individualistic preferences.
To compare the results with the literature, we will ﬁrst use individualistic prefer-
ences. The consequences of interdependent preferences are also explained. We will
also have a look at situation where individualistic principals contract agents with
negatively interdependent preferences.
After the optimal contracts are determined, we will have a look at relative con-
tracts. The relation of this type of contract to the contracts determined in Chapter
3 is explained. But in Chapter 4 we will concentrate on negatively interdependent
preferences. With negatively interdependent preferences in a contest, a principal
values his payoﬀ and also assesses the payoﬀ the opponent does not get, i.e. they
want to have more than the opponent. Principals do not play the contest and there-
fore the eﬀorts invested do not increase directly. But it is shown in Chapter 4 how
these negatively interdependent preferences inﬂuence the choice of the contract and
therefore increase eﬀorts indirectly. Relative contracts are chosen because they re-
ward the delegate if he was able to do better than the other delegate. Accordingly,
they can transfer the preferences of the principal to the delegate. In a divorce battle
with lawyers as delegates, for example, incentivizing the lawyer to gain more than
his opponent might be a good idea.
Relative contracts are therefore less concerned with absolute payoﬀs, but with the
relative position the delegate achieves. Putting a positive weight on sales in manager-
contracts is one example for this type of contract.
In Chapter 2 it is explained that negatively interdependent preferences yield an ad-
vantage in ﬁnite populations compared to altruistic and individualistic preferences.
In Chapter 4 we will examine whether something similar can be observed in the
selection of contracts or not, i.e. do negatively interdependent contracts have an
advantage or not.
Wa¨rneryd (2000) showed that no-win-no-pay contracts can reduce eﬀorts spent in
contests in a setting with mandatory delegation. Whether this also holds with rel-
ative contracts or not will also be part of my investigation in this chapter.
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It is assumed in Chapters 3 and 4 that the principal uses the contract to inﬂu-
ence the eﬀort made by the agent. In Chapter 5 we will introduce training into the
delegation setting. Training is modeled as an investment of the principal in order to
make the agent more eﬀective. Two approaches are used in this chapter: Training
can reduce the unit costs of investing eﬀort for the agent or it can inﬂuence the
weight the eﬀort has, i.e. whether the agent can achieve more without doing more
just because he was trained. The principal pays to increase the skills of his delegate.
We can think of soldiers and their basic training when they start. Also researchers
go to conferences and employees get training when they start a job. These examples
show that principals are willing to invest money to make the agents more eﬀective.
As we will see, the design of training makes it also possible to include assistance
to the delegate. That means that also investing in technical assistance etc. can be
included in this setting. A steel helmet for example does not kill an enemy, but it
helps to keep the soldier alive and therefore to make him more eﬀective, in a sense.
Another example is water and food for soldiers. To provide sustenance can increase
the eﬀectiveness of the soldiers in a battle. We will be concerned with the inﬂuence
of training on principals and delegates. But we will concentrate on the contest ac-
tually played. The eﬀects of training in the future are neglected. Also the eﬀects
of changing the costs of training or the form of the Contest-Success-Function are
shown.
To judge whether delegation can decrease wasteful investment or not, the results are
recapitulated in Chapter 6. Also the implications of the development of contracts
are shown. So far, introducing mandatory delegation can be seen as an interven-
tion by government to reduce investments in rent-seeking. We will discuss whether
this is enough or not, i.e. should the government also determine the contracts
to be used. Such a type of governmental interference is the German “Rechtsan-
waltsvergu¨tungsgesetz”. We will also have a look at how principals can inﬂuence
the outcome of the contest even though contracts are prescribed.
So far, contracts were given by no-win-no-pay contracts. We want to emphasize
that more competitive contracts may also be used by the principals. Also training
may be used to inﬂuence the eﬀort put in by the delegate. Additionally, in the sec-
tion “Future Research” we will be concerned with another type of gaining inﬂuence
on the behavior of the delegate. As Akerlof and Kranton (2000) show, identity is
also an important factor for individuals. And we will try to introduce identity in a
contest with delegation.
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1.2 Tullock Rent-Seeking Contest
Before we start with the model of Tullock (1980), we will give an intuition for the
meaning of the terms economic rent and rent-seeking. According to Tollison (1982)
an economic rent is “deﬁned as a return in excess of a resource owner’s opportunity
cost,[...]”. An economic rent can be artiﬁcial or not, i.e. a shortage that leads
to an excess return can be created by a shift in demand, for example, or by the
decision of an authority. The diﬀerence is that artiﬁcial rents may be persistent,
i.e. they are not driven to normal levels by market forces. We will give an example
to demonstrate what this means. Let us consider the National Football League
(NFL) in the USA. Each of the 32 clubs is granted a franchise. Each team has a
“Home Territory” and a “Home Marketing Area”. In the Home Territory the team
can exclusively host professional football games. In the Home Marketing Area a
team has the right to advertise, promote, and host events, i.e. a team can act as
a monopolist in the deﬁned territories and therefore earns an economic rent. This
rent is artiﬁcial because the number of franchises is restricted by the NFL to 32.
According to Forbes magazine all 32 NFL clubs rank among the top 50 most valuable
sports teams in the world7.
We can also use this example to demonstrate what is meant by rent-seeking. Assume
that the league decided to grant another franchise and that there is more than one
candidate. Each of the candidates wants to convince the authorities of the NFL
that he is the best. Accordingly, every candidate spents money on promotion,
bribery and so on. But only one candidate wins the franchise. This expenditure
of scarce resources by all candidates to capture an economic rent is called rent-
seeking. According to Congleton et. al (2008) “Incentives for rent seeking are
present whenever decisions of others inﬂuence personal outcomes or more broadly
when resources can be used to aﬀect distributional outcomes.” (p. 1).
In most cases a monopoly leads to a loss in welfare. If this monopoly is artiﬁcial and
scarce resources are spent to gain this monopoly, we have to add these expenditures
to the welfare loss of the monopoly to account for all negative eﬀects. The idea
that resources spent attempting to make or prevent transfers should be counted as
a cost to society was introduced by Tullock (1967). Compared to the economic rent
of a monopoly, how much is invested to gain the monopoly rights? Until Tullock
(1980) it was believed that the total amount invested is as high as the monopoly
rent or even higher. In “Eﬃcient Rent Seeking” Tullock modeled the actual process
of rent-seeking and showed that this is not necessarily true. Tullock uses a simple
lottery to explain his model. In this section we will recall his model. Assume that
7Kurt Badenhausen (April 18, 2012). ”Manchester United Tops The World’s 50 Most Valuable
Sports Teams”. Forbes. Retrieved September 12, 2012.
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two risk-neutral players can buy lottery tickets. The amount of ticket bought by
the ﬁrst player is denoted by 퐴 and the amount of tickets of the second player is
given by 퐵. One ticket is randomly chosen and the player who bought it wins the
contest. Accordingly, the probability that 퐴 wins the lottery is 푃퐴 =
퐴
퐴+퐵
. A
function that maps eﬀorts (“ticket purchases”) to winning probabilities is called a
Contest-Success-Function (CSF).
Tullock assumes that the prize of the lottery is an amount of 100 Dollars and that
the price of one lottery ticket is one Dollar. He showes that both players should buy
25 lottery tickets and therefore only one half of the rent is dissipated. The money
spent for the tickets is sunk from the point of view of 퐴 and 퐵. Accordingly, they
spent irreversible eﬀort to win the prize; i.e. both players seek to win the rent (100
Dollars) and in order to do this they buy tickets.
To get the odds of one player in the model, we just have to devide the number of his
tickets by the sum of all tickets sold. Tullock extends his model to model a broader
class of situations. In his extension the probability that the ﬁrst player wins is given
by
푃퐴 =
퐴푟
퐴푟 +퐵푟
.
We will stick to this form of modeling rent-seeking. 푟 is an exogenously given pa-
rameter and 푟 determines the weight of the eﬀort in the CSF. If 푟 > 1, then the
impact of an additional unit of eﬀort invested is higher than the impact of the unit
spent before. If 푟 < 1, the impact of an unit of eﬀort decreases the more eﬀort has
already been spent. As soon as 푟 > 2, we are confronted with multiple equilibria
where only one player invests. That would mean that only one player in the contest
is active. We want to avoid this rather unrealistic scenario and therefore do not
consider this case. Another interpretation is that 푟 is a measure of how much the
relative size of eﬀort counts. If 푟 is zero, it does not matter who invested more.
Every individual has the same probability of winning. If 푟 is close to inﬁnity, the
player who invested the most will win the contest almost certainly.
We will use this so-called exponential form in our analyses. One reason is that we
can model many real world scenarios with this function. Another reason is that
according to Skaperdas (1996) this is the standard form in modeling rent-seeking.
12
Chapter 2
On the Evolution of Preferences
This chapter has beneﬁtted from extensive discussions with Wolfgang Leininger and
Burkhard Hehenkamp.
2.1 Introduction
Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2007) point out that individuals not only engage in mutual
beneﬁcial activities but also use resources to appropriate wealth of other agents. A
vast literature concerning this aspect has evolved in the last decades: Tullock (1980)
with his idea of eﬃcient rent-seeking and the use of a Contest-Success-Function,
Haavelmo (1954) who ﬁrst modeled the choice between production and appropriation
and Hirshleifer (1995) theorizing about conﬂict, are just a few.
In recent years evolutionary concepts have also been applied in this context.
Mostly this is done in order to gain some insights about how strategies evolve over
time. In the direct evolutionary approach, evolution works on the level of strategies.
A behavior that yields a higher payoﬀ than any other behavior is imitated by others.
In the long run, only the strategy which performs best compared to other available
strategies survives, and is therefore evolutionarily stable. Ultimately, only those
individuals form the population that were more successful than their opponents,
because they have more resources to spend on reproduction, for example. In ﬁnite
populations this can cause a deviation from Nash equilibrium. But evolution does
not only work on the level of strategies. For that reason, an indirect evolutionary
approach has been termed by Gu¨th and Yaari (1992). The behavior of an individual
depends on his preferences which act as stimuli. The strategy chosen according to
the given preferences, compared to the strategies used by other individuals in the
population, determines the ﬁtness of an individual. Evolution does not take place
in the choice of certain strategies, those are chosen rationally, but in the stimuli
appearing over time. In the end only individuals with the most “useful” stimuli form
the population. By using this approach, Leininger (2009) develops evolutionarily
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stable preferences (EST) in a two-player Tullock contest. He shows that pure proﬁt
maximization is evolutionarily stable only within an inﬁnite population. But as
soon as the population is smaller, the individuals are concerned with a weighted
relative payoﬀ. This leads to perfectly negatively interdependent preferences for a
population of two individuals. It is worth to notice, that even though individuals
hurt themselves by such a behavior, they hurt the opponent even more. Of course,
negative interdependent preferences are not rational from the point of view of the
whole population. Accordingly, the term spiteful is used in the literature.
This chapter is aiming at the indirect evolutionary approach as well. We state
that both, the preferences over the outcome for the enemy and the valuation of
the contested prize, can act as a stimulus. Of course, some individuals can use
the prize more eﬃciently than others, but this case is of no importance here. The
prize has a unique value, but the individuals may rate it diﬀerently. This approach
is equivalent to a situation where every individual faces the same costs, but the
individuals think that the costs are diﬀerent. Therefore, underestimation of the
own costs can act as an explanation for an overestimation of the contested prize
and the other way around. Additionally, if we compute our own costs correctly,
we can still overestimate the prize if we overestimate the costs of our opponents.
Another explanation is an intrinsic value of winning. Getting the desired object
gives individuals an extra boost in utility that cannot be explained solely by the
value of the prize. Boudreau and Shunda (2010) also used a Tullock rent-seeking
contest and the indirect evolutionary approach to determine evolutionarily stable
prize perceptions. But they only consider two-player contests and compare their
outcome to the direct evolutionary approach.
We assume that there is an ex-post outcome which is unknown to the players
ex-ante. We want to show that overvaluation is evolutionarily stable in contests
of arbitrary size if the population is ﬁnite. It is also shown that overvaluation
can occur in inﬁnite populations. This means that making a “mistake” can be
beneﬁcial in evolutionary terms. Because of a higher valuation, the opponents are
discouraged on the one hand and the player acts more aggressively and therefore
hurts his opponent even more than he hurts himself on the other hand. The latter
eﬀect is similar to the result of Leininger (2009). We will show that the material
outcome and the invested eﬀorts are the same for both indirect approaches. It is also
shown that both indirect evolutionary approaches predict more aggressive behavior
and therefore lower material payoﬀs than the direct evolutionary approach. Only
in two-player contests and playing the ﬁeld contests all investigated approaches are
equivalent in the behavior they predict.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 2.2 we specify an
evolutionary game to explain the direct and the indirect evolutionary approach. In
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section 2.3 we set up the model and recapitulate some basic deﬁnitions and concepts.
In Section 2.4 evolutionarily stable prize perceptions are derived within an arbitrary
but ﬁnite population for two-player Tullock contests and for Tullock contests with
more than two opponents. Section 2.5 compares our results with the results of the
direct evolutionary approach according to Schaﬀer (1988) and with the results of the
indirect evolutionary approach developed by Leininger (2009); Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Direct and Indirect evolutionary approach
2.2.1 Direct evolutionary approach
To demonstrate the direct evolutionary approach, we will concentrate on symmetric
two-player games. This presentation draws heavily on Schaﬀer (1988). Assume that
there is a population of 푁 individuals. It holds that 2 ≤ 푁 <∞. All players engage
in contests of size two. Suppose that two individuals are randomly chosen to play
a contest. We call the players player 1 and player 2. The strategy space of the ﬁrst
player is 푆1. The set of strategies of the second player is 푆2. It holds that 푆1 = 푆2
and that 푆1, 푆2 ⊂ R. 푆 = 푆1×푆2 is the product of strategy sets. Both players want
to maximize their material payoﬀ or ﬁtness. We denote by 푓푖 : 푆 → R, 푖 ∈ 푁 , the
material payoﬀ function of individual 푖. The material payoﬀ of any player in the
two-player contest depends on his strategy and the strategy of the opponent.
Suppose that one individual in the population is a mutant, i.e. he plays a strategy
that is diﬀerent from the strategy the other 푁 − 1 individuals in the population
are playing. We will denote his strategy by 푥푀 . We will call the strategy the
other individuals are using 푥퐸푆푆. The superscript indicates that this strategy is an
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). Before the conditions for a strategy to be an
ESS are explained, we will give a short description of what an ESS is: “Roughly,
an ESS is a strategy such that, if most of the members of a population adopt it,
there is no ’mutant’ strategy that would give higher reproductive ﬁtness.” (Maynard
Smith and Price (1973), p.15). Higher reproductive ﬁtness in this context means
that once the ESS is used by all members of the population, no individual can get
more resources for reproduction by playing a diﬀerent strategy.
Because there is only one mutant, this mutant will always play against a player that
plays 푥퐸푆푆. His material payoﬀ is given by
푓푀 = 푓푀(푥
푀 , 푥퐸푆푆).
The payoﬀ of an ESS-player, when he plays the contest against the mutant, is
denoted by 푓퐸푆푆(푥
푀 , 푥퐸푆푆). The probability that an ESS-player plays the contest
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against the mutant is given by 1
푁−1 . Accordingly, his expected material payoﬀ is
푓퐸푆푆 =
푁 − 2
푁 − 1푓퐸푆푆(푥
퐸푆푆, 푥퐸푆푆) +
1
푁 − 1푓퐸푆푆(푥
푀 , 푥퐸푆푆).
According to Schaﬀer (1988) a strategy is an ESS if and only if two conditions are
fulﬁlled:
a) Equilibrium condition and
b) Stability condition.
The Equilibrium condition requires that the following holds:
푓퐸푆푆 ≥ 푓푀 ,
i.e. the expected material payoﬀ of an ESS-player has to be at least as high as the
payoﬀ of a mutant. Accordingly, there is no strategy that yields a material payoﬀ
that is higher.
To ﬁnd the ESS, we have a look at
max
푥푀
푓푀 − 푓퐸푆푆.
For 푥푀 = 푥퐸푆푆 the maximum of zero is reached. By using the conditions for 푓푀
and 푓퐸푆푆 derived above, we get
max
푥푀
푓푀(푥
푀 , 푥퐸푆푆)− 1
푁 − 1푓퐸푆푆(푥
푀 , 푥퐸푆푆).
In a ﬁnite population an ESS does not maximize the material payoﬀ of a player.
In fact, in a ﬁnite population it is evolutionarily stable to maximize a weighted
relative payoﬀ. The weight put on the material payoﬀ of the opponent depends on
the size of the population. As 푁 → ∞, the concern for the opponent vanishes and
the problem is therefore to maximize the own material payoﬀ. Accordingly, in a
ﬁnite population the ESS can be diﬀerent from the Nash equilibrium strategy. In
an inﬁnite population it is evolutionarily stable to act according to the preferences
and therefore to maximize the material payoﬀ. In such a population the ESS is also
the Nash equilibrium strategy. But in a ﬁnite population it is evolutionary stable to
act as if the aim is to maximize a weighted relative payoﬀ. Accordingly, the Nash
equilibrium strategy and the ESS need not be the same.
The intuition is that the evolution of strategies works relatively fast, i.e. the individ-
uals realize easily whether a diﬀerent strategy is more successful or not. Successful
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in this context means that a strategy yields a material payoﬀ, and therefore a re-
productive ﬁtness, that is higher than the average material payoﬀ of the opponents.
The higher the material payoﬀ, the more oﬀspring can be raised. By deviating from
the Nash equilibrium, the material payoﬀ is decreased, but the material payoﬀ of
the opponents that use the Nash equilibrium strategy is decreased even more. Ac-
cordingly, it is evolutionarily stable to hurt oneself in order to hurt the opponents
even more.
We just concentrated on one contest that is played in the population. We have
to remember that every individual in the population is part of a two-player contest.
We have to consider the payoﬀ of each of the individuals to check whether a strategy
is evolutionarily stable or not. We also assumed that there is only one mutant. This
assumption must also be relaxed to account for the appearence of more than one
mutant. Accordingly, we will now turn to the second condition that an ESS must
fulﬁll. Schaﬀer (1988) deﬁnes stability as follows:
“A strategy 푥퐸푆푆 is Y-stable if, in a population with a total of up to Y identical
mutant strategists with any mutant strategy 푠푀 ∕= 푠퐸푆푆, 푓푀 < 푓퐸푆푆 for all 2 ≤
푀 ≤ 푌 . The ESS is globally stable if 푌 = 푁 − 1.” (p.473)
The equilibrium condition ensures that there is no strategy that is more successful
than the ESS in the two player contest. The stability condition deals with strategies
that perform as good as the ESS in the two-player contest. In fact, if there are no
more than Y mutants, then the expected material payoﬀ of using the ESS is higher
than the material payoﬀ of the mutant strategy, i.e. the expected material payoﬀ
of a mutant in a contest with another mutant is lower compared to the expected
material payoﬀ of an ESS-player playing a contest with another ESS-player.
We will now turn to the indirect evolutionary approach. It is important to remember
that the direct evolutionary approach may predict a deviation from Nash equilibrium
in ﬁnite populations.
2.2.2 Indirect evolutionary approach
We will concentrate on symmetric two-player games to explain the indirect evolu-
tionary approach. This subsection follows the idea of Gu¨th and Peleg (2001) and
Leininger (2009). The notation and the depiction follow Leininger (2009).
Assume that a game is played by two players. We call these players player 1 and
player 2. The set of strategies of player 1 is denoted by 푆1. Because this game
is symmetric, it holds that 푆1 = 푆2, where 푆2 is the strategy set of player 2. Ac-
cordingly, 푆 = 푆1 × 푆2 is the product of strategy sets. The preference of any player
determines how he will act in the game. But the preferences of any player can change
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in this game. 푀푖 denotes the set of all kinds of preferences player 푖 = 1, 2 can be
stimulated by. Accordingly 푀 = 푀1 ×푀2 is the “’mutation space’ of stimuli”, as
Leininger (2009) called it.
The utility Π푖 of player 푖 is given by
Π푖 : 푆 ×푀 → R.
We can see that the payoﬀ of any player is determined by his preference and the
preference of the other player, but also by his strategy and the strategy of the other
player. The question arises how strategies are chosen and how preferences evolve.
The preference of any player is the result of an evolutionary process. For any com-
bination of preferences, the strategy chosen by the players is always the result of
(Nash-)equilibrium behavior. Evolution determines the utility functions of the play-
ers. Both players are totally rational and play the unique Nash equilibrium of the
game that is speciﬁed by the utility functions. The intuition is as follows: Prefer-
ences evolve slowly. We can think of a father and his son. The preference of the
father is determined when he is born and cannot change. But the prference of the
son can diﬀer from the preference of the father. Because of this slow process, the
individuals have time to ﬁnd the optimal strategy.
Figuratively speaking, the evolutionary game consists of two games. One game is
played by the players, who choose the best strategy in order to maximize their utility.
The second game is played by nature. The strategies of nature are the preferences.
Only these preferences that make the players choose the correct strategies will sur-
vive. To judge whether a preference function is better ﬁt than another preference
function or not, we have to introduce the evolutionary ﬁtness function 푓푖 : 푆 → R of
player 푖 ∈ 푁 . 푁 is the number of individuals in the evolutionary game and again 푁
is at least two. The ﬁtness function of player 푖 gives us the material payoﬀ of player
푖 for any combination of strategies. The players perceive a utility, but normally this
says little about his material payoﬀ. Consider a player that goes base jumping. His
utility is positive, but he risks his life and spents money. Accordingly, his material
payoﬀ may be negative.
Note that the ﬁtness of player 푖 is only dependent on the chosen strategies. The
preferences determine the strategies that are chosen, but they do not inﬂuence the
ﬁtness of a player directly. The higher is the ﬁtness of an individual, the more oﬀ-
spring he can raise and therefore the higher is the probability that his preference
will prevail in the population.
To formalize the evolutionary game, assume that two players are randomly chosen
from the population to play the game. The preference of the ﬁrst player is given by
푚1 and the preference of the second player is 푚2. The preferences are determined,
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therefore we denote the game the players are playing as
퐸(푚1,푚2) = ({1, 2}, 푆,Π1(푥1, 푥2,푚1,푚2),Π2(푥1, 푥2,푚1,푚2)).
For simplicity, we assume that 퐸 is well deﬁned and has a unique Nash Equilib-
rium for each 푚 ∈ 푀 . The Nash Equilibrium strategies are given by 푥∗1(푚1,푚2)
and 푥∗2(푚1,푚2). As mentioned above, the strategies chosen by the players only
depend on the preferences. The utilities of the players in equilibrium are de-
pendent on the strategies and the preferences. Accordingly, they are given by
Π∗1(푥
∗
1(푚1,푚2), 푥
∗
2(푚1,푚2),푚1,푚2) and Π
∗
2(푥
∗
1(푚1,푚2), 푥
∗
2(푚1,푚2),푚1,푚2). But
we can also compute the evolutionary ﬁtness of the players:
푓1(푥
∗
1(푚1,푚2), 푥
∗
2(푚1,푚2)) and 푓2(푥
∗
1(푚1,푚2), 푥
∗
2(푚1,푚2)).
“This gives rise to indirect ﬁtness functions
퐹푖(푚1,푚2) = 푓푖(푥
∗
1(푚1,푚2), 푥
∗
2(푚1,푚2)), 푖 = 1, 2
for the players, which can be regarded as the payoﬀ functions of an evolutionary
game that is played over types.”(Leininger (2009), p.347)
This is the second game we mentioned above. Following Leininger, we denote this
game
퐸¯ = ({1, 2},푀, 퐹1(푚1,푚2), 퐹2(푚1,푚2)).
The preferences determine the Nash equilibrium and therefore the payoﬀs of the ﬁrst
game. But utility normally tells us nothing about the material payoﬀ. Therefore
we use the ﬁtness functions to calculate the material payoﬀs. Using 퐹푖 we can
judge whether player 푖 = 1, 2 has a higher material payoﬀ or not. If his material
payoﬀ is higher, then his preference yield an advantage in the evolutionary game.
But by using these indirect ﬁtness functions, we can judge for any combination of
preferences, which one is better. The solution concept applied to this problem is
ESS (evolutionarily Stable Strategies). But since we are confronted with preferences,
we will call it ESP (Evolutionarily Stable Preferences), i.e. we are searching for
the preference that, once spread in the whole population, cannot be invaded by a
suﬃciently small number of mutants with another preference. Assume that 푚∗ =
(푚∗1,푚
∗
2) is the unique ESP of 퐸¯. Hence, the Nash equilibrium of 퐸 is given by
푥∗(푚∗) = (푥∗1(푚
∗
1,푚
∗
2), 푥
∗
2(푚
∗
1,푚
∗
2)).
Accordingly, the solution of the indirect evolutionary game is given by a vector of
preferences and strategies. Note that the strategies are induced by these preferences.
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2.3 The Model
As Alchian (1950) points out, it might to some degree be the case that environ-
ment adapts individuals through natural selection instead of individuals adapting
to environment. Gu¨th and Yaari (1992) had this in mind when they wrote about an
indirect evolutionary approach. They allow for an indirect dependence of behavior
on genetically determined “stimuli”. These stimuli deﬁne the game played directly
by determining the preferences of the players. Leininger (2009) argued that the
preferences for the opponent can act as such a stimulus. In this article we show that
this need not necessarily be the only possibility. The perception of the prize can
act as a stimulus as well. The strategies and therefore the actions depend on the
valuations the players have.
Time and time again, rational players are involved in Tullock contests with 푟 ≤ 1
and with an arbitrary number of opponents 푛 ≥ 2 within a given population of
arbitrary size 푁 . It holds that 푁 is at least as high as 푛. As will be shown below,
we have to consider 푟 to be smaller or equal to one because the material payoﬀ of
the players is in expectation negative otherwise. The consequences of a negative
material payoﬀ are given in the ﬁrst chapter. The contest is for the prize 푉 . We
assume that this is also the objective value of the prize. The perception of player
푖 ∈ {1, ..., 푛} is given by 휎푖푉 , with 휎푖 ∈ [0,∞). Note that we have overvaluation if
휎푖 > 1, undervaluation if 휎푖 < 1 and a correct prize perception if 휎푖 = 1.
According to his valuation, player 푖 invests eﬀort denoted by 푥푖. The sum of all
eﬀorts by all players, except player 푖, is denoted by 푥−푖.
Accordingly, the probability that player 푖 wins the contest is given by
푝푖(푥푖, 푥−푖) =
⎧⎨⎩
푥푟푖
푥푟푖+푥
푟
−푖
for 푥푖 + 푥−푖 > 0
1
푛
for 푥푖 + 푥−푖 = 0.
After all players have exerted eﬀort, the winner is chosen by nature according to the
achieved probabilities and the prize is handed over.
To determine the amount of eﬀort a player is willing to invest, we have to take a
look at his utility function. The utility function of an arbitrary player 푖 is given by
Π푖 =
푥푟푖
푥푟푖 + 푥
푟
−푖
휎푖푉 − 푥푖.
With probabiliy
푥푟푖
푥푟푖+푥
푟
−푖
player 푖 wins the contest. If he is successful, he gets the prize
which is worth 휎푖푉 to him. If he loses, he gets nothing. But in both cases player 푖
has to bear the costs for the invested eﬀort.
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We denote by 푥∗푖 (휎푖, 휎−푖) the (optimal) eﬀort player 푖 is willing to exert in the Nash
equilibrium of this contest. Because the invested eﬀorts are determined by the
valuation parameters, the utility in the Nash equilibrium of the contest Π∗푖 (휎푖, 휎−푖)
of any player 푖 is also dependent on these parameters. This gives rise to the indirect
evolutionary approach. Note that we get a second game that is played by nature
with preference parameters acting as “strategies”. The valuations evolve through an
evolutionary process. The most successful valuation can spread faster and therefore
increase its share of the population. Evolution “determines” the valuations, but the
choice of strategies is the result of (Nash) equilibrium behavior of the players.
From time to time, mutations with a diﬀerent prize perception than the prevailing
one appear. If the new valuation is ﬁtter, then it will become the dominant prize
perception through natural selection. In order to judge whether a prize perception
is ﬁtter or not, we take a look at material payoﬀs. Only if an individual is relatively
more successful in material terms than his opponent, he can raise more oﬀspring
and the perception reproduces faster.
To determine the evolutionarily stable valuation, we have to have a look at the
evolutionary success function, as Leininger (2009) termed it.
The material payoﬀ of any player 푖 is given by
푓푖 =
(푥∗푖 (휎푖, 휎−푖))
푟
(푥∗푖 (휎푖, 휎−푖))푟 + (푥
∗
−푖(휎푖, 휎−푖))푟
푉 − 푥∗푖 (휎푖, 휎−푖).
Note that 푓푖 is deﬁned with regard to the true, not perceived value of the prize. But
as stated above, absolute payoﬀ is not all that matters. Absolute payoﬀ has to be
compared to the payoﬀ the opponents get. Only if we have a higher absolute payoﬀ
than our opponents, we are more successful in evolutionary terms. To determine
the ﬁtness of any player, it is necessary to subtract the weighted material payoﬀs
of the opponents from the material payoﬀ. The weight on the material payoﬀ of
the opponents is determined by the number of opponents and by the share of the
population these opponents represent. If the opponents in the contest represent
a large fraction of the population, then the weight is high because beating the
opponents leads to an advantage over a large fraction of the population. The indirect
ﬁtness function of player 푖 is given by
퐹푖 = 푓푖(휎푖, 휎−푖)− 1
(푁 − 1)
푛∑
푗=1
푗 ∕=푖
푓푗(휎푗, 휎−푗).
The evolutionarily stable valuation parameter for the contested prize is given by 휎∗.
Given that any player has a valuation of 휎∗푉 , any deviation leads to a ﬁtness that
is lower or equal compared to the ﬁtness with 휎∗. Additionally, 푥∗(휎∗) is the Nash
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equilibrium of the contest played by the individuals.
2.4 Evolutionarily stable prize perception
As mentioned in Section 2.1, we ﬁrst concentrate on contests between two-players
with 푟 ≤ 1, before we turn to contests between an arbitrary number of players with
푟 = 1. In the last subsection we also have a look at 푛-player contests and 푟 ≤ 1.
2.4.1 Two-player contests
Any two players1 out of an arbitrary but ﬁnite population 푁 are chosen to play a
Tullock contest. Suppose that 푁 − 1 individuals rate the contested prize according
to the evolutionarily stable prize perception (ESV) 휎퐸푆푉 . The remaining individual
is a mutant with a diﬀerent valuation. This valuation is denoted by 휎푀 . The eﬀort
invested by the mutant is given by 푥푀 , and the eﬀort exerted by a random player
with the evolutionarily stable prize perception is denoted by 푥퐸푆푉 . If the mutant
was to play the contest, he would maximize
Π푀 =
푥푟푀
푥푟푀 + 푥
푟
퐸푆푉
휎푀푉 − 푥푀 .
An ESV-player is concerned with
Π퐸푆푉 =
푥푟퐸푆푉
푥푟푀 + 푥
푟
퐸푆푉
휎퐸푆푉 푉 − 푥퐸푆푉 .
Deriving both ﬁrst order conditions and setting them equal yields
푥퐸푆푉 =
휎퐸푆푉
휎푀
푥푀 .
The equilibrium eﬀorts are
푥푀 =
휎푟+1푀 휎
푟
퐸푆푉
(휎푟푀 + 휎
푟
퐸푆푉 )
2
푟푉,
푥퐸푆푉 =
휎푟푀휎
푟+1
퐸푆푉
(휎푟푀 + 휎
푟
퐸푆푉 )
2
푟푉.
The probability that the mutant wins the contest is given by
푝푀 =
휎푟푀
휎푟푀 + 휎
푟
퐸푆푉
.
1see Boudreau and Shunda (2010) for the case of 푟 = 1.
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Whether the probability of winning the contest is higher for the mutant or for the
ESV-player depends on the relative size of the prize perceptions of both players. If
the mutant values the prize higher than the ESV-player, he will invest more and
will therefore win with a higher probability.
Given the probability and the eﬀorts, we can determine the material payoﬀs of the
players. The indirect ﬁtness function is used to decide whether a prize perception
is evolutionarily stable or not. The indirect ﬁtness function of the mutant reads
퐹푀 =
휎푟푀
휎푟푀 + 휎
푟
퐸푆푉
푉 − 휎
푟+1
푀 휎
푟
퐸푆푉
(휎푟푀 + 휎
푟
퐸푆푉 )
2
푟푉
− 1
(푁 − 1)
휎푟퐸푆푉
휎푟푀 + 휎
푟
퐸푆푉
푉 +
1
(푁 − 1)
휎푟푀휎
푟+1
퐸푆푉
(휎푟푀 + 휎
푟
퐸푆푉 )
2
푟푉.
퐹푀 is composed of four terms. The ﬁrst is the expected prize the mutant gets.
The second term is what he spends in the contest. The last term is the investment
of the opponent. The third term is the share of the prize the ESV-player gets
in expectation. The last two terms are weighted by the share of the remaining
population the ESV-player represents.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to 휎푀 is used to determine the inﬂuence of
the prize perception on the evolutionary ﬁtness. Since 휎퐸푆푉 is the evolutionarily
stable prize perception, the maximum ﬁtness of the mutant is reached when his prize
perception is equal to 휎퐸푆푉 . Therefore, we can set 휎푀 = 휎퐸푆푉 = 휎. The ﬁrst order
condition reduces to
0 = (2푟휎2푟−1 − 푟휎2푟−1)2휎푟 − 2(푟 + 1)푟휎3푟 + 2푟2휎3푟
+
2푟
(푁 − 1)휎
3푟−1 +
푟
(푁 − 1)(2푟휎
3푟 − 2푟휎3푟)
0 = 2푟휎3푟−1 − 2푟휎3푟 + 2푟 1
푁 − 1휎
3푟−1.
Searching for the evolutionarily stable prize perception yields
Theorem 2.1: For a ﬁnite population of size N and any 푟 ≤ 1, the unique
symmetric evolutionarily stable prize perception in a two-player contest is given
by 휎∗ = 푁
푁−1 ; i.e. the evolutionary stable preference function of player 푖=1,2 is
determined as
Π푖 =
푥푟푖
푥푟1 + 푥
푟
2
푁
푁 − 1푉 − 푥푖.
Accordingly, we can state:
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Lemma 2.1: In a two-player Tullock contest the material payoﬀ of a player is
휋푀 = 휋퐸푆푉 = 휋1 =
2푁 − 2− 푟푁
4(푁 − 1) 푉.
And the utility is given by
푈푀 = 푈퐸푆푉 = 푈1 =
푁
(푁 − 1)
(2− 푟)
4
푉.
The eﬀort invested is given by
푥푀 = 푥퐸푆푉 = 푥1 =
푁
(푁 − 1)
푟푉
4
.
Note that the utility is always positive because 푟 ≤ 1. The utility is also always
greater than the material payoﬀ because the contested prize is overvalued, at least
in ﬁnite populations. Therefore the individuals feel better since they believe that
the value of the prize is greater than it actually is. In contrast, the material payoﬀ
is zero for 푟 = 1 and 푁 = 2. The evolutionary ﬁtness of every player is positive as
long as 푁 > 2.
Because winning has an intrinsic value, full dissipation can occur. This happens for
푁 = 2 and 푟 = 1. Although the individuals spent everything the prize is worth,
they still have a positive utility that is created by the overvaluation of the prize. We
may think of a collector of coins. Although he spent everything the coin is worth
objectively in the contest for this coin (on Ebay, for example), he still is happy
because he got the desired coin, which might have been the ﬁnal piece to complete
his collection.
Boudreau and Shunda (2010) also ﬁnd that the evolutionarily stable prize percep-
tion is equal to 휎∗. But because they only used 푟 = 1, they do not ﬁnd that this
prize perception is independent of 푟 and therefore holds for a much broader set of
Contest-Success-Functions.
2.4.2 푛-player contests
We now assume that 2 ≤ 푛 ≤ 푁 . Individuals are chosen to play a contest for 푉 .
Only one of the chosen players is a mutant and has a prize perception 휎퐴푀 . The
prize perceptions of the other players are given by the ESV-prize perception 휎퐴퐸푆푉 .
In contrast to Section 2.4.1, we assume 푟 = 1.
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Accordingly, if the mutant is chosen to play the contest, his utility is given by
Π퐴푀 =
푥푀
푥푀 + (푛− 1)푥퐸푆푉 휎
퐴
푀푉 − 푥푀 .
And the utility of an arbitrary opponent is
Π퐴ˆ퐸푆푉 =
푥ˆ퐸푆푉
푥푀 + 푥ˆ퐸푆푉 + (푛− 2)푥퐸푆푉 휎
퐴
퐸푆푉 푉 − 푥ˆ퐸푆푉 ,
where 푥ˆ퐸푆푉 denotes the eﬀort the chosen ESV-player exerts.
Accordingly, the ﬁrst order condition of any of the ESV-players is given by
∂Π퐴ˆ퐸푆푉
∂푥ˆ퐸푆푉
=
푥푀 + (푛− 2)푥퐸푆푉
(푥푀 + (푛− 1)푥퐸푆푉 )2휎
퐴
퐸푆푉 푉 − 1 != 0.
Setting this equal to the ﬁrst order condition of the mutant yields
푥푀 =
(푛− 1)휎퐴푀 − (푛− 2)휎퐴퐸푆푉
휎퐴퐸푆푉
푥퐸푆푉 .
It is worthwhile to have a look at the resulting equilibrium eﬀorts invested by the
players:
푥푀 =
(푛− 1)휎퐴푀휎퐴퐸푆푉 푉 ((푛− 1)휎퐴푀 − (푛− 2)휎퐴퐸푆푉 )
((푛− 1)휎퐴푀 + 휎퐴퐸푆푉 )2
,
푥퐸푆푉 =
(푛− 1)휎퐴푀(휎퐴퐸푆푉 )2푉
((푛− 1)휎퐴푀 + 휎퐴퐸푆푉 )2
.
By using the ﬁrst derivatives with respect to the prize perceptions, it is possible to
identify two eﬀects of an increase in the prize perception. The ﬁrst order conditions
are the following:
∂푥퐴푀
∂휎퐴푀
=
(푛− 1)(휎퐴퐸푆푉 )2푉
((푛− 1)휎퐴푀 + 휎퐴퐸푆푉 )3
(
푛(푛− 1)휎퐴푀 − (푛− 2)휎퐴퐸푆푉
)
,
∂푥퐴푀
∂휎퐴퐸푆푉
=
(푛− 1)2(휎퐴푀)2푉
((푛− 1)휎퐴푀 + 휎퐴퐸푆푉 )3
(
(푛− 1)휎퐴푀 − (2푛− 3)휎퐴퐸푆푉
)
,
∂푥퐴퐸푆푉
∂휎퐴퐸푆푉
=
2(푛− 1)2(휎퐴푀)2휎퐴퐸푆푉 푉
((푛− 1)휎퐴푀 + 휎퐴퐸푆푉 )3
,
∂푥퐴퐸푆푉
∂휎퐴푀
=
(푛− 1)(휎퐴퐸푆푉 )2푉
((푛− 1)휎퐴푀 + 휎퐴퐸푆푉 )3
(
휎퐴퐸푆푉 − (푛− 1)휎퐴푀
)
.
If the value the mutant assigned to the prize increases, for example, his invested
eﬀort would rise if 푛(푛− 1)휎퐴푀 > (푛− 2)휎퐴퐸푆푉 . Whereas, if 휎퐴퐸푆푉 < (푛− 1)휎퐴푀 , the
ESV-players would be discouraged and would therefore invest less. The chance of
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winning the contest for an arbitrary ESV-player is rather low. If a mutant invests
more, the contest becomes unattractive and therefore the invested eﬀort decreases.
We term the ﬁrst eﬀect incentive-eﬀect, because a higher valuation for the contested
prize incentivizes the player to act more aggressively. But if a player faces an
opponent with a higher prize perception, then he is discouraged and invests less.
Accordingly, we term this eﬀect discouragement-eﬀect. These two eﬀects are also
present if the prize perception of the ESV-players increases: The ﬁrst derivative of
the eﬀorts invested by the ESV-players with respect to 휎퐴퐸푆푉 is always positive. But
the discouragement-eﬀect on the mutant is only present if (2푛−3)휎퐴퐸푆푉 > (푛−1)휎퐴푀 .
If (푛 − 1)휎퐴푀 < 휎퐴퐸푆푉 , the mutant is encouraged to react with a higher investment
against opponents with an increasing prize perception. The mutant is alone and
wants to survive. If the pressure on him increases from all sides, he can only have
success in evolutionary terms if he can hold the ground. This means, that he has to
invest more eﬀort.
Note that the discouragement-eﬀect vanishes in a symmetric equilibrium in two-
player contests since they cancel out. The mutant is discouraged by the ESV-player
to the same degree he discourages the ESV-player. This is an explanation why this
eﬀect is not present in Section 2.4.1.
We can compute the winning probabilities of the mutant and an arbitrary ESV-
player by using the equilibrium eﬀorts:
푝퐴퐸푆푉 =
휎퐴퐸푆푉
(푛− 1)휎퐴푀 + 휎퐴퐸푆푉
,
푝퐴푀 =
(푛− 1)휎퐴푀 − (푛− 2)휎퐴퐸푆푉
(푛− 1)휎퐴푀 + 휎퐴퐸푆푉
.
Accordingly, the indirect evolutionary ﬁtness of the mutant is given by
퐹퐴푀 =
(푛− 1)휎퐴푀 − (푛− 2)휎퐴퐸푆푉
(푛− 1)휎퐴푀 + 휎퐴퐸푆푉
푉 − (푛− 1)휎
퐴
푀휎
퐴
퐸푆푉 푉 ((푛− 1)휎퐴푀 − (푛− 2)휎퐴퐸푆푉 )
((푛− 1)휎퐴푀 + 휎퐴퐸푆푉 )2
− (푛− 1)
(푁 − 1)
휎퐴퐸푆푉
(푛− 1)휎퐴푀 + 휎퐴퐸푆푉
푉 +
(푛− 1)
(푁 − 1)
(푛− 1)휎퐴푀(휎퐴퐸푆푉 )2푉
((푛− 1)휎퐴푀 + 휎퐴퐸푆푉 )2
.
By deriving the ﬁrst order condition with respect to 휎퐴푀 and setting 휎
퐴
푀 = 휎
퐴
퐸푆푉 = 휎
∗
afterwards, we can calculate the evolutionarily stable prize perception:
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Theorem 2.2: For a ﬁnite population of size N and 푟 = 1, the unique symmet-
ric evolutionarily stable prize perception in a 푛-player contest is given by
휎∗ = 푛(푛−1)푁
푁(푛2−2푛+2)−푛 ; i.e. the evolutionary stable preference function of player 푖=1,...,n
is determined as
Π푖 =
푥푟푖
푥푟푖 + 푥
푟
−푖
(
푛(푛− 1)푁
푁(푛2 − 2푛+ 2)− 푛
)
푉 − 푥푖.
Note that 휎∗ = 푛(푛−1)푁
푁(푛2−2푛+2)−푛 reduces to
푁
푁−1 if 푛 = 2 (Theorem 2.1).
휎∗ is maximal for a population of 푁 individuals if 푛max = 2푁푁+1 +
√
2푁(푁−1)
(푁+1)2
players
are active in the contest. The latter expression converges to 2+
√
2 for 푁 approach-
ing inﬁnity. Accordingly, the evolutionarily stable preference for the contested price
is highest for two-and three-player contests, even within a very large population. To
have three players in the contest already leads to the highest valuation for popula-
tions with more than three individuals. It can be shown that even for an inﬁnite
population the evolutionarily stable valuation is greater than one for three-and four-
player contests. In fact, for 푁 approaching inﬁnity and 푛 = 3 or 푛 = 4, 휎∗ converges
to 6
5
. Even if there is an inﬁnite number of individuals, an overvaluation of the prize
occurs, except for playing the ﬁeld contests. A reason for this is that a player with
a higher prize perception acts more aggressively in the single contest. This behavior
yields an advantage in the contest. And in evolutionary terms, the player can have
an edge over these competitors if he is successful.
Another striking result is that 휎∗ = 푁
푁−1 for playing the ﬁeld contests, i.e. 푁 = 푛
and for contests with only two players. By comparison with 휎∗ from Section 2.4.1,
one can also see that the equilibrium prize perception in contests between more than
two-players is greater than the equilibrium prize perception in two-player contests as
long as 푁 > 푛. In two-player contests no discouragement-eﬀect exists. Accordingly,
a valuation that is higher than 휎 = 푁
푁−1 is not beneﬁcial for a player in a two-player
contest. But as soon as 푛 is higher than 2, the discouragement-eﬀect occurs and a
further increase of 휎 may be beneﬁcial. With a higher prize perception an individ-
ual has a higher chance winning the prize. One reason is that he invests more and
another reason is that the opponents are discouraged and therefore invest less.
To see why it is not beneﬁcial for any player to have a prize perception higher than
푁
푁−1 in a playing the ﬁeld contest, we have a look at the ﬁrst derivative of the
ﬁtness function of the mutant with respect to 휎퐴푀 after we applied the symmetry
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assumption:
0 = 푛(푛− 1)휎21
− (푛2 − 2(푛− 1))휎31
+
푛− 1
푁 − 1푛휎
2
1
− 푛− 1
푁 − 1(푛− 2)휎
3
1.
The ﬁrst line gives the eﬀect of a higher valuation on the winning probability. Of
course, this eﬀect is positive. In the second line the eﬀect on the invested eﬀort is
given. Because more exerted eﬀort leads to higher costs, this eﬀect is negative. The
third line states that a higher prize perception decreases the probability of winning
the contest of an opponent, and is therefore beneﬁcial. The reason for the relatively
low prize perception in playing the ﬁeld contests is shown in the fourth line. It is
true that a higher valuation discourages the opponents. But this eﬀect is not only
beneﬁcial as can be seen in the ﬁtness function. By discouraging the opponents,
their investments are reduced. This means that their costs are lower and therefore
they have more resources left. Accordingly, the eﬀect in the fourth line is negative.
Because this eﬀect is weighted with 푛−1
푁−1 , the loss in ﬁtness due to discouraging the
opponents is the highest in playing the ﬁeld contests.
Lemma 2.2: The material payoﬀ for a player with the evolutionarily stable prize
perception 휎∗ in the equilibrium of a contest of 푛 players with 푟 = 1 is
휋퐴푀 = 휋
퐴
퐸푆푉 = 휋2 =
푁 − 푛
(푁(푛2 − 2푛+ 2)− 푛)
푉
푛
.
The utility in equilibrium is given by
푈퐴푀 = 푈
퐴
퐸푆푉 = 푈2 =
(푛− 1)
푛
푁
푁(푛2 − 2푛+ 2)− 푛푉.
The equilibrium eﬀort invested is
푥퐴푀 = 푥
퐴
퐸푆푉 = 푥2 =
(푛− 1)2푁
푛푁(푛2 − 2푛+ 2)− 푛2푉.
Note that the material payoﬀ is zero for playing the ﬁeld contests and positive
otherwise. Again, the intrinsic value makes the individuals spend as much as the
prize is worth objectively. The reason why it is not beneﬁcial to spend even more is
given by the fact that this leads to a negative ﬁtness. The utility is always positive
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and greater than the material payoﬀ. The reason for this is the evolutionarily stable
prize perception, i.e. even if the ﬁtness is negative, the utility can be positive. An
individual may feel happy even if the opponents are more successful. In a ﬁnite
population, 휎∗ is strictly greater than one. Accordingly, it is beneﬁcial to overvalue
the contested prize within a ﬁnite population. On the one hand it makes an agent
“happy” because he believes that he has more in expectation and on the other hand
he acts more aggressively and hurts the opponents more than he hurts himself.
Another important result is that the eﬀorts invested in equilibrium are falling in 푛
and 푁 . This holds for all but one case. The eﬀort invested by an arbitrary player
in a three-player contest is higher than in a two-player contest. Individuals in a
contest are concerned with the size of the population and the number of opponents.
Holding the number of opponents in the contest constant and increasing the number
of individuals in the population always reduces the invested eﬀort. The smaller is
the number of players in the contest compared to the number of individuals in the
population, the smaller is the share of the population you can beat in this particular
contest. This makes saving resources compared to a smaller population worthwhile.
If we add a player to a given contest within a population with a determined number
of individuals, there are two eﬀects. On the one hand an additional player can be
beaten and therefore a victory becomes more important from an evolutionary point
of view. This increases the investment by a player. On the other hand an additional
player invests and therefore winning becomes less likely. This eﬀect decreases the
investment of a player. In equilibrium the latter eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst one for
contests with at least three players; i.e. only in two player contests the equilibrium
investment per player increases, if an additional player is added.
2.5 푛-player contests with 푟 ≤ 1
The assumption of 푟 = 1 is relaxed now. Accordingly, the utility of the mutant is
given by
Π퐶푀 =
(푥퐶푀)
푟
(푥퐶푀)
푟 + (푛− 1)(푥퐶퐸푆푉 )푟
휎퐶푀푉 − 푥퐶푀 .
It is rather diﬃcult to ﬁnd the evolutionarily stable prize perception analytically.
But it is possible to state the following:
Theorem 2.3: The evolutionarily stable prize perception without discouragement-
eﬀect is given by
휎퐶 =
푁
푁 − 1 .
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Proof: Suppose that we are in a symmetric situation with 푛 arbitrary players,
out of a population of size 푁 , playing a given contest. The players do not diﬀer
with respect to their prize perception. This common prize perception is denoted by
휎.
The utility of player ℎ, ℎ = 1, ..., 푛, is given by
Πℎ =
푥푟ℎ
푛∑
푖=1
푥푟푖
휎푉 − 푥ℎ.
Because of the symmetric situation, the ﬁrst order condition with respect to 푥ℎ
reduces to
푛2푥2푟 = (푛− 1)푟푥2푟−1휎푉.
Accordingly, the equilibrium eﬀort is given by 푥∗ = 푛−1
푛2
푟휎푉 .
Now suppose that we have two types of players. The type is determined by the
prize perception. A player of type 1 has a valuation of 휎˜ for the prize, and a player
of type 2 has a valuation of 휎ˆ. We have one player of type 1 and (푛 − 1) players
of type 2. The player of type 1 believes that he is in a symmetric situation, i.e.
that the other players are also of type 1. Accordingly, his invested eﬀort is given by
푥1 =
(푛−1)
푛2
푟휎˜푉 . A type 2 player also believes that he is only facing type 2 players.
His invested eﬀort is given by 푥2 =
(푛−1)
푛2
푟휎ˆ푉 .
By employing this assumption, we can exclude the discouragement-eﬀect because
the investment of any player depends solely on his prize perception. An increase in
valuation only increases the eﬀort invested by this particular player, but it does not
alter the eﬀorts spent by any other player because they still believe that they are in
a symmetric situation.
Subsequently, we can calculate the material payoﬀs
푓1 =
(휎˜)푟
(푛− 1)(휎ˆ)푟 + (휎˜)푟푉 −
(푛− 1)
푛2
푟휎˜푉,
푓2 =
(휎ˆ)푟
(푛− 1)(휎ˆ)푟 + (휎˜)푟푉 −
(푛− 1)
푛2
푟휎ˆ푉.
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Accordingly, the indirect ﬁtness function of the type 1 player is
퐹1 =
(휎˜)푟
(푛− 1)(휎ˆ)푟 + (휎˜)푟푉 −
(푛− 1)
푛2
푟휎˜푉
− (푛− 1)
(푁 − 1)
(
(휎ˆ)푟
(푛− 1)(휎ˆ)푟 + (휎˜)푟푉 −
(푛− 1)
푛2
푟휎ˆ푉
)
.
Since we are searching for a symmetric solution, we substitute 휎˜ and 휎ˆ by 휎¯ in the
ﬁrst order condition:
1
푛2
=
푁
푁 − 1
휎¯2푟−1
푛2휎¯2푟
.
Therefore we can state that the evolutionarily stable prize perception without the
discouragement-eﬀect is given by 휎¯ = 푁
푁−1 .
■
We have seen in Section 2.4.2 that an increase in the prize perception of one player
increases the eﬀort invested by that particular player and also decreases the eﬀorts
invested by any other player, except in two-player contests. Without the second
eﬀect the evolutionarily stable valuation in a Tullock contest is given by 푁
(푁−1) . But
by incorporating the second eﬀect, even higher prize perceptions can be evolution-
arily stable. Accordingly, it is purely the discouragement-eﬀect which varies and
determines the evolutionarily stable prize perception. Making a mistake changes
the own behavior, but it also has an eﬀect on the opponents. This can help to make
the mistake to be persistent, to become more severe, or make an even bigger mistake
evolutionarily stable. In this model a prize perception of more than one leads to
an advantage in the contest. On the one hand because it induces more aggressive
behavior, but on the other hand because the opponents are deterred. By natural
selection, this may lead to even higher prize perceptions.
2.6 Comparison
2.6.1 Direct evolutionary approach
Schaﬀer (1988) showed that it is not evolutionarily stable to be an absolute payoﬀ
maximizer in a ﬁnite population. Only if the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
- as proposed by Maynard Smith (1973)- is employed by a player, then he is able
to compete with the other individuals in the population. Evolution takes place on
the level of strategies. If a player uses a new strategy and is more successful than
the other players in the population, then this strategy is imitated and becomes the
predominant strategy. This movement stops if the ESS is used by any player. To
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derive the ESS in the given contest, suppose that we have one mutant. We also have
(푛 − 1) players that already use the ESS. ESS-players and the mutant are playing
the Tullock-contest with 푟 ≤ 1. The mutant’s material payoﬀ is given by
푓퐷푀 =
푥푟푀
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푆
푉 − 푥퐷푀 .
As opposed to this, the payoﬀ of an arbitrary ESS-player is given by
푓퐷퐸푆푆 =
푥푟퐸푆푆
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푆
푉 − 푥퐸푆푆.
The equilibrium condition for 푥퐸푆푆 being an evolutionarily stable strategy according
to Schaﬀer (1988) is
푓퐷푀 ≤ 푓퐷퐸푆푆, for any strategy 푥퐷푀 .
Accordingly, the problem for the mutant’s strategy is max
푥퐷푀
(푓퐷푀 − 푓퐷퐸푆푆). Which can
be written as
max
푥퐷푀
{
푥푟푀
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푆
푉 − 푥푀 − (푛− 1)
(푁 − 1)
(
푥푟퐸푆푆
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푆
푉 − 푥퐸푆푆
)}
.
The solution for this problem is given by 푥푀 = 푥퐸푆푆 and the corresponding max-
imum is zero. It is evolutionarily stable to act as if the preferences are given by a
weighted relative payoﬀ. A striking result is that in ﬁnite populations the ESS is a
deviation from the Nash equilibrium strategy.
Note that the stability condition used by Schaﬀer (1988) is omitted here due to
simplicity.
The probability that the mutant does not win the contest
is given by
(
1− 푥푟푀
푥푟푀+(푛−1)푥푟퐸푆푆
)
. Accordingly, the objective function of the mutant
can be rewritten as
Π퐷푀 =
푥푟푀
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푆
푉 − 푥푀
− (푛− 1)
(푁 − 1)
(
1
(푛− 1)
(
1− 푥
푟
푀
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푆
))
푉 +
(푛− 1)
(푁 − 1)푥퐸푆푆.
Which reduces to
Π퐷푀 =
푥푟푀
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푆
푁
(푁 − 1)푉 − 푥푀 +
1
(푁 − 1)((푛− 1)푥퐸푆푆 − 푉 ).
We can immediately state the following:
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Theorem 2.4: The direct evolutionary approach and the indirect evolutionary ap-
proach that is concerned with prize perceptions are only equivalent in the behavior
they predict for two-player and playing the ﬁeld contests in ﬁnite populations.
The evolutionarily stable prize perception for two-player and playing the ﬁeld con-
tests is given by 푁
푁−1 . This is exactly the weight the direct evolutionary approach
“puts” on the prize (implicitly) as can be seen by having a look at Π퐷푀 . “Puts” is
put in quotation marks here, because the direct evolutionary approach just predicts
that it is evolutionarily stable to weight the contested prize with this factor.
1
(푁−1)((푛− 1)푥퐸푆푆 − 푉 ) in Π퐷푀 is independent of the eﬀort invested by the mutant.
This term therefore has no inﬂuence on the investment choice of the M-player. That
leads to the same ﬁrst order condition the indirect evolutionary approach would
predict. And therefore the eﬀort chosen in the Nash equilibrium of the indirect
evolutionary approach and the ESS-strategy are the same.
The reason why the direct evolutionary approach can be transformed is that any
player accounts for the part of the prize he is supposed to win and additionally the
share of the prize the opponents do not get. This relation is described by Leininger
(2003). He compared Nash equilibrium behavior in a transfer contest to ﬁnite pop-
ulation ESS-behavior in a contest. He found that both are identical. In a transfer
contest individuals care for the expected payoﬀ of the opponents because they have
to pay them in expectation. And in an evolutionary equilibrium the players care for
their opponents’ payoﬀ because they have to beat them to have a higher ﬁtness. It
is also obvious why this case creates the same behavior in the evolutionary equilib-
rium as the indirect evolutionary approach concerning prize perceptions without the
discouragement-eﬀect suggests. The prize perception is determined to be 푁
푁−1 , the
opponent cannot be discouraged by a high valuating opponent because they all have
the same prize perception. Accordingly, the material payoﬀs in the two-player and
the playing the ﬁeld case are identical in equilibrium for both approaches. However,
when the discouragement-eﬀect is at work (for 2 < 푛 < 푁), the two approaches
predict diﬀerent behavior: For 푟 = 1 and 2 ≤ 푛 ≤ 푁 , the material payoﬀ of an arbi-
trary player is 푓퐷 =
(
(푁−푛)
푛2(푁−1)푉
)
. This material payoﬀ is greater than the material
payoﬀ in the indirect evolutionary approach using prize perceptions for 2 < 푛 < 푁 ,
because the higher valuation makes the players act more aggressively. Nevertheless,
the “utility” is smaller in the direct evolutionary approach unless overdissipation
occurs, since 1
(푁−1)((푛 − 1)푥퐸푆푆 − 푉 ) is negative otherwise. The reason for that is
that the prize perception is smaller.
33
2.6.2 Indirect evolutionary approach according to
Leininger (2009)
As stated above, Leininger (2009) argued that the preferences about the opponent’s
expected payoﬀ can act as stimuli. Only the preferences about the opponent’s
expected payoﬀ that make the player choose the most successful strategy will survive
in the long run. Suppose that 푛 players, drawn out of a population of 푁 individuals,
are chosen to play a contest with 푟 ≤ 1 for the prize 푉 . Note that Leininger (2009)
only considers two-player contests with 푟 = 1. We assume that 푛 − 1 players are
concerned with the evolutionarily stable preferences (ESP) and that only one mutant
has a diﬀerent preference function. Because the non-mutants are all alike, we assume
that the preferences of the mutant do not depend on the non-mutant he is facing in
the contest, i.e. he treats them all alike. We also assume that the preferences of any
ESP-player stay the same for any opponent he is facing in the contest. Accordingly,
if the mutant was chosen to play the contest, his utility is given by
Π퐿푀 =
푥푟푀
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푃
푉 − 푥푀 − (푛− 1)훿푀
(
푥푟퐸푆푃
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푃
푉 − 푥퐸푆푃
)
.
Where 훿푀 ∈ [−1, 1] denotes the preferences of the mutant about the expected payoﬀ
of an arbitrary ESP-player. If 훿푀 < 0, he is an altruistic player, he is an individu-
alistic player for 훿푀 = 0 and a spiteful player otherwise. The evolutionary process
works on the level of preferences about the opponents’ expected payoﬀ and operates
in the interval [−1, 1]. The ESP is given by 훿∗.
It is possible to state the following:
Lemma 2.3: Concerning the evolutionarily stable preferences and the evolution-
arily stable prize perception 휎∗, it always holds that
휎∗ = (1 + 훿∗).
Proof: The probability that the contest is won by an ESP-player is given by
1 − 푥푟푀
푥푟푀+(푛−1)푥푟퐸푆푃 . Because they are all alike, the probability for one ESP-player
is 1
푛−1 times the latter expression. Accordingly, the utility function of the mutant
can be rewritten as
Π퐿푀 =
푥푟푀
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푃
푉 − 푥푀
− (푛− 1)훿
(
1
(푛− 1)
(
1− 푥
푟
푀
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푃
)
푉 − 푥퐸푆푃
)
.
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After solving the brackets we get
Π퐿푀 =
푥푟푀
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푃
푉 − 푥푀 − 훿푉 + 푥
푟
푀
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푃
훿푉 + (푛− 1)훿푥퐸푆푃 ,
which reduces to
푈퐿푀 =
푥푟푀
푥푟푀 + (푛− 1)푥푟퐸푆푃
(1 + 훿)푉 − 푥푀 + 훿((푛− 1)푥퐸푆푃 − 푉 ).
Substitute (1 + 훿) by 휎퐶푀 . The only diﬀerences to the utility function Π
퐶
푀 from
section 2.4.3 are (푛 − 1)훿푥퐸푆푃 and −훿푉 . These two terms are independent of the
eﬀorts invested by the mutant, and have therefore no inﬂuence on the decision of
the mutant.2 Accordingly, both indirect evolutionary approaches lead to identical
ﬁrst order conditions and therefore to no diﬀerence in behavior by the players in the
Nash equilibrium of the contest.
■
It is straightforward to show that
Theorem 2.5: Both indirect evolutionary approaches are equivalent in the behavior
they predict in the Nash equilibrium of the contest.
This theorem shows that the indirect evolutionary approach concerning preferences
about the opponents’ payoﬀs, which works on the interval [−1, 1] can be transformed
into the indirect evolutionary approach that is concerned with price perceptions and
that works on the interval [0, 2]. The intuition behind the fact that interdependent
preferences can be transformed is that any player does not only take account of
the share of the prize he might get but also of the prize the opponents do not get.
This means the contest is played for a quasi-prize that is greater than the objective
value. In the indirect evolutionary approach concerning prize perceptions this eﬀect
is internalized by the higher prize perception.
That theorem also suggests, for example, that a perfectly altruistic player (훿 = −1)
in the approach of Leininger (2009) is equivalent to a player with a prize perception
of zero in the second indirect approach. Both players will invest nothing. The player
in the ﬁrst approach will do so because he does not want to harm the opponent, and
the player in the second approach does not want to pay anything for the prize.
Calculating the evolutionarily stable values for the two-player and for the 푛-player
case with 푟 = 1 yields the following:
2Note that we can employ the same type of analysis for any of the ESP-players.
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Lemma 2.4: In the evolutionary equilibrium of a two-player contest with 푟 ≤ 1
the payoﬀ of the opponent is weighted by
훿1 = 휎
∗ − 1 = 1
푁 − 1 .
Accordingly, the material payoﬀ and the utility of any player is given by
푓퐿1 =
2푁 − 2− 푟푁
4(푁 − 1) 푉,
and Π퐿1 =
(푁 − 2)(2푁 − 2− 푟푁)
4(푁 − 1)2 푉, respectively.
Contrary to this, in the evolutionary equilibrium of a contest between 푛 players and
푟 = 1 the payoﬀ of the opponent is weighted by
훿2 = 휎
∗
1 − 1 =
푛푁 + 푛− 2푁
푁(푛2 − 2푛+ 2)− 푛.
Accordingly, the material payoﬀ and the utility of any player in equilibrium is given
by
푓퐿2 =
(푁 − 푛)
(푁(푛2 − 2푛+ 2)− 푛)
푉
푛
,
and Π퐿2 =
(푁 − 푛)2
(푁(푛2 − 2푛+ 2)− 푛)푉, respectively.
As induced by Theorem 2.5, both approaches yield the same material payoﬀ for
the players because their behavior does not change3. The only diﬀerence is that the
utilities in both approaches diﬀer. It can be shown that the utility for any player
is always higher in the indirect evolutionary approach used in section 2.4, for both
cases. One reason is that they believe that the value of the prize is higher than
it actually is. Another reason is that the material payoﬀ of the opponent is not
included in their preference function.
In both approaches the individuals invest the same eﬀort, but they are supposed to
be happier in the approach that assigns an additional value to the prize. Pointing
to this result, a soccer-trainer in Germany recently said, “Ich glaube nicht daran,
dass die Angst vor dem Verlieren dich eher zu einem Sieger macht als die Lust auf
Gewinnen.” (Ju¨rgen Klopp)
That means “I don’t believe that the fear of losing makes you become a winner more
3The equilibrium eﬀorts have already been computed in sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.
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easily than the desire to win.”
The fear of losing is the approach of Leininger (2009). The fear is incorporated by
the negative weight on the payoﬀ of the opponents. The desire to win is given by
the higher prize perception. You do not care for the payoﬀ of the opponents. The
only thing that matters is to win.
2.7 Conclusion
We asked whether it is beneﬁcial in evolutionary terms to overvalue the prize in a
Tullock contest or not. We ﬁnd that this is indeed the case. Because of a higher valu-
ation for the contested prize, the players invest more and the opponents are discour-
aged and exert less eﬀort. Accordingly, we named these two eﬀects incentive-eﬀect
and discouragement-eﬀect. Both eﬀects make overvaluation evolutionarily stable.
The discouragement-eﬀect is only at work in contests between more than two play-
ers but not in playing the ﬁeld contests. Even without the discouragement-eﬀect
overvaluation does occur in ﬁnite populations. Without the discouragement-eﬀect
overvaluation is not evolutionarily stable in an inﬁnite population. But if this eﬀect
is at work, then overvaluation can be evolutionarily stable even in an inﬁnite popu-
lation. This is especially true for three- and four-player contests.
Subsequently, we compared the indirect evolutionary approach concerning prize
perceptions to the direct evolutionary approach and to the indirect evolutionary
approach according to Leininger (2009). We ﬁnd that all three approaches predict
the same behavior for two-player contests and for playing the ﬁeld contests. The
direct evolutionary approach and the indirect evolutionary approach that introduces
preferences about the opponents’ payoﬀs implicitly put a weight on the contested
prize. In the direct evolutionary approach the implicit prize valuation is constant.
This constant prize perception is equal to the prize perception in the indirect evo-
lutionary approach concerning prize valuations without the discouragement-eﬀect.
Accordingly, both approaches do not diﬀer in the behavior they predict in the equi-
librium of two-player and playing the ﬁeld contests. In a two player contest both
players get discouraged by a high prize perception to the same amount they dis-
courage the opponent. In playing the ﬁeld contests the discouragement-eﬀect raises
the costs of a higher prize perception to such an amount that the players only act
as aggressively as in the direct evolutionary approach. All other opponents exert
less eﬀort if the prize perception is high. But because there are many players, the
probability of winning changes only slightly. Since the opponents save eﬀort and
therefore have more resources to spend, the evolutionary costs for the high valuat-
ing player rises. The material payoﬀ in the direct evolutionary approach is higher
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because of the less aggressive behavior.
We also show that for contests that have more than two players and that are not
playing the ﬁeld the behavior predicted by the indirect approaches is more aggres-
sive. This is due to the discouragement-eﬀect.
The indirect evolutionary approach according to Leininger (2009) predicts ex-
actly the same aggressive behavior in the Nash equilibrium of the contest as the
indirect evolutionary approach using prize perceptions because the weights on the
prizes are identical. The implicit weight is not ﬁxed. Therefore this weight is al-
lowed to evolve evolutionarily and in equilibrium amounts to the same amount as
in the new indirect evolutionary approach. Accordingly, the material payoﬀs are
the same. Only the utility of the players diﬀers. In the indirect evolutionary ap-
proach according to Leininger (2009) the utility is smaller as long as we do not face
overdissipation. The reason for this is that the material payoﬀ of the opponent is
not subtracted and that the prize is overvalued. The individuals feel better because
of their desire to win and they are not depressed by their fear of losing.
We are able to calculate the result for more than two players and for decreasing
marginal eﬃciency of eﬀort only if we control for the discouragement-eﬀect. It would
shed some light on the relations in perceived utility between direct and indirect
evolutionary approach if we could ﬁnd an equilibrium for that case. It also might
be interesting whether the result changes if the non-mutants treat the mutants
diﬀerently from the way they treat a player that has the same preferences he has.
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Chapter 3
Equilibrium contracts in
two-player Tullock contests
3.1 Introduction
Since Shelling wrote “The Strategy of Conﬂict”(1960), strategic delegation is an
important topic in economic research. By using a contract a delegate is hired to
act on behalf of a principal. The behavior of the agent is inﬂuenced directly by the
chosen terms of the contract. Accordingly, the principal can inﬂuence the outcome
of a game in his favor, if he chooses an appropriate contract. Delegation is also an
important issue in human society. Firm owners hire managers, lawyers are hired
to act in lawsuits or employees are sent to negotiations to act on behalf of their
employer. There are many reasons for delegation. The agent may be more skilled,
as stated by Baik and Kim (1997), or the agent may have more instruments that
he can use compared to the principal, as explained by Schoonbeek (2007). Oppor-
tunity costs or better information of the agent also act as explanations. Delegation
may even be required by law. Another interesting point compared to Chapter 2
is that delegation is not present in animal populations. Delegation is therefore a
pure invention of humans. This Chapter will show whether delegation can decrease
wasteful expenditures. This is one explanation for why delegation has been invented.
In economics, delegation is often used in contests. In contests, delegation is able
to reduce the eﬀort made, as is shown by Wa¨rneryd (2000) for two-player Tullock
rent-seeking contests by using no-win-no-pay contracts. The agent has to be paid
and the principal also wants to get a part of the desired prize. Accordingly, the
contested prize has to be split up and therefore the incentives for both are smaller
compared to the incentives of a principal playing the contest on his own behalf. But
if principal and agent do not diﬀer, for example in their abilities, then no principal
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would voluntarily choose to delegate. The principal would always have a higher
probability of winning and therefore a higher expected payoﬀ in a contest due to
the higher incentives. Accordingly, mandatory delegation is assumed by Wa¨rneryd
(2000).
We also use a two-player Tullock contest for a given and indivisible prize in this
chapter. The prize has the same value to both players. It is assumed that agents
and principals are risk neutral. The eﬀort made by the agent is not revealed to the
principal. This gives rise to moral hazard. But it will be shown that moral hazard
can be neutralized by choosing an appropriate contract. Mandatory delegation is
assumed, but it is shown that it is possible to relax this assumption. By choosing an
appropriate contract, the incentives for the agent can be increased to the same level
a principal, acting on his own, is incentivized with. Konrad (2009) assumed that the
eﬀort choice of the agent is revealed to the principal. Using this assumption, he de-
rives that the principal can also incentivize his agent to the extent he is incentivized
with. But, as we will show, it is not even necessary to know the investment of the
agent. Also, selling the right to participate is no preferred option in this article.
Baik (2007) showed that no-win-no-pay contracts are optimal for hiring an agent if
the eﬀort made by the agent is unobservable for the principal. In this paper it is
shown that a no-win-no-pay contract is only one representative of a broader class
of contracts and that Baik (2007) has not examined all possible types of contracts.
Baik (2007) showed that principals only use a part of the prize to pay the agent
and do not use ﬁxed payments. In this chapter, we assume that principals oﬀer a
payment contingent on the prize in case of victory, but they also implement a ﬁne
that is also contingent on the prize if the agent loses the contest. A game structure
similar to the prisoners’ dilemma prevents moral hazard on part of the agents. The
ﬁne is included to meet the idea of contractual penalties. Penalties are often used
in contracts in everyday life to ensure a desired behavior by the contract partners.
But in the theory of contests, this type of contract parameter was excluded so far.
In a contest, the contestants ﬁght against each other to gain the desired prize. A
defeat in this contest is an unwanted result because you have costs and your oppo-
nent a gain. In a delegation scenario a ﬁne represents the wish of the principal not
to lose. This wish can be transferred to the agent through a ﬁne. The reward and
the ﬁne may be bounded, in order to represent contractual law or common rules in
contracting.
If no ﬁne is used, the setting of Baik (2007) results. To the best of my knowledge,
these kind of contracts have been introduced by Harris and Raviv (1979). The con-
tracts are called dichotomous contracts and they are used in a monitoring model.
The contract consists of two branches. If the action of the agent is acceptable for
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the principal, then the agent is paid according to a predetermined schedule. But if
the action is found to be unacceptable, the agent receives a less preferred payment
or he may be dismissed. A signal that may be correlated to the eﬀort invested by
the agent is used to judge whether the action is acceptable or not. In this chapter
the signal is the outcome of the contest, i.e. who is the winner. If the contest is
won, the agent is rewarded; otherwise the agent is punished. Introducing a ﬁne is
quite common in real life, either directly or indirectly. Yubitsume in Japan is a very
good example. This ritual is mainly performed by the Yakuza. To apologize for
disappointing or oﬀending one’s principal, a member amputates parts of his ﬁngers.
This weakens the members ability to ﬁght. Because of his weakness, the ties be-
tween principal and agent become stronger. We also mentioned the “contracts” the
Islamic State uses to contract his soldiers. A situation without enforceable property
rights may also lead to such contracts.
But also in legal sectors such dichotomous contracts may be used. To show this, we
will refer back to contractual penalties. There is a well-known example for such a
penalty in Germany. The government delegated the introduction of the toll system
in Germany to a group of ﬁrms (Toll Collect). The contract also deﬁned a ﬁne for
Toll Collect. And indeed Toll Collect had to pay this ﬁne, because the ﬁrms were
not able to get the system started on time. The ﬁne stood for the forgone tolls for
the government’s budget.
Another example is a lawyer who loses an important lawsuit. He may not be hired
again and even other individuals may refrain from hiring him. The forgone future
earnings act as an implicit ﬁne.
By using a ﬁne, the incentives for the agent can be increased. Accordingly, by choos-
ing an appropriate contract, a principal can induce more invested eﬀort on part of
the agent and therefore more aggressive behavior than by using a no-win-no-pay
contract.
It is shown that no-win-no-pay contracts are not chosen in equilibrium and that it
is possible to incentivize an agent by contracting to the same extent the principal
himself is incentivized with. Accordingly, a reduction in eﬀort by sending a delegate
cannot be observed if the set of contracts is not limited. By prescribing the contracts
to use, i.e. by forbidding Yubitsume, the legislator can reduce wasteful expenditures.
Concerning Yubitsume, one has to admit that it is still used although it is illegal to
force an agent to do this. One explanation for the usage is that it proved to be an
eﬀective mean to encourage the agents, even if the use is sentenced. Additionally,
other contractual penalties are quiet common in real life, which is another hint that
they proved to be useful.
The inﬂuence of a limited ﬁne and reward is explained. Selling the right to partic-
ipate is excluded in this setting. But it is described how this assumption changes
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the results.
Leininger (2009) showes that in ﬁnite populations interdependent preferences yield
an advantage. In such populations hurting oneself in order to hurt the opponent
even more may be a good idea. This is also a topic in economics, as the Uralkali
example shows. Also Uralkali hurts itself to get rid of some of the competitors. An-
other example is given by a divorce battle. Both parties want to get more than the
opponent. In the latter example mandatory delegation is prescribed in Germany.
It is not immediately clear whether interdependent preferences change the chosen
contract by the principal or not. On the one hand, the principal wants to transfer
his preferences on the delegate, but on the other hand, the agent is only interested
in his material payoﬀ. If an evolutionary setting is employed, an important question
can be asked: Will the delegates also have interdependent preferences? This topic
is also addressed. In this chapter, the inﬂuence of interdependent preferences of the
agents on the chosen contracts by principals with independent preferences is also
considered. Whether the results of this model diﬀer or not is also explained.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we set up the model. Af-
terwards the game is solved using Baik’s (2007) no-win-no-pay contracts and the
contracts using a ﬁne. In section 3.4 the model is solved for a limited ﬁne and a
limited reward. Section 3.5.1 deals with the inﬂuence of interdependent preference
on the side of the principals on the chosen contract and 3.5.2 is concerned with
agents with interdependent preferences. The conclusion is given in section 3.6.
3.2 The Model
Two risk neutral players are chosen to play a contest for the exogenously given,
indivisible, and strictly positive prize 푉 . The players are named principal one and
principal two. Each player has to choose an agent that plays the contest for him. We
assume that there is perfect competition on the labor market. The reservation wage
is normalized to zero. Accordingly, their participation constraint is met as long as
their wage is in expectation non-negative. This also means that the contested prize
is always greater than the reservation wage, otherwise delegation would be excluded
by the principals. The agents and the principals do not diﬀer in any detail except
that the principals can hire the delegates. Principals and agents are only interested
in their material payoﬀ.
The game has two stages. At stage one both principals hire a delegate. Katz (1991)
showed that it does not matter whether the terms of the contract are observable or
not. At stage two the agents put in irreversible eﬀort to win the prize 푉 . The unit
costs of eﬀort are constant and are given by one for any player. To hire a delegate
at stage one, both principals determine the share they want to pay to the delegate
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if he wins and the share the agent is ﬁned with if he is defeated (the contractual
penalty). The penalty and the oﬀered share may be limited. This extension is dis-
cussed in Section 3.4. The principal does not have the possibility to sell the right of
participating.
The share of the contested prize, paid by principal one if his agent wins, is given by
훼1 ∈ [0, 1]. The share demanded, if his agent is not successful, is given by 훼2 ∈ [0, 1].
For simplicity it is assumed that both shares are not greater than one. Nevertheless,
if both shares are used, it is possible to incentivize the delegate with an amount
greater than the contested prize. The corresponding shares used by principal two
are 훽푖 ∈ [0, 1], 푖 = 1, 2. Note that we make no assumption concerning the relative size
of the shares, i.e. whether for principal one it holds that 훼1 > 훼2 or not, for example.
Both principals are aware of the fact that their agent’s expected payoﬀ must be
non-negative, i.e. that the reward for a victory is high enough to make the agents
willing to sign the contract, even if they have to pay a contractual penalty and the
costs of the eﬀort made when they are not successful.
The model of Baik results, if 훽2 = 훼2 = 0.
The eﬀort invested by the agent of principal one is given by 푑1. The corresponding
eﬀort of the second delegate is given by 푑2. The winner of the contest is determined
by using the well-known Tullock contest success function with 푟 ≤ 2. Accordingly,
the probability that the delegate of player one wins the contest is given by
푝1 =
⎧⎨⎩12 for 푑1 + 푑2 = 0,푑푟1
(푑푟1+푑
푟
2)
for 푑1 + 푑2 > 0.
After both agents put in their eﬀorts, the winner is determined and the prize is
handed out. In Chapter 2 푟 has to be smaller or equal to one because a higher 푟
could lead to negative material payoﬀs. The reason is the more aggressive behavior
induced by the negatively interdependent preferences. But in this chapter the indi-
viduals act not as aggressively as they do in Chapter 2. Accordingly, 푟 can rise to
values smaller or equal to two.
The game is solved by using backward induction. Both principals think about
how the behavior of the agents at stage two is aﬀected by the parameters of the
contract. If they know the relation between contract and behavior, both principals
can choose their preferred contract, contingent on the contract of the opponent, at
stage one. The equilibrium is reached if no principal wants to change a parameter
of the contract, for given parameters of the opponent.
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We start at the second stage. The agent of principal one maximizes
휋퐷1 =
푑푟1
(푑푟1 + 푑
푟
2)
훼1푉 −
(
1− 푑
푟
1
(푑푟1 + 푑
푟
2)
)
훼2푉 − 푑1.
By calculating the ﬁrst order condition with respect to 푑1 and setting it equal to
zero, it results
(푑푟1 + 푑
푟
2)
2 = (훼1 + 훼2)푑
푟−1
1 푑
푟
2푟푉. (3.1)
Calculating the ﬁrst order condition of the second delegate, and setting both condi-
tions equal afterwards, yields
푑2 =
훽1 + 훽2
훼1 + 훼2
푑1.
The eﬀort invested by an agent in equilibrium depends on the sum of both shares.
The relation of the sum of both shares of both principals determines which delegate
invests more; i.e. the agent with the higher total incentive also invests more.
To ﬁnd the equilibrium eﬀort levels, this condition is plugged into (3.1), it results
Lemma 3.1: The equilibrium eﬀorts of the agents contingent on the oﬀered shares
are given by
푑1 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟+1(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푟푉,
푑2 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟(훽1 + 훽2)
푟+1
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푟푉.
Accordingly, the probability that the agent of principal one wins the prize is given
by
푝1 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)
and analogously for the agent of principal two
푝2 =
(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)
.
It can be seen from the eﬀort made that any agent is incentivized by the sum
of both shares. A delegate considers the amount he gets if he wins, and he also
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pays attention to the share he has to pay if he loses. By implementing a ﬁne, a
principal can induce more aggressive behavior. If the contest is lost, then the agent
has a negative payoﬀ because he has to pay the ﬁne and has to bear the costs of the
invested eﬀort. It is assumed that the stake of any agent is suﬃcient to pay the ﬁne.
If the contest is won, then the payoﬀ for the agent is positive. Baik (2007) explained
that no-win-no-pay contracts are optimal because the agent is incentivized by the
diﬀerence in payment between winning and losing. This diﬀerence is maximized
by no-win-no-pay contracts if no payment takes place if the agent is defeated. By
introducing a ﬁne, the diﬀerence can be increased even further. An employee, for
example, acts more committed if his job is on the line.
3.3 Equilibrium contracts
To analyze the implications of all parts of the contract, the analysis is split up. In
the ﬁrst subsection no ﬁne is allowed. That means 훼2 = 훽2 = 0. Since this connotes
that only no-win-no-pay contracts are used, the subsection is named that way.
Afterwards, a ﬁne is allowed for but the participation constraint is not considered.
In the last subsection the principal uses both parts of the contract and designs
contracts that the agent is willing to sign. This subsection contains the equilibrium
contract for the game speciﬁed above. Without loss of generality, we concentrate on
principal one.
3.3.1 No-win-no-pay contracts
If an agent wins, then his principal gets the contested prize. But the principal has
to pay the share speciﬁed in the contract to his delegate. If the agent loses, he gets
paid nothing. Accordingly, the expected payoﬀ for principal one is given by
휋푃1 = 푝1(1− 훼1)푉 = 훼
푟
1
(훼푟1 + 훽
푟
1)
(1− 훼1)푉.
Calculating the ﬁrst order condition and setting 훼1 = 훽1 afterwards, because we are
looking for a symmetric solution, yields the contract used in Nash equilibrium:
훼1 = 훽1 =
푟
2 + 푟
.
It can be established
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Lemma 3.2: If only no-win-no-pay contracts are allowed, the eﬀorts invested
and payoﬀs achieved in equilibrium are given by
푑1 = 푑2 =
푟2
(2 + 푟)
푉
4
,
휋푃1 = 휋푃2 =
푉
(2 + 푟)
,
휋퐷1 = 휋퐷2 =
(2− 푟)
(2 + 푟)
푟푉
4
.
By using no-win-no-pay contracts, the principal oﬀers a share of the prize to the
delegate that is suﬃcient to endow him with an expected payoﬀ that is non negative.
The expected payoﬀ is strictly positive as long as 푟 < 2. The oﬀered share is
always smaller than 1
2
. Note that the eﬀorts made are smaller than in the case
without mandatory delegation. Accordingly, the payoﬀs for the principals are higher
compared to not hiring a delegate1. Another result is that the expected payoﬀ of the
principal is always higher than the expected payoﬀ of his delegate. The principal
has the initial right to participate in the contest and therefore he beneﬁts the most.
This is ensured formally by the fact that he knows how the agent reacts to the share
oﬀered. He can use the share most useful to him.
3.3.2 Equilibrium contracts without participation constraint
Now suppose that the principal can use a ﬁne. This ﬁne has to be paid by the agent if
the contest is lost. This can be seen as an insurance against losing. The participation
constraint is not taken into account here. That means that the expected payoﬀ of
the delegate may be negative. The purpose of this section is to show which tool
is preferred by the principal if he does not have to ensure that the participation
constraint is fulﬁlled.
The payoﬀ of principal one is given by
휋푃1 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)
(1− 훼1)푉 + (훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)
훼2푉.
By using the ﬁrst derivatives, it is possible to show
1For a detailed interpretation, see Baik (2007) and Wa¨rneryd (2000).
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Lemma 3.3: The Nash equilibrium in the contract game without participation
constraint is given by
훼1 = 훽1 = 0 and
훼2 = 훽2 = 1.
Proof:
The payoﬀ of principal one is given by
휋푃1 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)
(1− 훼1)푉 + (훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)
훼2푉.
First of all, we have a look at 훼1 and under what circumstances this tool is used.
∂휋푃1
∂훼1
=
푟(훼1 + 훼2)
푟−1((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푉 − 푟(훼1 + 훼2)
푟−1(훼1 + 훼2)푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푉
− ((훼1 + 훼2)
푟 + 푟훼1(훼1 + 훼2)
푟−1)((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푉
+
푟(훼1 + 훼2)
푟−1훼1(훼1 + 훼2)푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푉 − 푟(훼1 + 훼2)
푟−1(훽1 + 훽2)푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
훼2푉 > 0.
Substituting (훼1 + 훼2) by 푎, (훽1 + 훽2) by 푏 and simplifying the expression yields
푏푟(푟푎푟−1 − (1 + 푟)푎푟) > 푎2푟.
The term in brackets on the left hand side can be positive or negative. Assume for
the moment that 푟 ∕= (1 + 푟)푎. Accordingly, we have to consider two cases. For
푟
1+푟
> 푎, we get
푏푟 >
푎푟+1
푟 − (1 + 푟)푎.
If the total incentive of the opponent is high enough, then this inequality is fulﬁlled,
although the total incentive of principal one is strictly smaller than one.
The second case is given for 푟
1+푟
< 푎.
푏푟 <
푎푟+1
푟 − (1 + 푟)푎.
This case is ruled out because the right hand side is negative. The total incentive
cannot be negative.
Accordingly, principal one will only use 훼1 if the total incentive he wishes to use is
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smaller than 푟
1+푟
.
Now we have a look at 훼2.
This tool is only used as long as the ﬁrst derivative is positive.
∂휋푃1
∂훼2
> 0.
Computing this expression and simplifying it, yields
푟(훼1 + 훼2)
푟−1 + (1− 푟)(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟 > 0.
This condition is fulﬁlled because 푟 as well as (훼1 + 훼2) are not greater than two.
That means that increasing the ﬁne is always beneﬁcial for the principal. Accord-
ingly, the total incentive will be equal to one because as soon as 훼2 is greater than
푟
1+푟
, the principal reduces the reward to 훼1 = 0. But 훼2 is still increased. This
movement stops if the upper bound is reached. The same kind of analysis can be
applied to the second principal. And also 푟 ∕= (1 + 푟)푎 holds.
■
Lemma 3.3 states that if the agent works for the principal anyway2, then there
will only be punishment for defeats. If the participation constraint is disregarded,
also the eﬀects of both tools on the payoﬀ of the agent are ignored. If a principal
increases the share of the prize oﬀered to the delegate to reward a victory, then the
willingness of the agent to sign the contract increases. Suppose that only a ﬁne is
used. No rational agent will sign the contract because the payoﬀ is negative for sure.
The agent has to pay something if he loses and gets paid nothing if he wins, and
the agent has to pay for the eﬀort invested anyway. But if a reward is used, then
the agent gets a share of the prize. Accordingly, it is possible that his participation
constraint is met. Nevertheless, using a reward that is too high lowers the payoﬀ
for the principal. And a ﬁne that is too high attracts no agent. These eﬀects are
ignored if the participation constraint is neglected.
3.3.3 Equilibrium contracts
In this subsection any principal can reward his delegate for a victory, punish his
agent for a defeat, and has to ensure that the payoﬀ for the delegate is non-negative.
Hence, principal one is confronted with
max
훼1,훼2
휋푃1 subject to 휋퐷1 ≥ 0.
2We would call this slavery.
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The expected payoﬀ for the delegate in equilibrium of stage two is given by
휋퐷1 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)
훼1푉 − (훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)
훼2푉
− (훼1 + 훼2)
푟+1(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푟푉.
The ﬁrst part is the share of the prize the agent gets weighted by the winning
probability. The second part represents the ﬁne and the last part are the costs of
eﬀort invested by the agent.
We conclude that principal one does not want to pay more than necessary to his
agent. Accordingly, he only ensures that the payoﬀ of the delegate is zero, no more,
no less. Thus,
(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)
훼2푉 = +
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)
훼1푉
− (훼1 + 훼2)
푟+1(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푟푉.
Applying this to the payoﬀ function of principal one yields
휋푃1 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)
푉 − (훼1 + 훼2)
푟+1(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푟푉.
Note, that any principal cannot observe the eﬀort invested by any delegate directly.
But by assuming rational behavior of the delegate and knowledge of the fact that
all individuals maximize their material payoﬀ, any principal can conclude how the
delegates react to the terms of the contract. Accordingly, the design of the contract
is used to provide the incentives most useful to the principal. The principal knows
the ﬁne he gets paid and the reward that he has to pay. The delegate has to be
compensated for the ﬁne, but the reward reduces the compensation. Accordingly,
both cancel out if they are applied to the problem of the principal. In expectation
the principal only has to compensate the delegate for the eﬀort invested.
By introducing a ﬁne, it is possible for the principal to oﬀset the reduction in
incentive due to the split up of the prize.
By substituting (훼1 + 훼2) by 푎 and (훽1 + 훽2) by 푏, the problem of principal one
reduces to
휋푃1 =
푎푟
푎푟 + 푏푟
푉 − 푎
푟+1푏푟
(푎푟 + 푏푟)2
푟푉.
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By calculating the ﬁrst derivative and simplifying the ﬁrst order condition, it can
be shown that
푎푟 + 푏푟 − (푟 + 1)푎푟+1 − (푟 + 1)푎푏푟 + 2푟푎푟+1 = 0.
Rearranging yields
푎푟
푏푟
=
푎(푟 + 1)− 1
푎(푟 − 1) + 1 . (3.2)
Doing the same for the second principal yields
푎푟
푏푟
=
푏(1− 푟)− 1
1− 푏(푟 + 1) . (3.3)
Setting (3.2) and (3.3) equal yields
푏 =
푎
2푎− 1 . (3.4)
And 푎 is implicitly deﬁned by
(2푎− 1)푟 = 푎(푟 + 1)− 1
푎(푟 − 1) + 1 . (3.5)
Using (3.4) and (3.5), it is possible to state
Lemma 3.4: The Nash equilibria in the contract game are given by (푎∗, 푏∗) =(
푎∗, 푎
2푎∗−1
)
. Where 푎∗ is determined by (3.5).
According to Lemma 3.4 we can state that there is a symmetric equilibrium that
is independent of 푟. In fact, 푎 = 1 always solves equation (3.5) for any 푟. Another
result is that for 푟 = 1 any 푎 solves the equation. We will be concerned with this
case in Section 3.3.4 Whether there are asymmetric equilibria or not, depends on 푟.
For the symmetric equilibrium we can state
Theorem 3.1: In the symmetric Nash equilibrium any principal incentivizes his
agent with the whole prize.
The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted3. In essence, it is optimal for
any principal to use a contract that incentivizes the agent with the whole prize. The
principal tries to put the agent in the same situation he would be in. That means
3Using the fact that we are searching for a symmetric equilibrium, we can set (3.2) equal to
(3.3). This leads to 푎 = 푏 = 1 because of symmetry.
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that winning the prize is as important for the agent as it would be for the principal
if he were ﬁghting himself. Selling the right to participate is no preferred option in
this setting. Whether the right is sold or not, has no inﬂuence on the eﬀorts invested
by the delegate because in both cases his incentives do not diﬀer.
Konrad (2009) shows that for observable eﬀort choices the principal can incentivize
the agent to invest as much as he would. Theorem 3.1 shows that this is also the
case for unobservable eﬀort choices. By using an appropriate contract, the principal
can completely overcome the problem of moral hazard.
In the symmetric equilibrium any agent invests 푟푉
4
to win the contest. In a contest
with no-win-no-pay contracts a delegate invests 푟
2
(2+푟)
푉
4
. Accordingly, an agent is
more aggressive and therefore invests more when there is a ﬁne for a defeat.
To determine the values for the ﬁne and the reward that are chosen by the
principal, we use the participation constraint.
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훼1푉 =
(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훼2푉
+
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟+1(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푟푉.
In expectation the payment to the delegate is as high as the ﬁne that the agent has
to pay and the costs of eﬀort he makes.
Because this is the symmetric equilibrium and 훼1 + 훼2 = 1, we get
Theorem 3.2: The shares used by the principals in the symmetric equilibrium
contracts are
훼1 = 훽1 =
(2 + 푟)
4
and
훼2 = 훽2 =
(2− 푟)
4
.
It is obvious that the reward is always greater than the ﬁne. If the reward is greater
than (2+푟)
4
, the delegate has a positive payoﬀ in expectation. But if the reward is
smaller, then the agent has a negative payoﬀ. 훼1 and 훽1 are greater than
1
2
for every
푟 and they increase in 푟. 훼2 and 훽2 are always smaller than
1
2
and they decrease in
푟. The reason for this are the incentives for the principal. If 푟 is very low, investing
more eﬀort than the opponent has only a small eﬀect on the winning probability.
For very low values of 푟, the determination of the winner is comparable to a coin
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ﬂip. Accordingly, the principal wants to be prepared for both cases. He oﬀers only
a small share as a reward, because the positive eﬀect of more eﬀort is only small
and luck plays an important role. The ﬁne is high, because the principal wants to
insure himself against losing. If 푟 is high, then investing eﬀort leads to a higher
winning probability and the agent has a high incentive to invest eﬀort. And because
he invests much, the principal cannot use a high ﬁne because this would lead to a
negative expected payoﬀ.
Concerning the payoﬀs, it can be established
Corollary 3.1: The material payoﬀ of any principal is given by 휋푃1 = 휋푃2 =
(2−푟)
4
푉
in equilibrium. The material payoﬀ of the agent is always zero.
The principal only ensures the participation of the agent. Accordingly, the pay-
oﬀ for any delegate in equilibrium is zero. Note that the payoﬀ for the principal
is as high as his payoﬀ would be in an equilibrium without mandatory delegation.
Suppose that mandatory delegation is not assumed anymore. Whether a delegate
is hired or not, has no eﬀect on the expected payoﬀ of the principal4. Accordingly,
any principal is indiﬀerent between delegating or playing the contest himself. This
may lead to a situation where only one principal delegates or no principal delegates,
i.e. the assumption of mandatory delegation can be relaxed.
Note that if the contract space is unlimited, agents act as aggressive as principals
would do and it is therefore not possible to observe a reduction in wasteful invest-
ments by introducing mandatory delegation. The eﬀorts invested by the players
can only be decreased if the number of possible contracts is decreased. This would
lead to higher payoﬀs for the principals and can also lead to higher payoﬀs for the
delegates. How these restrictions aﬀect the equilibrium is investigated in the next
section.
Concerning the asymmetric equilibria, if they exist, we can state that a principal
sets the total incentive greater than 1 if the other principal sets the total incentive
smaller than 1. One property of these equilibria is that the sum of both total in-
centives of the principals is greater than 2. In the asymmetric equilibria they act
overall even more aggressive. If a principal is confronted with an opponent with
a rather low incentive scheme, he wants to use this weakness by setting an even
4If an aditional stage is introduced to account for the decision on delegating or not, we have four
subgames: no principal delegates, both principals delegate and only one principal delegates. It is
straightforward to show that setting a total incentive of one is an equilibrium even if the opponent
does not delegate. The material payoﬀ for both principals does not diﬀer compared to the no
delegation scenario. On the one hand the non-delegation principal is confronted with an agent
that is as incentivized as the other principal is. And on the other hand the delegating principal
made the agent act as he would do himself.
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higher incentive for his agent. An interesting case where it is possible to see such a
behavior is the case of 푟 = 1.
3.3.4 The case of 푟 = 1
Setting 푟 = 1 in (3.2) and (3.3) yields for both conditions
푏 =
푎
2푎− 1 . (3.6)
Accordingly, the best response curves are completely identical5. Therefore, there is
one symmetric equilibrium and there are multiple asymmetric equilibria.
In the symmetric equilibria 푎=푏=1 holds and 휋푃1 = 휋푃2 =
푉
4
. The asymmetric
equilibria are characterized by
(
푎, 푎
2푎−1
)
.
Now assume, without loss of generality, that 푎 > 푏. According to (3.4) this is true
for 푎 > 1. It also holds that
푎+ 푏 > 2.
The sum of incentives in an asymmetric equilibrium is always higher than in the
symmetric equilibrium.
The payoﬀs for both principals are given by
휋푃1 =
2푎− 1
4푎
푉
휋푃2 =
1
4푎
푉.
It is easy to check that
휋푃1 >
푉
4
> 휋푃2.
Therefore, the more aggressive principal has a higher payoﬀ than the principal with
the weaker incentive scheme.
Suppose that one principal uses a low incentive for his agent. In this case the other
principal increases the incentives for his principal to make proﬁt out of this weak
incentive scheme.
5Leininger (2009) searching for evolutionarily stable preferences derived a similar result in his
model. He concentrates on the relevant symmetric equilibrium.
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3.4 Limited reward and/or ﬁne
Principal 1 has to solve
max
훼1,훼2
휋푃1
wrt 휋퐷1 ≥ 0
훼¯− 훼1 ≥ 0
훼− 훼2 ≥ 0.
훼¯ represents the upper bound for the reward and 훼 the upper bound for the ﬁne.
All constraints can be binding or not. That means we have to consider the following
cases:
Case 푐1 푐2 푐3
1 + + +
2 + + 0
3 + 0 +
4 + 0 0
5 0 + +
6 0 + 0
7 0 0 +
8 0 0 0
푐1 stands for the participation constraint, 푐2 for the upper bound constraint for
the reward and 푐3 for the upper bound constraint for the ﬁne. A “+” indicates that
the constraint is binding. We will concentrate on the symmetric equilibrium.
Case 6 can be excluded because the principal has an incentive to increase the ﬁne.
An increase in the ﬁne increases the incentives for the agent and increases the ex-
pected payoﬀ for the principal. This upward shift continues until the participation
constraint or the upper bound of the ﬁne (or both) are met. Using this argument
Case 8 can also be excluded. Case 4 is examined in Section 3.3.3. We can also
exclude Case 3. This case is equivalent to Case 4. The principal does not want
to increase the reward. An increase would increase the payoﬀ for the agent and
therefore the participation constraint would not be binding anymore. The only case
where the upper bound of the ﬁne is reached, the principal does not want to in-
crease the reward and the participation constraint is binding is when the chosen ﬁne
in Section 3.3.3 is equal to the upper bound.
The participation constraint is binding if
훼1 =
2 + 푟
2− 푟훼2.
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Accordingly, this condition is fulﬁlled in cases 1 to 4. In the other cases 훼1 is greater
than the right-hand side. There will be positive proﬁts for the agent in these cases.
Of course, for the upper bound constraint for the ﬁne and for the reward to be
binding, the shares have to be lower than the values given in Theorem 3.2. The
second condition can only be binding as long as 훼1 + 훼2 ≤ 푟2+푟 .
In the following, we will concentrate on symmetric equilibria. The results for the
maximization problem are given in the following table
Case 훼1 훼2 휋푃1
1 훼¯ 훼 (1− 훼¯ + 훼)푉
2
2 훼¯ 2−푟
2+푟
훼 2+푟−2푟훼¯
2+푟
푉
2
4 2+푟
4
2−푟
4
2−푟
4
푉
5 훼¯ 훼 (1− 훼¯ + 훼)푉
2
7 푟
2+푟
− 훼 훼 ( 1
2+푟
+ 훼)푉
If the use of the ﬁne is forbidden, the problem given by Case 7 characterizes a no-
win-no-pay contract.
An important result of this table is that limiting the set of contracts is beneﬁcial
for the principal (and it can also be beneﬁcial for the agent)6. The payoﬀ of the
principal is lowest in Case 4, i.e. when the restrictions do not aﬀect his contract
choice. The payoﬀ of the agent is positive in Cases 5 and 7. In any other case the
payoﬀ is zero. Note that in Case 5 and in Case 7 the ﬁne is limited.
Another result is that limiting the reward leads to a higher payoﬀ than limiting the
ﬁne does, i.e. the payoﬀ of the principal in Case 2 is higher than in Section 3.3.3.
This is due to the participation constraint. The principal has to compensate the
agent with a higher reward if he uses a ﬁne. If the reward is limited, the ﬁne is also
limited.
Cases 5 and 1 are not equal. For a given ﬁne, the reward in Case 5 is higher than
in Case 1.
3.5 Interdependent Preferences
We are concerned with interdependent preferences and their inﬂuence on the cho-
sen contract in this section. Common sense tells us that negatively interdependent
preferences would also lead to more aggressive behavior. Whether this is true or
not is explained below. But before, we have to say a few words about negatively
interdependent preferences. In a divorce battle, for example, the negatively inter-
dependent preferences result from the relationship between two individuals. If one
of these two has to play a contest with a foreigner, he may not have this kind of
6The upper bounds must be strictly smaller than the desired shares given in Theorem 3.2.
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preferences anymore. But in Chapter 2 we described the work of Leininger (2009).
He derives the result that negatively interdependent preferences are evolutionar-
ily stable in ﬁnite populations. Hence, it seems sensible to examine the eﬀects of
such preferences in our framework as well. But this opens another problem: Given
that negatively interdependent preferences are evolutionarily stable, why don’t the
delegates, or principals in the other model respectively, also have negatively inter-
dependent preferences?
We will address two possible explanations here. The decision about the plausibility
of either one is left to the reader.
One answer is that we have two populations. In only one population evolution led to
negatively interdependent preferences. And the same government that introduced
mandatory delegation also obliged that one has to choose a delegate from the pop-
ulation with individualistic preferences.
Another answer could be that the delegates are only hired and have no personal
concern for the prize at stake. A soldier that has to defend his hometown is more
incentivized than a mercenary ﬁghting on the same battleﬁeld, for example. This
could also be an explanation why a delegate may or may not share the principal’s
negatively interdependent preferences. For a principal it may be a good decision to
hire an agent that hates the agent of the opponent. Common sense tells us that an
agent with negatively interdependent preferences will invest more.
3.5.1 Principals with negatively Interdependent Preferences
For simplicity, let us assume that both principals have negatively interdependent
preferences. 훿, with 0 ≤ 훿 ≤ 1, represents the degree of negatively interdependent
preferences. 훿 is the same for both principals. 훿 = 0 holds for an individualistic
player. The higher 훿 is, the higher are the concerns for the payoﬀ of the opponent.
For 훿 = 1, an individual is interested in the diﬀerence between his payoﬀ and the
payoﬀ of his opponent. Accordingly, he has relative preferences. If an evolutionary
setting is employed, 훿 = 1
푁−1 holds. 푁 stands for the number of individuals in the
population.
The preferences of the agents and the set of possible contracts are not changed.
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Accordingly, the results at the last stage stay the same:
휋푃1 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
(1− 훼1)푉 + (훽1 + 훽2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훼2푉,
휋푃2 =
(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
(1− 훽1)푉 + (훼1 + 훼2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훽2푉,
휋퐷1 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훼1푉 − (훽1 + 훽2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훼2푉
− (훼1 + 훼2)
푟+1(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푟푉.
As stated above 휋푃푖 (푖 = 1, 2) gives the material payoﬀ for principal 푖 and 휋퐷1
determines the payoﬀ for the delegate of principal one.
Principal one does not maximize his material payoﬀ given by 휋푃1. Because of the
interdependent preferences he maximizes:
푈푃1 = 휋푃1 − 훿휋푃2.
And principal one has to meet the participation constraint of his agent, i.e. 휋퐷1 has
to be non-negative in equilibrium.
Theorem 3.3: The total incentive a principal with negatively interdependent prefer-
ences uses in the unique symmetric equilibrium is also one, i.e. 훼1+훼2 = 훽1+훽2 = 1.
Proof:
푈1 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
(1− 훼1)푉 + (훽1 + 훽2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훼2푉
− (훽1 + 훽2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훿(1− 훽1)푉 − (훼1 + 훼2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훿훽2푉.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to 훼2 is given by
∂푈1
∂훼2
=
푟(훼1 + 훼2)
푟−1(훽1 + 훽2)푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
(1− 훼1)푉 + (훽1 + 훽2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
푉
− 푟(훼1 + 훼2)
푟−1(훽1 + 훽2)푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
훼2푉 +
푟(훼1 + 훼2)
푟−1(훽1 + 훽2)푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
훿(1− 훽1)푉
− 푟(훼1 + 훼2)
푟−1(훽1 + 훽2)푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
훿훽2푉.
This ﬁrst derivative is greater or equal to zero, for
(훽1 + 훽2)
푟 + (훼1 + 훼2)
푟(1− 푟) + 푟(훼1 + 훼2)푟−1(1 + 훿 − 훿(훽1 + 훽2)) ≥ 0.
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This condition is always fulﬁlled, because 푟 ≤ 2, the total incentive is smaller or
equal to two and 훿 ≤ 1.
Accordingly, principal one wants to increase the penalty, as long as his delegate is
willing to participate. To ensure that the payoﬀ of the delegate is non-negative, the
principal will use the ﬁne until 휋퐷1 = 0.
Using this condition yields
(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훼2푉 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훼1푉
− (훼1 + 훼2)
푟+1(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푟푉.
Applying this to 푈1 yields
푈1 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
푉 − (훼1 + 훼2)
푟+1(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푟푉
− (훽1 + 훽2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훿(1− 훽1)푉 − (훼1 + 훼2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훿훽2푉.
(훼1 + 훼2) represent the total incentive principal one uses to incentivize his agent.
To facilitate our further analysis, we will set 푡 = (훼1 + 훼2):
∂푈1
∂푡
=
푟푡푟−1(훽1 + 훽2)푟
(푡푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푉
− (푟 + 1)푡
푟(훽1 + 훽2)
푟(푡푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)
푟)2 − 2(푡푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)푟푡2푟(훽1 + 훽2)푟
(푡푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)4
푟푉
+
푟푡푟−1(훽1 + 훽2)푟
(푡푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
(1− 훽1)훿푉 − 푟푡
푟−1(훽1 + 훽2)푟
(푡푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
훽2훿푉
= 0.
That expression reduces to
(훽1 + 훽2)
푟(1 + 훿 − 훿(훽1 + 훽2))
=
(푟 + 1)푡(훽1 + 훽2)
푟(푡푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)
푟)− 2푟푡푟+1(훽1 + 훽2)푟
푡푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
.
Setting 푡 = (훽1 + 훽2) (symmetry assumption) yields
2푡푟(1 + 훿 − 푡훿) = 푡(푟푡푟 + 푡푟 + 푡푟 − 푟푡푟).
And therefore 푡 = 1.
We excluded altruism (훿 < 1) and therefore 푡 = 1 is the unique symmetric solution.
■
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The negatively interdependent preferences are supposed to increase spiteful behav-
ior. And indeed they increase the incentive to win the contest for the principal. But
the participation constraint is a barrier that keeps the total incentive from rising.
In the setting with individualistic preferences, the payoﬀ of the delegate was already
zero. That means the delegate already invested everything the contract allowed him
to. Accordingly, increasing 훼2 is not possible for principal one.
An increase of 훼1 also does not pay. A higher 훼1 decreases the share he gets if the
delegate wins and this case happens with a higher probability. This increase would
also allow a higher ﬁne, but the case in which he gets paid the ﬁne occurs with a
lower probability. On the other hand, a higher 훼1 and 훼2 decreases the probability
of winning for the opponent. But because of the ﬁne, the eﬀect on the material
payoﬀ of the opponent is mitigated. In the symmetric equilibrium all these eﬀects
cancel each other out. Accordingly, it is still optimal to use a total incentive of one
in equilibrium.
As can be seen, delegation can indeed be an adequate mean to decrease waste-
ful investments in contests. Negatively interdependent preferences would make the
principals act more aggressively in the contest if they had to play it. But the par-
ticipation constraint in the delegation setting prevents the principal from increasing
the incentives by using the terms of the contract. With individualistic preferences,
the principals are able to put the agent in the same situation they would be in when
playing themselves. But they are not able to transfer the negatively interdependent
preferences to their agents. Note that the principals also beneﬁt from this because
their material payoﬀ stays the same compared to the case without negatively inter-
dependent preferences. But without delegation it would decrease, and the utility
would be the same as in the delegation setting.
The principal has a positive material payoﬀ. By using a ﬁxed payment, the principal
could increase the total incentive and compensate the delegate for a possible loss.
We will introduce ﬁxed payment 퐹1 for principal one and 퐹2 for principal two, in
order to show that this is no option. A ﬁxed payment does not change the behavior
of the agent directly, but it enlarges the contract space for the principal. Due to
changed contract parameters the behavior of the delegate can be changed. With the
ﬁxed payment the payoﬀ of the delegate of principal one is
휋˜퐷1 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훼1푉 − (훽1 + 훽2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훼2푉
− (훼1 + 훼2)
푟+1(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푟푉
+ 퐹1.
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Increasing the ﬁne until the participation constraint is met is still beneﬁcial for the
principal. Setting 휋˜퐷1 = 0 and using this condition yields
푈˜1 =
(훼1 + 훼2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
푉 − (훼1 + 훼2)
푟+1(훽1 + 훽2)
푟
((훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟)2
푟푉
− (훽1 + 훽2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훿(1− 훽1)푉 − (훼1 + 훼2)
푟
(훼1 + 훼2)푟 + (훽1 + 훽2)푟
훿훽2푉.
This is the same function as in the setting without a ﬁxed payment. Accordingly,
the result remains unchanged and the principal is still not able to increase the total
incentive to more than one. That also means that he is still not able to put the
delegate in the same situation he would be in.
3.5.2 Agents with negatively Interdependent Preferences
In this subsection the principals have independent preferences, but the agents have
interdependent preferences. To keep the analysis simple, it is assumed that an agent
is concerned with the payoﬀ of the other agent. Accordingly, we don’t consider the
eﬀects of an agent that is concerned with the payoﬀ of the other principal, of his
principal7 or even both. To avoid the strategic choice of an agent’s type8, 훿, with
0 ≤ 훿 ≤ 1, represents the degree of negatively interdependent preferences. 훿 is the
same for both and to ensure comparison, it is the same as in section 3.5.1. There are
two eﬀects in this model. The agent will invest more compared to a situation with
independent preferences. This may decrease the incentives oﬀered by the principals,
because the agents want to beat the opponent. But by using a high incentive, the
principal can increase the probability of winning.
The model has two stages. At the ﬁrst stage the principals choose the contract. The
contract chosen determines the eﬀort invested by the agent at the second stage. The
agent of principal one maximizes his utility 푢퐼퐷1. His utility is given by
푈 퐼퐷1 = 휋
퐼
퐷1 − 훿휋퐼퐷2.
휋퐼퐷1 is his material payoﬀ and 휋
퐼
퐷2 is the material payoﬀ of the other agent. 훼
퐼
1 is
the share used by principal one as a reward and 훼퐼2 is the share of the prize that is
used as a ﬁne. 훽퐼1 and 훽
퐼
2 are the shares used by principal two. The eﬀorts invested
by the agents are denoted by 푑1 and 푑2. Accordingly, the agent of principal one
7Such a kind of model is considered in Chapter 6.
8Of course, choosing the agent with the more negatively interdependent preferences may be
advantagous for the principal.
60
maximizes
푈 퐼퐷1 =
푑푟1
푑푟1 + 푑
푟
2
훼퐼1푉 −
푑푟2
푑푟1 + 푑
푟
2
훼퐼2푉 − 푑1 − 훿
(
푑푟2
푑푟1 + 푑
푟
2
훽퐼1푉 −
푑푟1
푑푟1 + 푑
푟
2
훽퐼2푉 − 푑2
)
.
Deriving the ﬁrst order condition and rearranging it yields
(푑푟1 + 푑
푟
2)
2 = 푑푟−11 푑
푟
2(훼
퐼
1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)푟푉.
Doing the same for the second agent yields
(푑푟1 + 푑
푟
2)
2 = 푑푟1푑
푟−1
2 (훿훼
퐼
1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)푟푉. (3.7)
Setting both conditions equal yields
푑2 =
(훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
(훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푑1. (3.8)
In the models so far the total incentive of an agent was given by the sum of both
shares, i.e. the determined ﬁne and reward. But in this model the total incentive
is given by the sum of the own shares and the sum of the shares of the opponent
weighted by 훿. That means, as long as 훿 > 0, the incentives for an agent to invest
eﬀort are higher in this model compared to the model with agents with independent
preferences for any value of the shares used by the principal. But it still holds that
the relation of the sum of both shares of both principals determines which delegate
invests more.
Using (3.7) and (3.8) yields the equilibrium eﬀorts of the second stage. We can state
Lemma 3.5: The equilibrium eﬀorts of the agents contingent on the oﬀered shares
are given by
푑1 =
(훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟+1(훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟
((훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟 + (훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟)2
푟푉,
푑2 =
(훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟(훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟+1
((훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟 + (훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟)2
푟푉.
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Accordingly, the probabilities of winning are
푝퐼1 =
(훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟
(훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟 + (훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟
,
푝퐼2 =
(훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟
(훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟 + (훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟
.
Let us turn to the ﬁrst stage of the game. Any principal maximizes his expected
material payoﬀ. The payoﬀ function of principal one is given by
휋퐼푃1 = (1− 훼퐼1)푝퐼1푉 + 푝퐼2훼퐼2푉.
But the principal must still ensure participation of the agent. Without the par-
ticipation constraint, the principal will only punish his agent. To prevent this, we
will assume that any agent will sign the contract only if the expected utility is at
least zero. Note that we don’t only consider the material payoﬀ. Accordingly, the
material payoﬀ can also be negative. The agent with interdependent preferences is,
for 훿 suﬃciently high, willing to suﬀer a loss but only if the opponent suﬀers a loss
that is even greater. A zero material payoﬀ assumption would include situations
with negative utility9. Of course, no agent that maximizes his utility will sign such
a contract. But we have to mention that a negative material payoﬀ for an agent is
problamatic, because he loses money by signing such a contract. We will see that
this problem can be neglected in equilibrium.
The utility of the agent of principal one is
푈 퐼퐷1 = 푝
퐼
1훼
퐼
1푉 − 푝퐼2훼퐼2푉 − 푑1 − 훿푝퐼2훽퐼1푉 + 훿푝퐼1훽퐼2푉 + 훿푑2.
Setting this expression equal to zero and rearranging it afterwards, yields
푝퐼2훼
퐼
2푉 = 푝
퐼
1훼
퐼
1푉 − 푑1 − 훿푝퐼2훽퐼1푉 + 훿푝퐼1훽퐼2푉 + 훿푑2.
Accordingly, the expected material payoﬀ of principal one is
휋퐼푃1 = 푝
퐼
1푉 − 푑1 − 훿푝퐼2훽퐼1푉 + 훿푝퐼1훽퐼2푉 + 훿푑2.
9Assume that 훿 = 1, the material payoﬀ of the ﬁrst agent to be zero and the material payoﬀ of
the second agent to be greater zero.
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Using the expressions derived at the second stage, leads to
휋퐼푃1 =
(훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟
(훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟 + (훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟
푉
− (훼
퐼
1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟+1(훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟
((훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟 + (훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟)2
푟푉
− (훿훼
퐼
1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟
(훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟 + (훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟
훿훽퐼1푉
+
(훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟
(훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟 + (훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟
훿훽퐼2푉
+
(훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟(훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟+1
((훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2 + 훿훽
퐼
1 + 훿훽
퐼
2)
푟 + (훿훼퐼1 + 훿훼
퐼
2 + 훽
퐼
1 + 훽
퐼
2)
푟)2
훿푟푉.
The ﬁrst two terms represent the beneﬁt created by the contest for principal and
agent. The last three terms represent the concern of the agent for the material
payoﬀ of his opponent. We can see that the principal cares for the material payoﬀ
of the other agent, although he has independent preferences. The reason for this is
that these preferences inﬂuence the behavior of his agent and therefore he has to
take these preferences into account.
Note that for principal one only the sum of both shares used by him matters. Ac-
cordingly, we will set (훼퐼1 + 훼
퐼
2) = 푎
퐼 . When possible, we will set (훽퐼1 + 훽
퐼
2) = 푏
퐼 .
63
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to 푎 is given by
0 =
푟(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟−1
(
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟
)
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)2
푉
−
(
푟(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟−1 + 푟훿(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟−1
)
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)2
푉
− ((푟 + 1)(푎
퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)
(
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟
)2
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)4
푟푉
− (푟훿(훿푎
퐼 + 푏퐼)푟−1(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟+1)
(
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟
)2
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)4
푟푉
+
2
(
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟
) (
푟(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟−1 + 푟훿(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟−1
)
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟+1(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)4
푟푉
+
2(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟
(
푟(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟−1 + 푟훿(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟−1
)
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟+1(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)4
푟푉
− 푟훿(훿푎
퐼 + 푏퐼)푟−1
(
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟
)
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)2
훿훽퐼1푉
−
(
푟(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟−1 + 푟훿(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟−1
)
(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)2
훿훽퐼1푉
+
푟(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟−1
(
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟
)
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)2
훿훽퐼2푉
−
(
푟(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟−1 + 푟훿(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟−1
)
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)2
훿훽퐼2푉
+
(푟(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟−1(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟+1)
(
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟
)2
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)4
훿푟푉
+
((푟 + 1)훿(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)
(
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟
)2
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)4
훿푟푉
− 2(푎
퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟+1
(
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟
) (
푟(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟−1
)
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)4
훿푟푉
− 2(푎
퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟+1
(
(푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟
)
푟훿(훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟−1
((푎퐼 + 훿푏퐼)푟 + (훿푎퐼 + 푏퐼)푟)4
훿푟푉.
We are searching for a symmetric equilibrium. Accordingly, we set 푎 = 푏 = 푐. It
results
0 = (1− 훿)− (푟 + 1)(푐+ 훿푐) + 푟(푐+ 훿푐)− 2훿2훽1 + (1 + 훿)훿훽1 + 2훿훽2
− (1 + 훿)훿훽2 + 훿(푐+ 훿푐)(푟 + 훿(푟 + 1))− 훿(푐+ 훿푐)푟(1 + 훿).
Which reduces to
0 = (1− 훿)− (푐+ 훿푐) + (1− 훿)훿푐+ 훿2(푐+ 훿푐).
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Accordingly, we can state
Lemma 3.6: The symmetric Nash equilibrium in the contract game is given by
푎∗ = 푏∗ = 1
훿2+훿+1
.
We can see that as long as 0 ≤ 훿 ≤ 1 holds, 1
훿2+훿+1
is falling in 훿. Accordingly,
the total incentive set by the principals is highest for 훿 = 0. We have seen that in
this case the total incentive is given by one. That means that the principal beneﬁts
from the negatively interdependent preferences of his agent. The principal pays less
to an agent with negatively interdependent preferences. Because he is only inter-
ested in his monetary payoﬀ, he does not want to defeat the other principal at any
cost. He therefore pays less, because the agent is intrinsically motivated by the wish
to defeat the other agent. Note that this result does not depend on 푟.
Another striking result is that the total incentive is 1
3
when 훿 is equal to one. Note
that 1
3
is the share of the prize used by a principal, if 푟 = 1, only no-win-no-pay
contracts are allowed and we are not confronted with negatively interdependent pref-
erences. That means the total incentive in a model with the new kind of contracts
and negatively interdependent preferences is always higher. Although the principals
beneﬁt from the negatively interdependent preferences, they still use a relatively
high share of the prize to incentivize their agent.
For the eﬀort invested by any agent, it holds
푑∗1 = 푑
∗
2 =
(1 + 훿)푟푉
4(훿2 + 훿 + 1)
.
In the symmetric equilibrium of the model without negatively interdependent pref-
erences the eﬀort invested by an agent is 푟푉
4
. Accordingly, the eﬀort invested by
an agent is smaller if he has negatively interdependent preferences. We have two
eﬀects. On the one side, the agent invests more because of the wish to defeat the
opponent, but, on the other hand, the principal reduces the incentive for the agent
and therefore investment falls. The latter eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst eﬀect. The prize
has to be split up between principal and agent. But the share oﬀered to the agent
is so small, that, although he hates the opponent, invests less.
Using the zero-utility condition and the result in Lemma 3.6, we can state
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Theorem 3.4: The shares used by a principal in the symmetric equilibrium
contract are
훼퐼∗1 = 훽
퐼∗
1 =
2 + (1 + 훿)푟
4(훿2 + 훿 + 1)
and
훼퐼∗2 = 훽
퐼∗
2 =
2− (1 + 훿)푟
4(훿2 + 훿 + 1)
.
We can see that both shares decrease if 훿 increases. The reduction in total incentive
used by the principal is therefore due to a reduction in the ﬁne and a reduction in
the reward.
Concerning the payoﬀs, we can state
Corollary 3.2: The material payoﬀ of any principal in equilibrium is given by
휋퐼푃1 = 휋
퐼
푃2 =
(2훿2+2훿+2−푟−푟훿)
(훿2+훿+1)
푉
4
. The material payoﬀ and the utility of any agent in
equilibrium are both zero.
Compared to the result of the contract choice game without negatively interde-
pendent preferences, we can state that if 훿 > 0, i.e. the agents do indeed have
negatively interdependent preferences, the material payoﬀ of the principal is higher.
The principal uses the intrinsic motivation of the agent to increase his share of the
pie. You have to pay more to a mercenary to ﬁght for you, than you have to pay to
a person that hates your opponent (or his soldiers) for some reason.
The material payoﬀ of the agent is zero. Accordingly, we are not confronted with the
problem of a negative material payoﬀ. Although the agent has negatively interde-
pendent preferences, he has no disadvantage: His material payoﬀ does not decrease.
3.6 Conclusion
Wa¨rneryd (2000) showed that mandatory delegation may decrease eﬀorts invested
in a two-player Tullock rent-seeking contest. Because the contested prize is split up
between principal and agent, the agent does not act as aggressively as the princi-
pal would do. Accordingly, eﬀorts made are reduced and expected payoﬀs for the
principals are increased. This holds true for no-win-no-pay contracts. In this pa-
per it is shown that no-win-no-pay contracts are only a subset of a broader class
of contracts. In fact, a ﬁne and a reward, both depending on the contested prize,
are introduced. Any principal can punish his delegate for a defeat. An example is
found in Yubitsume by the Yakuza, contractual penalties, the hiring of lawyers etc.
The agent acts more aggressive if he is in danger of losing the invested eﬀort and
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some extra money, compared to only losing the eﬀort put in. This ﬁne also prevents
moral hazard by the agent. The probability of shirking is reduced if a defeat is very
bitter.
In a no-win-no-pay contract only a reward is used.
In the symmetric equilibrium with risk neutral agents and principals both prin-
cipals put their delegate in the same situation they would be in without mandatory
delegation. In fact, the share oﬀered as a reward and the share used as a ﬁne must
add up to one. The sum of both shares determines the total incentive of the agent
because this is the diﬀerence between winning and losing. For any principal this is
also one because either he wins the contest, or he loses it. The expected payoﬀ for
the agents in equilibrium is always zero, but the payoﬀ of the principal is positive
and is as high as in a situation without delegation. In fact, whether a principal
delegates or not does not alter the payoﬀ in equilibrium. Accordingly, the principals
are indiﬀerent between delegating or not. In the asymmetric equilibria, if they exist,
one agent is incentivized with more than the complete prize and the other one with
less. In total the sum of incentives is greater than two times the prize. If a principal
is confronted with a principal using a weak incentive scheme, he wishes to overrun
the enemy by incentivizing his agent over proportionally compared to the prize at
stake.
The eﬀorts invested in the contest only decrease, as Wa¨rneryd stated, as long as the
contract space is limited. That means, upper bounds for penalties and for rewards
have to be introduced. By introducing a ﬁne, it is possible for the principals to
contract a delegate by using more aggressive contracts. An agent contracted with
the new type acts as a principal would do and, as Wa¨rneryd (2000) showed, has
therefore an advantage compared to a delegate with a no-win-no-pay contract. The
positive eﬀects of delegation are mitigated by more aggressive contracts. If only
no-win-no-pay contracts are allowed, then a principal using a ﬁne to contract an
agent has an advantage. But he has to fear detection. Introducing mandatory dele-
gation alone is not beneﬁcial, but introducing mandatory delegation and restricting
the possible contracts combined with law enforcement is. If the contract space is
limited, for example by law, then wasteful investments in contests can be reduced.
An example is the lawyers’ compensation act (Rechtsanwaltsvergu¨tungsgesetz) in
Germany. By introducing upper bounds, even a positive payoﬀ for the agent is pos-
sible.
Another important result is the inﬂuence of interdependent preferences on the side
of the principal on the chosen contract. The incentives of a principal with nega-
tively interdependent preferences to win the contest are higher than for a principal
with individualistic preferences. But the participation constraint keeps the spiteful
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principal from transferring the increased incentive to the agent. Accordingly, the
negative eﬀect of interdependent preferences is mitigated and delegation can indeed
decrease eﬀorts invested, even with the increased contract set. In a divorce battle
both parties want their lawyer to feel the pain they do and to act as he would be in
the same situation. But the lawyer is only interested in his material payoﬀ, and he
has no advantage from hurting himself, just to hurt the opponent even more.
Delegation can also decrease the eﬀort invested if agents have negatively interde-
pendent preferences. Because the agent is intrinsically motivated to invest eﬀorts,
the principal decreases the total incentive. He uses a lower ﬁne and a lower reward.
This reduction is high enough to make the agents invest less compared to a situation
without agents with negatively interdependent preferences. The principal beneﬁts
from this reduction, because his material payoﬀ increases. But the agent does not
beneﬁt. He still has a material payoﬀ of zero.
Delegation leads to a split up of the contested prize between agent and principal. If
the agent has negatively interdependent preferences, the principal can increase his
share, because the agent is intrinsically motivated. But this motivation makes the
agent spent his share in the contest.
It is an interesting endeavor to investigate empirically whether individuals choose
contracts that include punishments or not, and which implications this has on the
behavior of the agents. Also the inﬂuence of risk aversion on the delegation decision
and on the chosen contracts seems to be an interesting topic.
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Chapter 4
In defense of lawyers II:
Delegation as an Aid against too
aggressive behavior.
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we want again show that delegation is beneﬁcial. In order to show the
beneﬁts of delegation, it is assumed that the players in the contest have negatively
interdependent preferences. This assumption can also be justiﬁed by the fact that
individuals are to some extent concerned with their relative payoﬀ. As Riechman
(2007) states, this might be the case due to the imitation of successful opponents
or a payment scheme used by ﬁrm owners to pay the manager in the rent-seeking
contest. Riechmann also states that experimental evidence supports the signiﬁcance
of relative payoﬀs. We also examined evolutionary reasons in Chapter 2.
In this model, two players will compete for a single indivisible prize, and they are
each obliged to hire a delegate who has to compete for them. We use the well-known
Tullock Contest-Success-Function (CSF) to determine the winner. But we will use
a diﬀerent way of modelling the contest than we used in Chapter 3. In the previous
chapter we assumed that the principals can choose the ﬁne and the reward with-
out any restriction. But in this chapter we will use a model where the principals
have to choose between two types of contracts. Accordingly, the contest has three
stages. At the ﬁrst stage, the principals simultaneously choose the contracts they
wish to use. They then contract a delegate and truthfully announce the terms of
the contract to the other principal and to both delegates. As Katz (1991) showed,
it is possible to assume unobservability of contracts without changing the results.
At the third stage, the actual contest between the delegates takes place. A prin-
cipal has the choice of two kinds of contract. The ﬁrst oﬀers a share of the prize
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to incentivize the delegate. Such contracts have been used previously in literature,
by Baik and Kim (1997) or Baik (2007) for example. As before, we will call these
types of contracts no-win-no-pay contracts. The second type consists of a payment
that is made conditionally upon the agent’s success in the contest. Neither delegate
is involved in the conﬂict before he is contracted and maximizes his individualistic
payoﬀ. Suppose there are two groups of agents. One of these groups consists of
players that maximize weighted relative payoﬀ, irrespectively of the reason which
may have caused this behavior. In the other group the individuals maximize their
absolute payoﬀ. The delegates are hired from the latter group to act in a conﬂict
between two individuals from the ﬁrst group. In Germany, for example, a lawyer has
to be hired in divorce proceedings. The spouses may be driven by the maximization
of their relative payoﬀ but normally the lawyers are not.
We will show that both contracts make the principals at least as successful as players
that maximize their absolute payoﬀ in a setting without delegation. If the agent
is paid according to relative success, the principal has to pay a ﬁxed sum to hire
an agent. But a prisoners’ dilemma-like game-structure will prevent moral hazard
in the relationship between the agent and the principal. Accordingly, the second
contract used here diﬀers in to important aspects from the contract in the third
chpater. On the one hand, we introduce ﬁxed payments into the analysis and will
therefore be able to explain there existence. Note that in Chapter 3 they had no
eﬀect. But in this model we will show that they are necessary. On the other hand,
we will be confronted with contracts that reward the agent according to his relative
success, i.e. whether the agent is in expectation more successful than his opponent.
The chapter is structured as follows. First of all, we will recall the equilibrium
outcomes without delegation within a population of absolute and relative payoﬀ
maximizing players as a benchmark in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we will establish
the model with both kinds of contracts. The contract choice game is solved in
Section 4.4 before the conclusion in Section 4.5.
4.2 Rent-seeking without delegation
This paper examines Tullock’s (1980) contest with two opponents. Both opponents
make irreversible eﬀort to win the indivisible prize 푉 . The valuation is the same
for both. Since no delegation takes place, there is only one stage. The winner
is determined using the common Tullock Contest-Success-Function (CSF) where
푟 = 1 (constant marginal eﬃciency of eﬀort as it is called by Guse and Hehenkamp
(2006)). Accordingly, the probability of player 푖, 푖 ∈ {1, 2}, winning the prize is
given by
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푝푖 =
⎧⎨⎩ 푥푖푥푖+푥−푖 for 푥푖 + 푥−푖 > 01
2
for 푥푖 + 푥−푖 = 0.
4.2.1 Maximizing absolute payoﬀ
Every principal strikes for his own beneﬁt, irrespectively of group size and outcomes
for the other players. Accordingly, the expected utility of player 푖 is given by
휋푖 =
푥푖
푥푖 + 푥−푖
푉 − 푥푖.
Deriving the ﬁrst order condition for player 푖 yields
∂휋푖
∂푥푖
=
푥−푖
(푥푖 + 푥−푖)2
푉 − 1 != 0.
In equilibrium we get
푥1 = 푥2 =
푉
4
휋1 = 휋2 =
푉
4
= 휋.
4.2.2 Maximizing weighted relative payoﬀ
An arbitrary player 푗, 푗 ∈ {1, 2}, is now concerned with a weighted relative payoﬀ.
The term relative is used because the utility of a player not only depends on his own
material payoﬀ but also on the material payoﬀ of the opponent weighted by 훿, with
훿 ∈ [0, 1]. Here, 훿 states whether a player is an individualistic player or not. If 훿 = 0,
a player is only concerned with his individualistic payoﬀ. But 훿 = 1 indicates that a
player is maximizing his relative payoﬀ. Note that in Leininger’s (2009) derivation
훿 = 1
푁−1 , if preference evolution takes place in a population of size 푁 , i.e. 훿 = 1 for
푁 = 2. The eﬀort invested by player 푗 is given by 푦푗. Player 푗 maximizes:
푢푗 =
푦푗
푦푗 + 푦−푗
푉 − 푦푗 − 훿 푦−푗
푦푗 + 푦−푗
푉 + 훿푦−푗.
By deriving the ﬁrst-order conditions, it results that
푦푗 = 푦−푗 = (1 + 훿)
푉
4
.
Since the winning probability is 1
2
for all players, the material payoﬀ of any player
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is
휋푅 = (1− 훿)푉
4
,
the corresponding weighted relative payoﬀ is
푢푅 = (1− 훿)2푉
4
.
Note that there is full dissipation if 훿 = 1, as both players then maximize relative
payoﬀs. But if 훿 comes close to zero, the utility function converges to the individ-
ualistic payoﬀ function. As 훿 decreases, the concern regarding the other player’s
payoﬀs becomes smaller and smaller. Accordingly, as can be seen from the above
formulas 푢푅 = 휋푅 = 휋 =
푉
4
from section 4.2.1 for 훿 = 0. But for 훿 > 0 it holds
that 푉
4
> 휋푅. If 0 < 훿 < 1, it holds that 휋푅 > 푢푅. Because of the negatively
interdependent preferences the utility is smaller than the material payoﬀ. The per-
ceived state of the world is inferior to the actual state of the world. This does
not hold for relative payoﬀ maximization, i.e. 훿 = 1. In that case utility and mate-
rial payoﬀ is zero. This is due to the fact that the payoﬀ of the opponent is also zero.
4.3 The Model
We will now address contests with mandatory delegation. Suppose there is a group
with negatively interdependent preferences. It is common knowledge that this prefer-
ence structure induces aggressive and therefore spiteful behavior in contests. Since
more aggressive behavior yields an advantage compared to absolute payoﬀ maxi-
mization, no player has an incentive to change his behavior. But to compensate for
the disadvantages, mandatory delegation is introduced by law, for example. For the
purpose of simplicity, it is assumed that only two-player contests are allowed to take
place. The reason why the principals are assumed to hire a delegate is that delega-
tion by both principals is not an equilibrium. The contested prize has to be split
up between the delegate and the principal. The incentives for the principal acting
for himself are therefore higher than the incentives for a delegate would be. The
principal invests more and is therefore more successful. In equilibrium, all principals
prefer not to delegate and have a lower material payoﬀ, although the utility does not
change. There are many real life examples for mandatory delegation. In Germany
it is mandatory to hire a lawyer for legal proceedings that take place in the so-called
Landesgericht (regional court) and higher courts. In other words, if the contested
“rent” is suﬃciently high, delegation to a lawyer is mandatory (in Germany).
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Both principals have negatively interdependent preferences. It is worth mentioning
that this also ensures participation on the part of the principals: The individuals
experience negative utility if they do not invest, since the opponent then wins for
sure. As before, 훿 (with 훿 ∈ [0, 1]) denotes the player’s concern for the material pay-
oﬀ of his opponent. For the purpose of simplicity, it is assumed that both players
have the same concern for their opponent, i.e. 훿 is constant and the same for both
principals.
The game has three stages. At the ﬁrst stage, both principals choose a contract
simultaneously. At stage II, the principals contract a delegate. At stage III, both
delegates then engage in the contest and exert eﬀorts. Finally, the winner is deter-
mined, and the prize is handed over. Note that the principals cannot observe the
eﬀort of both delegates. They ﬁnd out whether their delegate won or not, and they
infer the objective functions of their opponent and of the agents. Both principals
can choose between two types of contracts: No-win-no-pay contracts and so-called
relative contracts deﬁned below.
First of all, the model is examined with both principals using no-win-no-pay con-
tracts. The delegate obtains part of the prize but only if he wins. After that the
model is deﬁned with a payment to delegates in case of success and a forfeit in case of
a defeat. This results in relative contracts. The idea behind these contracts is that
the other-regarding preferences of a principal might induce the corresponding dele-
gate to act according to the other-regarding preferences via these contracts. These
contracts also act as “defeat insurance” for the principal. We will then examine the
asymmetric case, namely where one principal uses a no-win-no-pay contract and the
other uses the alternative contract.
In all cases the eﬀorts invested by a delegate are denoted by 푑. A subscript indi-
cates the principal the delegate is working for. A superscript refers to the case under
examination.
4.3.1 No-win-no-pay contracts
Baik (2007) states that it is optimal to use no-win-no-pay contracts for absolute
payoﬀ maximizing principals if they have to hire a delegate. Note that no payment
is made if the contest is lost, neither positive nor negative. Only if the contest is
won, the agent will get a share of the contested prize. The share principal 푙 is using
as an incentive is denoted with 훼푙, where 훼푙 ∈ [0, 1] and 푙 ∈ {1, 2}. We are ruling
out the possibility of selling the right to participate to another agent. If the right
is sold, no delegation will take place but the principal alone will be substituted by
the buyer. It is shown that we can rule out this case without loss of generality.
Negative amounts as a ﬁxed part of compensation are excluded here because a ﬁxed
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payment does not change the behavior of the delegate and therefore the equilibrium
strategies. In Chapter 3 this was shown for a special case. Another result of that
chapter is that delegation with no-win-no-pay contracts is beneﬁcial for a principal
even without a negative ﬁxed payment for the delegate.
The utility function of principal 푙 is given by
푢퐴푃푙 =
푑퐴푙
푑퐴푙 + 푑
퐴
−푙
(1− 훼푙)푉 − 훿
(
푑퐴−푙
푑퐴푙 + 푑
퐴
−푙
)
(1− 훼−푙)푉.
The ﬁrst term represents the expected material payoﬀ received by the principal. He
does not have to bear any expenses directly. On account of this, he only gets the
remaining share of the contested prize in expectation. The second term reﬂects the
principal’s concern for his relative position. It is the expected material payoﬀ of his
opponent (after delegation) weighted by 훿.
The delegate is rewarded according to the following payoﬀ function:
휋퐴퐷푙 =
푑퐴푙
푑퐴푙 + 푑
퐴
−푙
훼푙푉 − 푑퐴푙 .
The reservation wage of the delegate is normalized to zero, so as long as the expected
payoﬀ for the delegate is negative, no rational agent will sign this contract.
The model is solved by using backward induction, starting at stage III. In order to
determine the optimal eﬀort, we have to derive the ﬁrst-order conditions
∂휋퐴퐷1
∂푑퐴1
=
푑퐴2
(푑퐴1 + 푑
퐴
2 )
2
훼1푉 − 1 != 0,
∂휋퐴퐷2
∂푑퐴2
=
푑퐴1
(푑퐴1 + 푑
퐴
2 )
2
훼2푉 − 1 != 0.
By solving these equations for 푑퐴1 and 푑
퐴
2 , it is possible to calculate the winning
probability for any principal 푙:
푝퐴푙 =
훼푙
훼푙 + 훼−푙
.
Accordingly, the probability is given by the ratio of the oﬀered share and the sum of
all shares, i.e. if a principal used a greater part of the prize to incentivize his agent
than his opponent did, he will also win the contest with a higher probability.
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We will now continue by analyzing the second stage. Principal 푙 chooses the
oﬀered share 훼푙 such that he maximizes his utility
max
훼푙
{
푢퐴푃푙 =
훼푙 − 훼2푙
훼푙 + 훼−푙
푉 − 훿훼−푙 − 훼
2
−푙
훼푙 + 훼−푙
푉
}
.
Focusing on a symmetric equilibrium, let 훼1 = 훼2 = 훼. The ﬁrst order condition of
any of the principals can be rewritten as
훼− 3훼2 + 훿(훼− 훼2) = 0.
By solving this for 훼, we obtain
훼 =
(1 + 훿)
(3 + 훿)
.
훼 = 0 is discarded here as a solution. The chosen 훼 of a player with other-regarding
preferences is 1
2
for 훿 = 1 and 1
3
for 훿 = 0. An absolute payoﬀ maximizing player
would use one third of the contested prize to incentivize his delegate. We can there-
fore state that a player with other-regarding preferences will incentivize his delegate
more than an absolute payoﬀ regarding principal. He therefore acts spitefully.
It is established:
Lemma 4.1: The utility of the principals in equilibrium is given by
푢퐴푃1 = 푢
퐴
푃2 =
(1− 훿)
(3 + 훿)
푉 = 푢퐴.
The underlying material payoﬀ that determines the ﬁtness of the principals in evo-
lutionary terms is
휋퐴푃1 = 휋
퐴
푃2 =
푉
(3 + 훿)
= 휋퐴푃 .
A delegate in this conﬂict has an equilibrium payoﬀ of
휋퐴퐷 =
(1 + 훿)
(3 + 훿)
푉
4
=
훼푉
4
> 0.
The material payoﬀ of both principals is positive in equilibrium for any value of
훿, though they experience zero utility for 훿 = 1.
Note that 휋퐴푃 > 휋푅 for 훿 < 1. Delegation is therefore beneﬁcial for the principals in
material terms because the expenditures in the contest are reduced and the winning
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probability remains unchanged since we are in a symmetric equilibrium. Through
introducing delegation with no-win-no-pay contracts, the prize has to be split up
between the agent and the principal. The incentives for a delegate to make eﬀort
and for a principal to incentivize the agent are therefore always lower than without
delegation. Exerting eﬀort also becomes more expensive because the principal has
to pay the delegate to put in more eﬀort, yet only a fraction of this extra incentive
is expended. The reason for this is, that the expected payoﬀ for a delegate is strictly
positive because 훼 is assumed to be non-negative. This result is in line with the
writings of Baik (2007), who predicted positive proﬁts in the “delegate industry” for
contests between absolute payoﬀ maximizing principals. As in the article by Baik,
positive proﬁts arise from strategic decisions by the principals. The principals try to
put their agents into a situation similar to that which they would be in themselves
without delegation. This is achieved by using 훼푉 as the prize in a new contest
between the delegates. According to Section 4.2.1, the absolute payoﬀ maximizing
behavior of the delegates leads to positive proﬁts for them. Note that the principal
and the agent are assumed to have the same abilities in the contest and the positive
proﬁts in the delegation industry are therefore not due to a skill advantage of the
agent.
4.3.2 Relative contracts
We will now address the case of relative contracts. Note that Baik (2007) ruled out
a punishment for the delegate if the contest is lost. This assumption is relaxed here.
Both principals can observe whether their delegate has won or not. If the contest is
won, the corresponding principal 푙 will pay a share of 훾푙 (where 훾푙 ≥ 0 and 푙 ∈ {1, 2})
of the prize. In case of a defeat the agent will have to pay a penalty. He will have
to pay a share of 훾푙 of the prize to his principal. The penalty is like insurance for
the principal. If the contest is lost, the principal will experience a negative utility.
But the contest will not be lost completely since he will get compensation from the
agent.
It is still assumed that all delegates and principals are risk-neutral. In addition, it
is possible to pay a ﬁxed amount 퐹푙 (where 퐹푙 ≥ 0 and 푙 ∈ {1, 2}) to the delegate
to meet his participation constraint. This means an agent gets a ﬁxed amount even
if the contest is lost. In Chapter 3, ﬁxed payments were ruled out, but they have to
be used in this case. The reason why is given by the speciﬁc contract. In the latter
Chapter the ﬁne is always smaller than the reward. But in this case both are equal.
The ﬁxed payment compensates the agent for the higher ﬁne.
It is also forbidden to sell the right of participation in this case. We will begin by
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examining stage III. Given the terms of the contract, each delegate chooses how
much eﬀort to put in. Knowing that the delegates are risk-neutral and that they
maximize their absolute payoﬀs, principal 푙 chooses his oﬀered share 훾푙 to maximize
his weighted relative payoﬀ at stage II.
Accordingly, the expected payoﬀ of the delegate of player 푙 at stage III is given
by
휋퐵퐷푙 = 훾푙
푑퐵푙
푑퐵푙 + 푑
퐵
−푙
푉 − 훾푙(1− 푑
퐵
푙
푑퐵푙 + 푑
퐵
−푙
)푉 − 푑퐵푙 + 퐹퐵푙 .
Which can be rewritten as
휋퐵퐷푙 = 훾푙
(
푑퐵푙
푑퐵푙 + 푑
퐵
−푙
− 푑
퐵
−푙
푑퐵푙 + 푑
퐵
−푙
)
푉 − 푑퐵푙 + 퐹퐵푙 .
We call this type of contract a relative contract, because the payment for any
delegate depends on the relative success compared to his opponent. This means
if any delegate succeeds in achieving a higher winning probability than the other
delegate by exerting eﬀort, then he will be rewarded. Note that a delegate will be
penalized if his opponent outperforms him. Payment according to the diﬀerence in
the winning probabilities is called a relative payment.
It was already explained in Chapter 3, why introducing a ﬁne may be a good idea.
We also stated some examples where this happens. In this chapter, however, we
examine a special case that was excluded in Chapter 31. But they are related in
some sense. Using relative contracts is quite common in everyday life. One may
think of payments for managers that are made contingent on market share or on
sales. An increased market share is clearly due to the fact that the competitors did
not as well as the ﬁrm of the manager.
Returning to the analysis by deriving both delegates’ ﬁrst-order condition and
by setting them equal, we get
푑퐵1 훾2 = 푑
퐵
2 훾1.
Using this relationship for determining the optimal eﬀorts and probabilities yields
푑퐵푙 =
2훾2푙 훾−푙
(훾푙 + 훾−푙)2
푉,
푝퐵푙 =
훾푙
훾푙 + 훾−푙
.
1This is excluded in Chapter 3 because the ﬁxed payment was excluded.
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At stage II, any principal 푙 maximizes
푢퐵푃푙 = 푝
퐵
푙 (1− 훾푙)푉 + (1− 푝퐵푙 )훾푙푉 − 퐹퐵푙 − 훿
(
푝퐵−푙(1− 훾−푙)푉 + (1− 푝퐵−푙)훾−푙푉 − 퐹퐵−푙
)
.
The ﬁrst term represents the share of the contested prize the principal gets, if the
contest is won. The second term represents the payment by the agent if the contest
is lost and the third part is the ﬁxed payment. These three terms are the material
payoﬀ of principal 푙. The fourth term stands for the concern of principal 푙 for the
monetary payoﬀ of the other principal.
Rearranging this expression yields
푢퐵푃푙 = 푝
퐵
푙 푉 − 훾푙푉 (푝퐵푙 − (1− 푝퐵푙 ))− 퐹퐵푙 − 훿
(
푝퐵−푙푉 − 훾−푙푉 (푝퐵−푙 − (1− 푝퐵−푙))− 퐹퐵−푙
)
.
Using the fact that (1− 푝퐵푙 ) = 푝퐵−푙 and 푝퐵푙 = 훾푙훾푙+훾−푙 leads to
푢퐵푃푙 =
훾푙
훾푙 + 훾−푙
푉 − 훾푙
(
훾푙
훾푙 + 훾−푙
− 훾−푙
훾푙 + 훾−푙
)
푉 − 퐹퐵푙
− 훿
(
훾−푙
훾푙 + 훾−푙
푉 − 훾−푙
(
훾−푙
훾푙 + 훾−푙
− 훾푙
훾푙 + 훾−푙
)
푉 − 퐹퐵−푙
)
.
As before, the payoﬀ function of the principal consists of his own material payoﬀ and
the material payoﬀ of the opponent weighted with the concern the individual has.
The material payoﬀ comprises the ﬁxed and the relative payment to the delegate as
well as the contested prize if the contest is won.
The ﬁrst order condition for player 1 is given by
∂푢퐵푃1
∂훾1
=
훾2
(훾1 + 훾2)2
푉 − 2훾1(훾1 + 훾2)− 훾
2
1
(훾1 + 훾2)2
푉
+
훾2(훾1 + 훾2)− 훾1훾2
(훾1 + 훾2)2
푉 + 훿
훾2
(훾1 + 훾2)2
푉
− 훿 훾
2
2
(훾1 + 훾2)2
푉 − 훿훾2(훾1 + 훾2)− 훾2훾1
(훾1 + 훾2)2
푉
!
= 0.
Using symmetry, we can solve this condition for 훾∗:
훾∗ =
1
2
.
훾∗ = 0 is omitted. We also don’t consider altruism. In equilibrium, the diﬀerence in
payment for a delegate between winning and losing is 푉 . By introducing a penalty,
a principal is able to incentivize his delegate with the same amount the delegate
would be incentivized with if he was a principal. As long as 훿 < 1 , it holds that
훼 < 훾∗. Because of the payment in the event of a defeat, a principal is able to oﬀer
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a greater share of the contested prize. The delegate therefore acts more aggressively.
Note that, since we are in a symmetric equilibrium, the expected relative payment
to the agent is zero because no delegate is more successful than the other one. His
payoﬀ would be negative and no rational agent will ever sign this contract without
a ﬁxed amount as compensation. Therefore the ﬁxed amount is used to meet the
participation constraint of an agent. The only sensible amount is 퐹 = 푑. As long
as 퐹 > 푑, other individuals will oﬀer to act as a delegate because positive proﬁts
are possible. This trend stops if the expected payoﬀ is zero and therefore 퐹 = 푑.
This means the principal pays the equilibrium expenses. But why should a delegate
invest anything when the ﬁxed amount is paid in any case? This problem is solved
by a kind of prisoners’ dilemma that both agents are in. Suppose that neither invests
anything. In expectation they will get their compensation
퐹1 = 퐹2 =
푉
4
.
But what happens if the agent of player 푙 deviates and invests an inﬁnitely small,
positive amount 휀 and the other invests nothing? The deviating agent would not
only get the ﬁxed payment but also half of the prize because he would be more
successful than the “lazy” delegate. He would therefore get
휋퐷푙 =
3
4
푉 − 휀, which is strictly greater than 퐹 = 1
4
푉.
The other agent would lose and be penalized by his principal, thus receiving strictly
less than the ﬁxed amount 퐹 . We can therefore see why an agent would want
to deviate by making eﬀort. Unlike no-win-no-pay contracts, both agents earn an
expected material payoﬀ of zero in equilibrium.
We have seen that a principal pays indirectly for the eﬀort made. He oﬀers a
contract and raises the ﬁxed amount until an agent’s participation constraint is met.
By using relative contracts in a contest with two players and mandatory delegation,
we get
Lemma 4.2: The utility of the principals in equilibrium with relative contracts
is given by
푢퐵푃1 = 푢
퐵
푃2 = (1− 훿)
푉
4
= 푢퐵푃 .
In material terms each principal has a payoﬀ of
휋퐵푃1 = 휋
퐵
푃2 =
푉
4
= 휋퐵푃 .
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We can see that the material payoﬀ is positive, although a principal might experi-
ence a utility of zero. And the result from Chapter 3 is also valid here: By using
appropriate contracts, the principal can prevent moral hazard even if the invested
eﬀorts are unobservable. As in the model with observable eﬀort choice used by
Konrad (2009), an agent being incentivized with relative contracts and a principal
playing the contest make the same eﬀort.
Note that 휋퐵푃 < 휋
퐴
푃 for 훿 < 1, and 휋
퐵
푃 = 휋
퐴
푃 for 훿 = 1. What makes the re-
sult more striking is that we excluded negative ﬁxed payments in the no-win-no-pay
contract case. We therefore have positive proﬁts in the delegation industry. But
in the case with relative contracts we assumed that the ﬁxed payment were only
used to endow the delegate with zero utility and therefore to meet his participation
constraint.
Due to the introduction of relative contracts, some of the eﬀects of delegation with
no-win-no-pay contracts are reversed and any principal as well as his relevant dele-
gate act more aggressively. The reason for this is that the only way for a delegate
to obtain a positive proﬁt is to get ahead of the other delegate. Hence, any agent is
incentivized to exert more eﬀort. This is similar to the situation the principals are
in since they are also concerned with maximizing a weighted relative payoﬀ, making
them more aggressive. But since 훾∗ = 1
2
, the prize for the delegate is smaller than
for the principal. He therefore does not act as aggressively as a principal would in a
situation without delegation. Thus, delegation with relative contracts is beneﬁcial
compared to a situation without delegation.
One may think of the following example: Two lawyers get a premium if they are
successful and are not hired again if they are unsuccessful. But they still invest
less than their principals would invest, because defeating the opponent is not as
important to them as it is to their principals.
4.3.3 Asymmetric case
In this case, one principal uses a no-win-no-pay contract and the other rewards his
delegate according to the relative contracts speciﬁed above. Without loss of gener-
ality, it is assumed that principal one uses a no-win-no-pay contract and principal
two uses a relative contract. Let 훼퐶 ∈ [0, 1] denote the share of the contested prize
that principal one oﬀers to his agent. And let 훾퐶 ≥ 0 be the corresponding factor
the second principal uses. 퐹퐶 is the ﬁxed payment used by the second principal.
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Starting at stage III, the payoﬀ functions of the delegates are
휋퐶퐷1 =
푑퐶1
푑퐶1 + 푑
퐶
2
훼퐶푉 − 푑퐶1
휋퐶퐷2 = 퐹
퐶 +
(
푑퐶2 − 푑퐶1
푑퐶1 + 푑
퐶
2
)
훾퐶푉 − 푑퐶2 .
Using both ﬁrst-order conditions to determine the winning probabilities in equilib-
rium, yields
푝퐶1 =
훼퐶
훼퐶 + 2훾퐶
,
푝퐶2 =
2훾퐶
훼퐶 + 2훾퐶
.
Principal one then maximizes
푢퐶푃1 = 푝
퐶
1 (1− 훼퐶)푉 − 훿
(
푝퐶2 (1− 훾퐶)푉 + (1− 푝퐶2 훾퐶푉 − 퐹퐶)
)
.
Again, the ﬁrst part is the monetary payoﬀ of principal one and the second part is
his concern for the monetary payoﬀ of the other principal.
Using 푝퐶1 and rearranging leads to
푢퐶푃1 =
(훼퐶 − (훼퐶)2)
(훼퐶 + 2훾퐶)
푉 − 2훾
퐶
(훼퐶 + 2훾퐶)
훿푉 +
(
(2훾퐶 − 훼퐶)
(훼퐶 + 2훾퐶)
)
훾퐶훿푉 + 훿퐹퐶 .
Using his ﬁrst-order condition to calculate the reaction function of principal one,
yields
훼퐶 = −2훾퐶 +
√
4(훾퐶)2(1− 훿) + 2훾퐶(1 + 훿). (4.1)
Since 훼퐶 ∈ [0, 1], we excluded −2훾퐶 −√4(훾퐶)2(1− 훿) + 2훾퐶(1 + 훿) as a solution.
The reaction function of principal 2 is given by
훾퐶 = −훼
퐶
2
+
√
(훼퐶)2(1− 훿) + 훼퐶(1 + 훿)
2
. (4.2)
Apparently, 훼퐶 = 훾퐶 = 0 is an intersection point of both reaction curves but
with mandatory delegation this is not an equilibrium since both principals have an
incentive to deviate.
It is rather diﬃcult to ﬁnd the equilibrium analytically. But it is not necessary to
know the exact answer for our further analysis. It is possible to state the following:
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Lemma 4.3: The upper bound for the share of the contested prize player one
chooses in equilibrium is 1
2
and the lower bound for the chosen share in equilibrium
is given by 0.3854, i.e. 훼퐶 ∈ [0.3854, 1
2
]. The corresponding upper bound for the
share player two chooses in equilibrium is
√
1
2
− 1
4
and the lower bound is 0.324, i.e.
훾퐶 ∈ [0.324,
√
1
2
− 1
4
].
Proof:
The superscripts are omitted here to simplify the examination.
(i) Lower bounds:
Suppose that 훿 = 0. Accordingly, the reaction functions are given by
훼 = −2훾 +
√
4훾2 + 2훾,
훾 = −1
2
훼 +
√
(훼2 + 훼)
2
.
The intersection of both reaction curves is given for 훼 = 0.3854 and 훾 = 0.324.
These values are the candidates for the lower bounds of 훼 and 훾. By using
the ﬁrst derivatives with respect to 훿 and the share oﬀered by the opponent,
the lower bound for 훾 is veriﬁed because 훾 is increasing in 훿 and 훼. But for
훼, we can see that the ﬁrst derivative with respect to 훿 is positive. The ﬁrst
derivative with respect to 훾 increases for low values of 훿 but decreases for high
values.
To check whether 0.3854 is the lower bound, it is necessary to replace 훼 by
using (4.1). It can be obtained:
−2훾 +
√
4훾2(1− 훿) + 2훾(1 + 훿) ≥ 0.3854.
This inequality holds whenever the following inequality holds
훿 ≥ (−0.4584훾 + 0.1485)
(2훾 − 4훾2) .
This condition is fulﬁlled for any 훿 if 훾 ≥ 0.324, which is indeed the case.
It is therefore possible to state that 0.3854 and 0.324 are the lower bounds for
the shares 훼 and 훾 respectively.
(ii) Upper bounds:
The principal using a no-win-no-pay contract will choose an 훼 ≤ 1
2
in equi-
librium if he has to deal with a principal using a relative contract, whatever
value 훾 and 훿 are.
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12
≥ 훼 = −2훾 +
√
4훾2(1− 훿) + 2훾(1 + 훿).
After some rearrangement, it results
16훾2훿 + 1 ≥ 8훾훿.
For 훿 < 1, the left side is greater than the right side for any value of 훾 since
훿 ∈ [0, 1]. Additionally, for 훿 = 1 both sides are equal if 훾 = 0.25 but for any
other value of 훾 the left side is also greater. We can therefore state that the
inequality holds true, whatever values 훾 and 훿 take.
To get the upper bound of 훾, it is useful to use the fact that 훾 increases in
훿 and 훼. Using (4.2) and setting 훿 = 1 and 훼 = 1
2
yields the upper bound√
1
2
− 1
4
. Note that the chosen 훾 for 훿 = 1 is 4
9
. Accordingly, the upper bound
is not a chosen value but the highest possible value.
The upper bound for 훼 is 1
2
and the upper bound for 훾 is
√
1
2
− 1
4
.
■
In addition, as can be seen from Lemma 4.3, the following inequality holds:
훼퐶 < 2훾퐶 .
The amount the agent of principal two is incentivized with is 2훾퐶 since this is the
diﬀerence between winning the contest and losing it. Since this is always greater
than 훼퐶 , it is possible to conclude that the incentives for the agent of player one
are always lower and that the winning probability of the agent of principal two is
higher. Using relative contracts therefore makes the agent act more aggressively.
To increase his probability of winning, principal one oﬀers a greater share of the
prize compared to 4.3.1, since 0.3854 is greater than 1
3
. This holds for low values
of 훿. But if the concern regarding the opponent is high, principal one reduces his
oﬀer from 4.3.1 because it is too expensive to compete with the oﬀer of principal two.
It is also worth having a look at the equilibrium payoﬀ of the delegate of principal
two:
휋퐶퐷2 =
(
(2훾퐶 − 훼퐶)
(훼퐶 + 2훾퐶)
)
훾퐶푉 −
(
4훼퐶(훾퐶)2
(훼퐶 + 2훾퐶)2
)
푉 + 퐹퐶 .
Using the reaction functions derived above, it can be shown
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Lemma 4.4: Principal two always has to use a ﬁxed payment to attract a dele-
gate and therefore 퐹퐶 > 0.
Proof: Principal two has to pay a ﬁxed amount if the payoﬀ for his agent would be
negative without a transfer. We have to show the following
(2훾퐶 − 훼퐶)
(훼퐶 + 2훾퐶)
훾퐶푉 − 4훼
퐶(훾퐶)2
(훼퐶 + 2훾퐶)2
푉 < 0.
After some rearrangement, it can be obtained that
(2훾퐶 − 훼퐶)2 − 2(훼퐶)2 < 0.
Applying (4.2) yields
2
√
(훼퐶)2(1− 훿) + 훼퐶(1 + 훿)
2
< (
√
2 + 2)훼퐶 .
After some rearrangement, it is possible to conclude that the material payoﬀ is
negative whenever the following inequality holds:
(1 + 훿)
(2 + 2
√
2 + 훿)
< 훼퐶 .
The left hand side is strictly increasing in 훿. Accordingly, the condition is fulﬁlled
whenever the inequality holds for 훿 = 0 and 훿 = 1, which is indeed the case (Lemma
4.3). The expected payoﬀ for the delegate of principal two is therefore negative
without a ﬁxed payment.
■
Although the winning probability for the second delegate is higher than that
for his opponent, it does not pay for him in expectation. The costs of exerting
the eﬀort to achieve this advantage are too high. Accordingly, principal two has to
compensate him for the expected loss.
4.4 Equilibrium in the contract choice game
Summing up the results derived in Section 4.3, we get the following normal form
game.
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Principal one
Principal two
NW RC
NW 푢퐴, 푢퐴 푢퐶푃1, 푢
퐶
푃2
RC 푢퐶푃2, 푢
퐶
푃1 푢
퐵, 푢퐵
Where NW stands for no-win-no-pay contracts and RC for relative contracts.
We will now show
Theorem 4.1: If two players are involved in a contest with mandatory delega-
tion, the unique Nash Equilibrium is given by (RC, RC).
Proof:
It has to be shown that using a relative contract is a dominant strategy. The fol-
lowing must hold
(i) 푢퐶푃2 > 푢
퐴 and
(ii) 푢퐵 > 푢퐶푃1.
For simplicity of examination, we have omitted the superscript.
(i) Claim: Using a relative contract is the best response to a no-win-no-pay con-
tract.
This means
2훾
(훼 + 2훾)
푉 − (2훾 − 훼)
(2훾 + 훼)
훾푉 − (훼− 훼
2)
(훼 + 2훾)
훿푉 − 퐹 > (1− 훿)
(3 + 훿)
푉.
Since 퐹 accounts for the diﬀerence between relative payment and eﬀort made,
we get
2훾
(훼 + 2훾)
− (훼− 훼
2)
(훼 + 2훾)
훿 − 4훼훾
2
(훼 + 2훾)2
>
(1− 훿)
(3 + 훿)
.
Rearranging the terms leads to
6훼훾 + 12훾2 + 2훼훾훿 + 4훾2훿 + 훼2훿(3 + 훿)(훼 + 2훾) + 훿(훼 + 2훾)2
> 4훼훾2(3 + 훿) + (훼 + 2훾)2 + 훼훿(3 + 훿)(훼 + 2훾).
Using Lemma 4.3, it can be easily shown that the ﬁrst four terms on the left
hand side are always greater than the ﬁrst two terms on the right hand side.
Looking at the remaining parts of the inequality, it is clear to see that the
terms on the left-hand side are greater than the term on the right-hand side.
The inequality is therefore fulﬁlled. It is beneﬁcial for a principal to react to
a no-win-no-pay contract with a relative contract.
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(ii) Claim: For any principal, it has to be beneﬁcial to react with a relative contract
to an opponent using a relative contract. Therefore
훼− 훼2
(훼 + 2훾)
푉 − 2훾
(훼 + 2훾)
훿푉 +
4훼훾2
(훼 + 2훾)2
훿푉 − (1− 훿)푉
4
< 0. (4.3)
Using Lemma 4.3, it can be shown that this inequality is fulﬁlled for 훿 = 1 and
훿 = 0. To see what happens in between, suppose that both sides are equal.
We obtain
(훼− 훼2)
(훼 + 2훾)
− 1
4
=
2훾
(훼 + 2훾)
훿 − 4훼훾
2
(훼 + 2훾)2
훿 − 훿
4
.
The solution for 훿 yields
훿 =
(3훼2 + 4훼훾 − 4훼3 − 8훼2훾 − 4훾2)
(4훼훾 + 12훾2 − 16훼훾2 − 훼2) .
According to Lemma 4.3, the denominator is positive but the numerator is
not. This is ruled out since 훿 ∈ [0, 1]. Accordingly, equality does not hold in
(4.3) for any meaningful value of 훿, 훼 and 훾. Since all terms are continuous in
the domain given by Lemma 4.3 and by assumption, we can conclude that 푢퐵
is greater than 푢푃1. Using a relative contract to counter a relative contract is
beneﬁcial for both principals.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are both fulﬁlled. Using a relative contract is therefore the
dominant strategy in the given 2x2 game.
■
Note that this theorem also holds for players that maximize their individualistic
payoﬀ. The agent’s more aggressive behavior induced by relative contracts is bene-
ﬁcial for the principal. Even without concern regarding the opponent.
Now that the equilibrium in the contract choice game has been revealed, we will
now address the respective material payoﬀs. Assuming that no delegation has been
introduced, a player would receive a material payoﬀ of 휋 = 푉
4
if the contest took
place between absolute payoﬀ maximizers. In contrast, if there were only relative
payoﬀ maximization, the material payoﬀs would be 휋푅 = (1−훿)
4
푉 . For the purpose
of comparison, we will refer to the ﬁrst case. The reason is, that it is necessary to
demonstrate that delegation can oﬀset any negative eﬀect of other-regarding prefer-
ences. Thus, we will show that delegation can provide the principals with as much
material payoﬀ as the simple payoﬀ maximization by all players would.
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It can be seen that
휋퐵 = 휋 =
푉
4
.
We can therefore immediately state:
Theorem 4.2: Contracting delegates by using relative contracts neutralizes (in
equilibrium) the eﬀect of negatively interdependent preferences completely. The ma-
terial payoﬀs to principals with negatively interdependent preferences, who use equi-
librium relative contracts, is the same as the one of principals with independent
preferences and no delegates.2
The reason for this is the symmetry of the opponents. In expectation no dele-
gate is more successful than his opponent. The material payoﬀ function therefore
decreases to
휋퐵푃푙 =
푑퐵푙
푑퐵푙 + 푑
퐵
−푙
− 퐹퐵푙 .
We have seen that a principal pays for the eﬀort made indirectly, i.e. 퐹퐵푙 = 푑
퐵
푙 . All
that remains is the well-known payoﬀ function for a contest used by Tullock (1980)
involving absolute payoﬀ maximizing players. The only diﬀerence is that the eﬀorts
are made by the delegates. The material payoﬀ for any delegate is zero because
no principal is willing to pay more in equilibrium, since this is the lowest value for
which the participation constraint is met. The reason for that result is that individ-
ualistic players are contracted. These agents are only interested in their monetary
payoﬀ. They do not care for the payoﬀ of any other player. Accordingly, a principal
can only incentivize them with the monetary value of the contested prize. To use
the whole prize to incentivize the agent is beneﬁcial for the principal, and therefore
agents act as a player without interdependent preferences would.
It is also worth noting that 푉
4
is the maximum amount an absolute payoﬀ maxi-
mizing player is willing to pay for the right to participate in the contest. The amount
decreases if the expected opponent or the buyer has a negatively interdependent util-
ity function. In the equilibrium of the contract choice game any principal is expected
to earn the same amount by participating in the contest. It therefore does not pay to
sell the right of participation and it is therefore possible to exclude this case without
loss of generality.
2This theorem is also true for two-player contests with 푟 ≤ 1. The proof is straightforward and
therefore omitted.
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4.5 Conclusion
The question we tried to answer is: Are there mechanisms to reduce competition and
thus wasteful investments in rent-seeking contests, when preferences induce spiteful
behavior?
To this end, this paper has explored the eﬀects of delegation in a Tullock rent-seeking
contest where principals maximize a weighted relative payoﬀ. Maximizing the rela-
tive position leads to higher eﬀorts and reduces the material outcome for each player.
It is shown that delegation makes the principals better oﬀ in a two-player Tul-
lock contest. We assume that the agents have no particular concern regarding the
opponent. An example is a lawyer acting for a woman in a divorcement process that
was cheated on by her husband. With prescribed delegation, each principal can do
at least as well as if he were in a group consisting only of individualistic payoﬀ max-
imizing players, i.e. “spiteful” preferences are “neutralized” in the contract choice
game. No-win-no-pay contracts can even overcompensate the negative eﬀects of
weighted relative payoﬀ maximizing behavior. But since interdependent preferences
yield an advantage in equilibrium in rent-seeking contests, contracts that reward
the delegate according to his relative success, these are developed and used by the
principals. Relative contracts mean that the delegate has something to lose. He is
therefore incentivized more and has an advantage if his opponent is not penalized
for a loss but only paid in the case of a win. This reduces the eﬃciency gained by in-
troducing delegation with no-win-no-pay contracts. However, compared to a group
of individualistic players, the eﬃciency is fully restored. In essence, the economic
institution of contracting delegates can completely oﬀset the ineﬃciency caused by
negatively interdependent preferences. In theory, delegation has an even better ef-
fect, but is held back by the same competitive forces at the contracting level. More
aggressive contracts drive out more moderate ones. Another result is that delegation
with relative contracts among individualistic principals does not give any advantage
over the equilibrium without delegation. This is due to the fact that relative con-
tracts incentivize the agent with the whole prize. Accordingly, the agent behaves
just like a principal with independent preferences would behave if he were to play the
contest. By delegating, a principal with negatively interdependent preferences can
be replaced by an individualistic player. And therefore there is no welfare gain for
individualistic principals compared to a situation without delegation. This is also a
drawback of delegation. Wasteful investments can only be reduced if the agent does
not care as much as the principals for the material payoﬀ of the opponent. This is
especially true for lawyers. Lawyers are only interested in their income.
It is shown that there is a ﬁxed amount the principal has to pay to hire a delegate
88
in the equilibrium of the contract choice game. The ﬁxed amount does not alter the
invested eﬀort but is necessary in order to make an agent willing to sign a contract.
A game-structure like in a prisoners’ dilemma prevents the delegate from acting as
a free rider.
One policy implication of the above analysis is, that mandatory delegation com-
bined with a limited contract space should be introduced. In Germany, for example,
a related system is at work: as stated previously, a lawyer has to be hired in divorce
proceedings and if the contested “rent” is high enough. The payment of lawyers is
also ﬁxed in the lawyers’ compensation act (Rechtsanwaltsvergu¨tungsgesetz).
Mandatory delegation has been assumed. The consequences of relative payoﬀ
maximizing players on the terms of contract have been shown. But it is interesting
to ﬁnd out whether prescribed delegation leads to changes for a larger group of
contests. Also empirical ﬁndings on this topic seem interesting.
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Chapter 5
Training in a Tullock Rent-Seeking
contest with delegation
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 the principal used the parameters of the contract to
inﬂuence the eﬀort put in by his delegate. To pay the agent, the prize at stake is
split up. Accordingly, the incentives for the delegate are decreased and therefore
investments are decreased. In this chapter the principal can also use training. The
principal cannot reverse the split up, but he can increase the weight of the eﬀort put
in by the agent. On the one hand, the principal uses a contract to hire an agent,
and, on the other hand, he determines the amount of training to employ. Training
increases the skills of the agent and therefore makes his invested eﬀort count more.
Accordingly, he is more eﬀective. Because of his increased skills, he can reach his de-
sired impact in the Contest-Success-Function with a lower investment than without
training. This can also be interpreted as technical assistance the principal pays for
and that does not “count” in the Contest-Success-Function directly because it only
inﬂuences the weight of the eﬀort made by the agent. There are many examples
where a principal either invests in training or gives support to his agent. The basic
training in the army is one example for better skills. But also support plays an
important role in an army. An idiom that expresses that a principal may support
his delegate is: An army marches on its stomach. A soldier that is not hungry is a
better ﬁghter than a soldier that nearly starves. One can also think of researchers
going to conferences paid for by their employer. An increased knowledge may in-
crease the possibility of winning a patent race.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst concern of training in a rent-seeking
contest with delegation. Baik and Kim (1997) use an approach to include diﬀerent
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skill-levels in the analysis. They assumed that the delegate has an advantage in the
contest compared to the principal. One example is a lawyer that knows the laws and
the verdicts so far. But a principal has to invest more eﬀort because he has to ac-
quire all the information and skills that can be helpful. Accordingly, the lawyer can
have the same impact in the lawsuit at lower costs. Schoonbeek (2007) introduces
another kind of diﬀerence in skills between agent and principal. He assumes that a
delegate can use two instruments and the principal can only use one. We have to say
that the second instrument increases the impact of the ﬁrst one. We can think of a
traﬃc violation in Germany. If a driver is accused of a traﬃc violation in Germany,
he has got the possibility to enter a caveat. A lawyer can do the same but he can
also have a look at the documents of the police which can make his caveat more
powerful. A variation of this approach is used here. Schoonbeek assumes that the
delegate can choose whether to use both instruments or only one. We will assume
that the agent only decides how much eﬀort to put in. The principal can decide
whether to increase the weight of the eﬀort put in or not. He also has to bear the
costs of the support given to the agent. We will also have a look at a situation
where training decreases the unit costs of investing eﬀort. The principal decides
whether to decrease the unit costs of investing eﬀort or not. On the one hand, that
increases the costs for the principal, but this can also make the agent invest more.
One may think of a worker that is more eﬀective because of training and therefore
produces more units per hour. The results of this case are compared to the ﬁrst
approach of including training. By using these two approaches, we can compare a
reduction in unit costs to an increase in the weight of eﬀort in the Contest-Success-
Function. Accordingly, we introduce two additional ways of how a principal can
inﬂuence the outcome of the contest. If the unit costs are reduced, the principal
inﬂuences the eﬀort choice of the agent. But if the weight is increased, he gains in-
ﬂuence directly, because he can choose how much the eﬀort that was invested counts.
As the examples above indicate, we assume mandatory delegation. The reason
for this assumption can be seen in the assumed contract. We assume that no-win-
no-pay contracts are used. This ensures comparison with the delegation literature so
far. It also shows that training does not need additional assumptions than already
made in the literature. The game has two stages. At the ﬁrst stage the delegate
is hired and the amount of training is determined. At the second stage the contest
is played by the agents. After the eﬀort was put in by both delegates, the winner
is determined, the prize is handed over, and payments take place. We will use the
Tullock Contest-Success-Function to determine the winner. It is shown under which
circumstances training is used. It is also shown how the parameter of the contract
and the amount of training change with the parameters of the model.
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As stated above, Wa¨rneryd (2000) showed that splitting the contested prize up
leads to an increased payoﬀ for the principal. Whether this holds true if training
is introduced or not, is not immidiately clear. On the one hand, the prize is still
split up and therefore the incentives to put in eﬀort are decreased. On the other
hand, the principal can also inﬂuence the outcome of the contest by his investment.
Accordingly, his payoﬀ may be decreased. The answer to this question is also given
in this chapter. Also the consequences for the delegate are given. Because of the
training used by the principals, the delegate can have a bigger impact in the contest,
without investing more. Common sense tells us that a delegate may decrease his
investment to increase his payoﬀ. Whether this is true or not is stated below.
In section 5.2 the model is explained. Section 5.3 gives the equilibrium of the
game. Accordingly, the contract-parameters and the amount of training is deter-
mined. Section 5.4 explains how the equilibrium changes if the parameters of the
model are changed and compares the result to the scenarios without delegation and
without training. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 The Model
We will consider two models here. In the ﬁrst model, training increases the weight
of the eﬀort invested by the agent. In the second model, training reduces the unit
costs of investing eﬀort. But before we will turn to the ﬁrst model, we give the
assumptions used in both models:
Two risk-neutral principals are involved in a contest for a single, indivisible prize.
The value of the prize is given by 푉 and is the same for all players. This is also
the objective value of the prize. Both principals have to hire a delegate. A del-
egate puts in eﬀort for his employer. The game has got two stages. At the ﬁrst
stage the principal contracts the delegate and determines the amount of training
the agent gets. At the second stage the contest is played by the delegates. The Tul-
lock Contest-Success-Function is used to determine the winner. 푟 is assumed to be
smaller or equal to two. The delegates are also risk-neutral. The reservation wage of
both agents is normalized to zero. The delegates are contracted with no-win-no-pay
contracts. 훼푖 ∈ [0, 1] determines the share of the prize the delegate of principal 푖,
푖 = 1, 2, gets if the contest is won. If the contest is lost, the principal pays nothing
to the agent. The agent has to bear the costs of the eﬀort he made in both cases. If
the expected payoﬀ is positive, then the agent will sign the contract. It is assumed
that all individuals only care for their absolute payoﬀ.
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5.2.1 Increased weight of invested eﬀort
The amount of training oﬀered by principal 푖 is given by 휏푖 ≥ 0. The costs of one
unit of training is given by 푉
푐
. 푐 is an exogenously given parameter and is always
greater than zero. If 푐 is too low, then the principal will only use the contract to
inﬂuence the outcome of the contest. If 푐 is very high, then the principal will train
the agent a lot. Note that the training costs are forgone. As we will show later,
the agent has no positive eﬀect from training, except that he has better skills that
he can use in the future. But the future eﬀects of training are not considered here.
The principal may not use training, but he will always oﬀer a positive share of the
prize to the agent. If no share of the prize is oﬀered, then no delegate will sign
the contract. Only a positive 훼푖 ensures a positive eﬀort made by the delegate of
principal 푖. The oﬀered share will always be smaller than one. The principal would
suﬀer a loss otherwise. The eﬀort a delegate puts in is given by 푑푖. The unit costs
of eﬀort are constant and equal to one. They are the same for any delegate. To sum
up, the probability that the agent of principal 푖 wins is
푝푖 =
⎧⎨⎩
(1+휏푖)
푟푑푟푖
(1+휏1)푟푑푟1+(1+휏2)
푟푑푟2
, for 푑1 + 푑2 > 0
1
2
, for 푑1 + 푑2 = 0.
Of course, if no eﬀort is put in, then training has no eﬀect on the probability. If
both principals decide to use no training, then the standard Tullock contest with
delegation is played, as used in Baik and Kim (1997). We assume a linear costs
function for training, i.e. all units of training cost the same amount. But in reality
improving the skills of an individual is harder the more skilled he already is. This
concept can also be observed in our model. The ﬁrst derivative of the winning
probability of 푖 with respect to his training decision is positive. But the second
derivative is negative for 푟 ≤ 1 and for a situation where the eﬀort choices do not
diﬀer very much. But in equilibrium this derivative will also be negative. That
means that the more training was used, the smaller is the eﬀect on the winning
probability. The same incremental amount invested in training has therefore a
smaller impact the more money was already invested.
The model is again solved by backward induction. The principals ﬁrst think about
the eﬀect of their decision on the actions of the delegates but they also think of the
eﬀect on the actions on the other principal. Afterwards, they choose the action that
maximizes their payoﬀ. At the second stage, the agent of principal 푖 decides on his
eﬀort 푑푖 to put in to maximize
휋퐷푖 =
(1 + 휏푖)
푟푑푟푖
(1 + 휏1)푟푑푟1 + (1 + 휏2)
푟푑푟2
훼푖푉 − 푑푖.
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The equilibrium is reached if the following holds
푑2 =
훼2
훼1
푑1.
Both agents cannot inﬂuence the amount invested in training. Accordingly, training
is viewed as a constant term and does not inﬂuence the equilibrium condition at
this stage. But training does have an inﬂuence on the eﬀort put in and therefore on
the winning probability:
Lemma 5.1: At the second stage, the eﬀort put in by the delegates in equilibrium
is
푑1 =
훼푟+11 훼
푟
2(1 + 휏1)
푟(1 + 휏2)
푟
(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟)2
푟푉
푑2 =
훼푟1훼
푟+1
2 (1 + 휏1)
푟(1 + 휏2)
푟
(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟)2
푟푉.
Accordingly, the probability that agent 푖 wins the contest is
푝푖 =
훼푟푖 (1 + 휏푖)
푟
훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟
.
As can be seen from the formula, the probability is inﬂuenced by both variables the
principal can use. Before we turn to the solution of the model, we will recapitulate
some results to ensure comparison.
On the one hand, we want to compare the model to a situation without training.
But on the other hand, we want to compare it to a situation without delegation.
The ﬁrst situation was analyzed in section 3.3.1 (Lemma 3.2). The result was
훼1 = 훼2 =
푟
푟 + 2
,
푑1 = 푑2 =
푟2
(2 + 푟)
푉
4
,
휋푃1 = 휋푃2 =
푉
(2 + 푟)
,
휋퐷1 = 휋퐷2 =
(2− 푟)
(2 + 푟)
푟푉
4
.
The latter situation was analyzed in section 4.2.1. But it was assumed that 푟 = 1.
Accordingly, the model has to be adjusted. It is assumed that both principals play
the contest. 푥푖 stands for the eﬀort principal 푖 puts in. The probability that he wins
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is
푞푖 =
⎧⎨⎩
푥푟푖
푥푟1+푥
푟
2
, for 푥1 + 푥2 > 0
1
2
, for 푥1 + 푥2 = 0.
Principal 푖 maximizes 휋푖 = 푞푖푉 − 푥푖.
The equilibrium of this contest is
푥1 = 푥2 =
푟푉
4
,
휋1 = 휋2 = (2− 푟)푉
4
.
As can be seen from the results, mandatory delegation is always beneﬁcial for the
principal. This is the result of Wa¨rneryd (2000).
5.2.2 Training decreases the unit costs
In this model the amount of training used by the principal has no inﬂuence on
the weight of the invested eﬀort in the Contest-Success-Function. The amount of
eﬀort that is invested by the delegate of principal 푖 is given by 푑¯푖. Accordingly, the
probability that the agent of principal 푖 wins the contest is:
푝¯푖 =
⎧⎨⎩
푑¯푟푖
푑¯푟1+푑¯
푟
2
, for 푑¯1 + 푑¯2 > 0
1
2
, for 푑¯1 + 푑¯2 = 0.
Training has an inﬂuence on the unit costs of eﬀort and therefore on the amount
invested by the agent. In this model the unit costs of eﬀort for the delegate of
principal 푖 are given by 1
1+휏¯푖
. 휏¯푖 denotes the amount of training used by principal
푖. If no training is used, the unit costs of eﬀort are constant and equal to one for
all agents. But as soon as the amount of training diﬀers, also the unit costs diﬀer.
The more training is used by principal 푖 (the higher 휏¯푖), the lower are the unit costs
for his agent. Because of the chosen functional form of the unit costs, the eﬀect
of one additional unit of training is the lower the more units have been already
used. If there are two soldiers, one soldier is untrained and the other soldier goes
jogging in his leisure time, then the same amount of physical training will have a
greater eﬀect on the ﬁrst soldier. To represent the costs of training, we will use an
approach similar to the ﬁrst model. The costs of one unit of training are given by
푉
푐¯
. 푐¯ is exogenously given, ﬁxed, and determines whether a lot of training is used
or no training takes place at all. For very high values of 푐¯ there will also be a lot of
training.
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The share used by principal 푖 is given by 훼¯푖 ∈ [0, 1] in this subsection. Hence,
the payoﬀ of the agent of principal 푖 is
휋¯퐷푖 =
푑¯푟푖
푑¯푟1 + 푑¯
푟
2
훼¯푖푉 − 푑¯푖
(1 + 휏¯푖)
.
The equilibrium condition at the second stage is given by
푑¯2 =
(1 + 휏¯2)훼¯2
(1 + 휏¯1)훼¯1
푑¯1.
In the ﬁrst model the intersection of the reaction curves of both agents was deter-
mined by the chosen eﬀort. But in this model we can see that the amount of training
chosen by the principal inﬂuences the point at which the reaction curves intersect.
Lemma 5.2: At the second stage, the eﬀort put in by the delegates in equilibrium
is
푑¯1 =
훼¯푟+11 훼¯
푟
2(1 + 휏¯1)
푟+1(1 + 휏¯2)
푟
(훼¯푟1(1 + 휏¯1)
푟 + 훼¯푟2(1 + 휏¯2)
푟)2
푟푉
푑¯2 =
훼¯푟1훼¯
푟+1
2 (1 + 휏¯1)
푟(1 + 휏¯2)
푟+1
(훼¯푟1(1 + 휏¯1)
푟 + 훼¯푟2(1 + 휏¯2)
푟)2
푟푉.
Note that Lemma 5.2 predicts more invested eﬀorts than Lemma 5.1 does if the
amounts of training and the oﬀered shares do not diﬀer. By increasing the weight
of eﬀort, the eﬀort actually invested counts more. By decreasing the costs of eﬀort,
more eﬀort is invested by the agents.
In this case the winning probability for the agent of principal 푖 is
푝¯푖 =
훼¯푟푖 (1 + 휏¯푖)
푟
훼¯푟1(1 + 휏¯1)
푟 + 훼¯푟2(1 + 휏¯2)
푟
.
We can see that the share oﬀered and the amount of training used both inﬂuence
the probability of winning. Note that 푝¯푖 is equal to 푝푖 if the oﬀered shares and the
amount of training used do not diﬀer. Decreasing the unit costs of eﬀort makes
the agent act more aggressively than increasing the weight does. But if 휏푖 = 휏¯푖 and
훼푖 = 훼¯푖, then the increased weight compensates the principal for the lower invest-
ment.
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5.3 Equilibrium Contract and amount of Training
We will turn to the ﬁrst stage, now. First, we will consider the model with an
increased weight. The principals know how their decisions inﬂuence the outcome at
the second stage. The objective of principal one is to maximize
휋푃1 =
훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟
훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟
(1− 훼1)푉 − 휏1푉
푐
.
An increase in 훼1 increases the winning probability, but it also decreases the share
the principal gets if the contest is won. Training also increases the probability of
winning, but he has to pay for every unit. The principal has to ensure that the
payoﬀ for the delegate is not negative. Because of the no-win-no-pay contracts, we
can ignore this for the moment. The principal can only apply a non-negative amount
of training.
Before we solve the model, we will have a look at the model with decreased unit
costs. In this model, any principal 푖 maximizes
휋¯푃푖 =
훼¯푟푖 (1 + 휏¯푖)
푟
훼¯푟1(1 + 휏¯1)
푟 + 훼¯푟2(1 + 휏¯2)
푟
(1− 훼¯푖)푉 − 휏¯푖푉
푐¯
.
We can see that the problem for the principal is similar in both models. Accordingly,
we will concentrate on the ﬁrst model. The analysis for the second model can be
done in the same manner. We will just give the results in the corresponding Lemma
and Theorems. But when it comes to the analysis of the eﬀorts invested by the
delegates, we will analyze both models separately.
Coming back to the problem of the principals in the model with an increased weight,
we can derive the ﬁrst order conditions. The ﬁrst order conditions for both principals
are
∂휋푃1
∂훼1
=
(푟훼푟−11 − (푟 + 1)훼푟1)(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)푟)
(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟)2
(1 + 휏1)
푟푉
− 푟훼
푟−1
1 (1 + 휏1)
푟(훼푟1 − 훼푟+11 )
(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟)2
(1 + 휏1)
푟푉
!
= 0,
∂휋푃1
∂휏1
=
푟(1 + 휏1)
푟−1(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟)− 푟훼푟1(1 + 휏1)2푟−1
(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟)2
훼푟1(1− 훼1)푉
− 푉
푐
!
= 0,
∂휋푃2
∂훼2
=
(푟훼푟−12 − (푟 + 1)훼푟2)(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)푟)
(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟)2
(1 + 휏2)
푟푉
− 푟훼
푟−1
2 (1 + 휏2)
푟(훼푟2 − 훼푟+12 )
(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟)2
(1 + 휏1)
푟푉
!
= 0,
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∂휋푃2
∂휏2
=
푟(1 + 휏2)
푟−1(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟)− 푟훼푟2(1 + 휏2)2푟−1
(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟)2
훼푟2(1− 훼2)푉
− 푉
푐
!
= 0.
The ﬁrst condition can be reduced to
훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟
훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟
=
훼1
푟 − (푟 + 1)훼1 . (5.1)
Rearranging the third condition yields
훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟
훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟
=
푟 − (푟 + 1)훼2
훼2
. (5.2)
Setting the r.h.s’s of (5.1) and (5.2) equal leads to
훼1 =
푟 − (푟 + 1)훼2
(푟 + 1)− (푟 + 2)훼2 . (5.3)
Let us now turn to the second and fourth condition. The aim is to get an equation
that tells us how the amount of training depends on the oﬀered shares. With such
an equation and (5.3) we can get an equation of how 훼2 depends on 푟. Rearranging
∂휋푃1
∂휏1
= 0 yields
1
푐
(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
2) = 푟훼푟1(1− 훼1)훼푟2(1 + 휏1)푟−1(1 + 휏2)푟. (5.4)
Rearranging ∂휋푃2
∂휏2
= 0 in the same way and setting it equal to (5.4) yields
(1 + 휏2) =
(1− 훼2)
(1− 훼1)(1 + 휏1). (5.5)
Using (5.4) and (5.5) leads to
(1 + 휏1) =
훼푟1훼
푟
2(1− 훼1)푟+1(1− 훼2)푟
(훼푟1(1− 훼1)푟 + 훼푟2(1− 훼2)푟)2
푟푐, (5.6)
(1 + 휏2) =
훼푟1훼
푟
2(1− 훼1)푟(1− 훼2)푟+1
(훼푟1(1− 훼1)푟 + 훼푟2(1− 훼2)푟)2
푟푐. (5.7)
Combining (5.2), (5.3), (5.6), and (5.7) leads to
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Lemma 5.3: The share that principal two uses in the equilibrium at the ﬁrst
stage of the game is determined by
훼푟+12 ((푟 + 1)− (푟 + 2)훼2)2푟 = (푟 − (푟 + 1)훼2)푟+1, and
훼¯푟+12 ((푟 + 1)− (푟 + 2)훼¯2)2푟 = (푟 − (푟 + 1)훼¯2)푟+1 respectively.
Accordingly, we get
Theorem 5.1: There are no asymmetric equilibria at the ﬁrst stage of both models.
Proof: Assume, without loss of generality, that in an asymmetric equilibrium
훼1 > 훼2 holds. Using (5.3) leads to
푟 − (푟 + 2)훼2
(푟 + 1)− (푟 + 2)훼2 > 훼2. (5.8)
The denominator of the left hand side of the inequality is negative for 훼2 >
푟+1
푟+2
.
The numerator of the same side is negative for 훼2 >
푟
푟+2
. A principal will always use
a share that is strictly positive. Accordingly, the right hand side is always positive.
For 훼2 ∈ ( 푟푟+2 , 푟+1푟+2 ] the inequality is wrong because the left hand side is negative. To
proof Theorem 5.1, we have to show that the inequality is wrong for 훼2 <
푟
푟+2
and
for 훼2 >
푟+1
푟+2
. The latter can be shown by having a look at the choice of principal
one. Principal one will only increase his oﬀered share if this increases his expected
payoﬀ. That means he will increase 훼1 as long as
∂휋푃1
∂훼1
> 0. This ﬁrst order condition
is negative if
훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟
훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟
>
푟 − (푟 + 1)훼1
훼1
.
Using (5.6) and (5.7) leads to
훼푟1(1− 훼1)푟
훼푟2(1− 훼2)푟
>
푟 − (푟 + 1)훼1
훼1
.
The left hand side is always positive. But the right hand side is negative for 훼1 ≥ 푟푟+1 .
If 훼1 ≥ 푟푟+1 , then the ﬁrst derivative with respect to 훼1 is negative, i.e. principal
one will never use a share that is that high. Because 푟+1
푟+2
> 푟
푟+1
and 훼1 > 훼2, (5.8)
is not true for 훼2 >
푟+1
푟+2
.
The only case that is left is 훼2 <
푟
푟+2
. It is straightforward to use ∂휋푃2
∂훼2
to show that
it is beneﬁcial for principal two to increase his share if 훼2 is that low. Accordingly,
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(5.8) is not true and therefore there is no asymmetric equilibrium.
■
Both principals are facing a symmetric situation. The desire for the contested prize
is the same for both and therefore they incentivize their delegate to the same extent.
By applying the symmetry assumption to (5.3), it results
Theorem 5.2:The share of the contested prize oﬀered by the principal to his delegate
in equilibrium is given by
훼1 = 훼2 =
푟
푟 + 2
, and
훼¯1 = 훼¯2 =
푟
푟 + 2
respectively.
It is straightforward to show that this indeed maximizes the expected payoﬀ for
the principals. 훼1 = 훼2 = 1 is also a solution of (5.3), but this is no equilibrium
because both principals can increase their expected payoﬀ by reducing their oﬀer.
Note that 푟
푟+2
is exactly the same oﬀer as in the situation without training. Because
the principal pays for the training and therefore for the increasing eﬀectiveness, the
higher skill-level does not pay for the delegate. Figuratively speaking, the principal
pays the delegate for the skills he had before the training. Note that this might only
hold for this particular contest. Whether the delegate gets higher wages because of
his increased skills in the future or not is not considered in this chapter.
In equilibrium, the amount of training that principal 푖=1,2 pays for is given by
휏푖 =
⎧⎨⎩0 for 푐 ≤
2(푟+2)
푟
⇔ 푉
푐
≥ 푟
2(푟+2)
푉
푟푐−2(푟+2)
2(푟+2)
for 푐 > 2(푟+2)
푟
⇔ 푉
푐
< 푟
2(푟+2)
푉.
If one unit of training is too expensive, then the principal prefers not to train the
agent. But if training is relatively cheap, then the principal will invest in the increase
of skills of his delegate. Battles in the last century are a good example. Firearms
can improve the eﬀectiveness of a soldier. But there are some battles in the 20th
century where not all soldiers had ﬁrearms because it was too expensive. Examples
are the war between Germany and Poland in 1939 and the Korean War 1950-1953.
In the equilibrium of the model with decreased unit costs of eﬀort, the equilibrium
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amount of training is given by
휏¯푖 =
⎧⎨⎩0 for 푐¯ ≤
2(푟+2)
푟
⇔ 푉
푐¯
≥ 푟
2(푟+2)
푉
푟푐¯−2(푟+2)
2(푟+2)
for 푐¯ > 2(푟+2)
푟
⇔ 푉
푐¯
< 푟
2(푟+2)
푉.
A principal will only invest in decreasing the unit costs of eﬀort for his delegate
if the costs of one unit of training are low enough. If the costs for decreasing the
unit costs of eﬀort are too high, then the additional eﬀort invested by the agent in
the contest does not compensate the principal for his investment. Accordingly, no
training is used. One may think of an unskilled worker that only has to operate a
machine in a factory. If anyone could handle the machine, then the factory owner
will not invest in training. But if a manufactory is considered, training may be used
if the output of the agent can be increased by a suﬃciently large amount.
The eﬀort made by any delegate in the symmetric equilibrium of the model with an
increased weight of eﬀort is given by
푑1 = 푑2 =
푟2
(푟 + 2)
푉
4
.
Surprisingly, the eﬀort put in is exactly the same as given in Lemma 3.2. That means
the amount of training has no eﬀect on the eﬀort choice of the delegate. Even if the
principal trains the agent, the delegate invests as much as in the delegation scenario
that only allowed for no-win-no-pay contracts. The reason for this result can be seen
in Lemma 5.1. The ﬁrst derivative of the eﬀort choice of delegate one with respect
to training is given by
∂푑1
∂휏1
=
푟(1 + 휏1)
푟−1(훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟 − 훼푟1(1 + 휏1)푟)
(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟)3
훼푟+11 훼
푟
2(1 + 휏2)
푟푟푉,
which can be rewritten as
∂푑1
∂휏1
= (푝1 − 푝2)푟훼
푟+1
1 훼
푟
2(1 + 휏1)
푟−1(1 + 휏2)푟푟푉
(훼푟1(1 + 휏1)
푟 + 훼푟2(1 + 휏2)
푟)2
.
Accordingly, training incentivizes the agent to invest more if he is left behind. This
movement stops if both go head to head. If the winning probability of agent one is
higher, then training reduces the investment because the same impact is achieved
with less eﬀort put in. With relative contracts, that are used in the chapter before,
there would be an additional inventive to have a higher probability of winning. But
the speciﬁc eﬀect on this setting is left to future research.
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In the second model the eﬀort invested in the symmetric equilibrium is given by
푑¯1 = 푑¯2 =
⎧⎨⎩ 푟
2
(푟+2)
푉
4
, if no training is used, and
푟3푐¯
2(푟+2)2
푉
4
, if training is used.
As stated above, training is used if 푉
푐¯
< 푟
2(푟+2)
푉 . We can see that, if training is
actually used, then the eﬀort invested by the agent is always higher compared to the
situation without training, and compared to the situation where training increases
the weight of eﬀort. Using training to decrease the unit costs of eﬀort is therefore
an eﬀective mean to increase investment by the agents.
5.4 Comparison
We will ﬁrst turn to the payoﬀ of the delegate. The probability of winning in the
symmetric equilibrium is 1
2
for both agents in both models. In the model with an
increased weight, the eﬀort put in and the share of the contested prize oﬀered by the
principal have not changed compared to the situation in Chapter 3. Accordingly,
the payoﬀ of the agent also does not change and is given by
휋퐷1 = 휋퐷2 =
(2− 푟)
(2 + 푟)
푟푉
4
.
Note that this holds with and without training. On the one hand, the principal
contracts the agent and has to ensure participation. Moreover, the principal can
determine the weight of the eﬀort put in. The eﬀort made by the delegate is deter-
mined by the contract. Because the amount invested is determined, the principal
can increase the impact. But the payoﬀ of the agent is not aﬀected because this
is solely a decision of the principal. A soldier, for example, acts according to the
contract he signed and he also has a certain capability. But the weapon he handles
crucially determines the impact he has on the battleﬁeld.
We will now turn to the model with a reduction in unit costs of eﬀort. If no training
is used, then, of course, the same result holds as in Chapter 3. But if training is used,
then more eﬀort is put in. On the one hand, this reduces the payoﬀ of the agent,
on the other hand, the costs are reduced, which is beneﬁcial for the agent. To see
which eﬀect dominates, we have a look at the payoﬀ in the symmetric equilibrium:
휋¯퐷1 = 휋¯퐷2 =
1
2
훼¯푉 − 훼¯(1 + 휏¯)푟푉
4
1
1 + 휏¯
,
where 훼¯ represents the share oﬀered in equilibrium by both principals and 휏¯ gives
the amount of training used in the symmetric equilibrium. Using the result from
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Section 5.3, we get
휋¯퐷1 = 휋¯퐷2 =
푟
푟 + 2
푉
2
− 푟
2
2(푟 + 2)2
푟푉
4
2(푟 + 2)
푟푐
=
(2− 푟)
(푟 + 2)
푟푉
4
.
We can state that both eﬀects cancel each other out. The reduction in unit costs
compensates the agent for the increased eﬀort. Accordingly, in both models the
payoﬀ of the delegate is not aﬀected. Whether there is an eﬀect in the future is not
considered here.
We will now turn to the decision of the principals. To shorten the analysis, we will
concentrate on the ﬁrst model. To get the results for the second model, we just have
to replace 푐 by 푐¯.
If 푐 is rather low, training is expensive and therefore the principal may not use train-
ing. In such a situation we are in the model described in Chapter 3 and therefore the
result of Wa¨rneryd (2000) still holds: Delegation is able to reduce the investments
and therefore increases the payoﬀ of the principals. If 푐 is high, i.e. the unit costs of
training are low, then training may be used. The payoﬀ of principal 푖, 푖=1,2 with
respect to 푐 is
휋푃푖 =
⎧⎨⎩ 푉(푟+2) if 푐 ≤
2(푟+2)
푟
푐(2−푟)+2(푟+2)
2푐(푟+2)
푉 if 푐 > 2(푟+2)
푟
.
(5.9)
The critical value of 푐 is therefore 푐ˆ = 2(푟+2)
푟
. As can be seen from the formula, 푐ˆ
decreases if 푟 increases. If 푟 is high and the impact of the eﬀort in the Contest-
Success-Function is high, then the principal will use training even if it is expensive.
If 푟 is rather low, then the principal will use training only if it is cheap. For very
low values of 푟, investing eﬀort has only a very limited inﬂuence on the probability
of winning. If 푟 is close to zero, then the probability of winning is close to 1
2
,
irrespectively of how much eﬀort was invested. In such a situation training is not
used very much.
If an additional unit of eﬀort put in may improve the chances a lot, then the principal
will use everything he has to incentivize the delegate. Accordingly, 푟 inﬂuences the
decision whether training is used or not. But it has also inﬂuence on the amount
of training that is used. Once 푐 is greater than the critical value 푐ˆ, the amount of
training used by principal 푖 is 휏푖 =
푟푐−2(푟+2)
2(푟+2)
. The ﬁrst derivative with respect to 푟 is
∂휏푖
∂푟
= 4푐
2푟+4
and therefore strictly positive. If the impact of eﬀort put in and therefore
also the impact of training is large, then the principal will train a lot. This result
is quite intuitive. For example, we can think of a soccer team. Although all players
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do their best, the result may be bad because they did not train to play together or
they did not train the moves.
Considering the payoﬀ of the principal, assume that training is used. The payoﬀ
of principal 푖 is given by the lower part of (5.9). Of course, it always holds that
휋푃푖 =
푉
(푟+2)
is greater. It also holds that 휋푃푖 is greater than 휋푖. Using training is
beneﬁcial for the principal if the following holds:
푐(2− 푟) + 2(푟 + 2)
2푐(푟 + 2)
> (2− 푟)푉
4
.
This only holds if 푐 < 4(푟+2)
푟(2−푟) . This leads to:
Theorem 5.3:The introduction of mandatory delegation and the possibility of train-
ing the delegate is beneﬁcial for the principal if and only if
푐 <
4(푟 + 2)
푟(2− 푟) , and
푐¯ <
4(푟 + 2)
푟(2− 푟) respectively.
On the one hand, if 푐 ∈ (2(푟+2)
푟
, 4(푟+2)
푟(2−푟)), then the introduction of delegation is bene-
ﬁcial for the principal, although he trains his delegate. But even if the introduction
of training may not be beneﬁcial, the payoﬀ of any principal is always positive. On
the one hand, by delegation the prize is split up and therefore incentives to invest
are reduced. But on the other hand, training gives the principal the possibility to
engage in the contest indirectly and therefore investments increase. The latter eﬀect
may even lead to a situation where delegation is not beneﬁcial anymore. The reason
for this result is that the principals are kept in a kind of prisoners’ dilemma. Both
principals would beneﬁt if training is abandoned, but once it is introduced and the
costs are not to high, they will use training. If the opponent does not use training,
it is beneﬁcial to use it because training leads to an advantage and therefore to a
higher probability of winning. Assume, for example, that soldiers have the same
capabilities. But the soldier using better equipment may have a higher probability
of defeating the enemy.
On a ﬁnal note, we turn to the cost-parameter of training. If 푐 = 푐¯ then both
approaches predict the same behavior by the principals, i.e. the share oﬀered and
the amount of training used do not diﬀer. But if training is used, then the predicted
eﬀort will always be higher in the model with decreased unit costs.
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There are four cases: no training, training in both models and only training predicted
by one model. If 푐 and 푐¯ are smaller or equal 2(푟+2)
푟
, then no training is used by the
principals. Training the agent is too costly for the principal in both approaches.
Training is used by both principals if 푐 and 푐¯ are greater than 2(푟+2)
푟
. The costs of
training are suﬃciently low, and therefore both approaches predict the principals to
train the agent. In this case more eﬀorts are invested in the model with decreased
unit costs. And the model with a higher costs-parameter also predicts a higher
amount of training that is used in equilibrium.
If only 푐 or 푐¯ are greater than 2(푟+2)
푟
, then only the model with the smaller costs-
parameter will predict no training. If training is used to decrease the unit costs of
eﬀort, then more eﬀort is invested.
5.5 Conclusion
The introduction of mandatory delegation with no-win-no-pay contracts into a Tul-
lock rent-seeking contest decreases the eﬀort made and increases the payoﬀ of the
principal. The contested prize is split up and therefore the incentives to invest are
lower for the agent compared to the incentives a principal has without delegation.
In this chapter this model is also applied and it is considered that the principal
may inﬂuence the weight of the eﬀort made by the agent in the contest. It is also
considered that the principal can decrease the agent’s unit costs of investing eﬀort.
This is used to model that the principal can train his delegate. This also includes
the possibility that the principal can support his delegate. The principal pays for
the training. There are no additional costs for the agent. The costs of training are
dependent on the contested prize. The marginal costs are constant. Because of the
speciﬁcation of the Contest-Success-Function, the eﬀect of one additional unit of
training decreases in the amount of training used. Normally, a machine gun has a
ﬁxed price. The more machine guns are on the battleﬁeld, the smaller is the eﬀect
of an additional machine gun. And therefore, more machine guns are needed to get
the same impact the ﬁrst machine gun had. The model has two stages. At the ﬁrst
stage the principal contracts the agent and determines either to what extent the
skills of the delegate are improved, or by how much the unit costs are decreased.
At the second stage the contest is played by the delegates and after they invested,
the winner is determined and payments take place. An army is a good example
to demonstrate this. The strength of an army crucially depends on the weapons
it uses and how well trained the soldiers are. The soldiers are contracted to serve
in the army, but the impact of the eﬀort they put in depends on the support the
army gives to them. Firms also constantly invest in the skills of their employees.
They also invest in technical support. The skills of an agent have been modeled
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before by Baik and Kim (1997) and Schoonbeek (2007). Schoonbeek assumes that
an agent can use two instruments. One instrument increases the eﬀect of the other
instrument. A similar approach is used here. Training acts as the instrument that
increases the impact of the other instrument, i.e. the eﬀort the agent puts in. It
is also considered here that training does not have an eﬀect on the weight of the
invested eﬀort directly. Training can be used to decrease the unit costs of eﬀort and
therefore increases the investment of the agent.
In both models the principal can inﬂuence the outcome of the contest. He can use
the terms of the contract, and, additionally, he can decide on how to improve the
skills of the agent. In the ﬁrst model the contract determines the eﬀort the agent
puts in. But the impact of the eﬀort is inﬂuenced by the principal. In the second
model training inﬂuences the investment of the agent. Training is therefore a way
to bypass mandatory delegation. By investing in training, the principal intervenes
in the contest. Whether the principal uses training or not depends on the costs of
training and on the marginal eﬃciency of eﬀort. If the costs of training are high, then
the principal may not use training. Accordingly, the beneﬁcial eﬀect of mandatory
delegation is still intact. But if the costs are low, then the principal uses training
and therefore increases the weight the eﬀort of his delegate has or decreases the unit
costs, respectively. If modern weapons are cheap, then an army may be modernized
with a higher probability than when new weapons are expensive.
The marginal eﬃciency of eﬀort inﬂuences the decision on whether to use training
or not, and it inﬂuences the amount of training that is used. If the eﬀect of eﬀort on
the probability of winning is only small and the decision on the winner is more like
a coin ﬂip, then the principal will use training only if the costs a very low. He will
also use a small amount of training. If the marginal eﬃciency is high, i.e. the eﬀect
of eﬀort is very high, then training is used even if the costs are high. He will also
use a lot of money to improve the skills of the agent. If a new weapon can ensure
victory, then this weapon is worth much to the army and it may also be used very
often.
Because of the way to bypass mandatory delegation, the eﬀect on the payoﬀ of the
principal is negative. A situation without training and with mandatory delegation
is best for the principal. If the costs of training are moderate, then the situation
with training leads to a higher payoﬀ compared to a situation without delegation.
But if training is very cheap, then abolishing mandatory delegation is beneﬁcial for
the principal. The principals are kept in a kind of prisoners’ dilemma. Not using
training gives a disadvantage if the opponent uses training. This decreases the prob-
ability of winning for the principal that does not use training.
An example is the use of poison gas in the First World War. It was used by the
Germans to end positional warfare and to help the soldiers win. In the end, the gas
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was used by both sides, increased the death toll, and the positional warfare held on.
The payoﬀ of the agents does not change. In the model with increased weight the
agent’s decision on how much eﬀort to put in is determined by the contract. The
contract is the same as in the situation without training and therefore they do not
invest more. They also do not pay for training. Accordingly, the payoﬀ in the sym-
metric equilibrium is the same as without training. In the second model, training
increases the investment of the agent. But because of the decreased unit costs, the
payoﬀ is held constant.
Overall, the eﬀect of training is therefore negative. The principal loses and the del-
egate does not gain anything. Only the investments in the contest are increased.
One policy implication is therefore to prevent the costs of training from being too
low if the principals are in a contest. Taxation may be used to reach this goal.
The question of whether the results also hold if interdependent preferences are in-
cluded or if the contract space is extended or not, is a topic that is postponed to the
future. It is an interesting approach to combine both models, i.e. training increases
the weight of eﬀort and decreases the unit costs. A machine gun is one example.
Using a machine gun improves the impact of a soldier. This is the direct eﬀect on
the Contest-Success-Function. Additionally training can be used to improve han-
dling. This makes ﬁghting with the gun more eﬃcient and therefore can be seen as
a reduction in unit costs of eﬀort.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Future Research
6.1 Summary
Contests are omnipresent in human society. Everywhere people are investing irre-
versible eﬀort to win an indivisible prize. The eﬀort put in the contest does not
increase the welfare of the society. These investments belong to the dark side of
the force, as Hirshleifer (2001) called it. Instead of creating wealth, people try to
appropriate the wealth that was created by other people. Contests are used here
to model this process of appropriation. In the second chapter, we had a look at
the eﬀect of evolution on the eﬀort exerted in contests in ﬁnite populations. In
fact, we asked whether it is beneﬁcial in evolutionary terms to overvalue the prize
in a Tullock contest or not. We found that overvaluation can indeed be beneﬁcial.
Because of a higher valuation for the contested prize, the players invest more and
the opponents may be discouraged and therefore exert less eﬀort. We found two
eﬀects: an incentive-eﬀect and a discouragement-eﬀect. The discouragement-eﬀect
is only operant in contests with more than two individuals, but not in playing the
ﬁeld contests. Even without the discouragement-eﬀect overvaluation occurs.
A comparison is drawn between the indirect evolutionary approach concerning prize
perceptions, the direct evolutionary approach and the indirect evolutionary approach
according to Leininger (2009). All three approaches predict the same behavior in
equilibrium for two-player contests and for playing the ﬁeld contests. The direct
evolutionary approach and the indirect evolutionary approach that introduces pref-
erences for the opponents put a weight on the contested prize implicitly. In the direct
evolutionary approach this weight is constant. The indirect evolutionary approach
according to Leininger (2009) produces exactly the same aggressive behavior as the
indirect evolutionary approach using prize perceptions because the weights on the
prize are identical. The implicit weight is not ﬁxed. This weight is therefore allowed
to evolve evolutionarily and in equilibrium amounts to the same amount as in the
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new indirect evolutionary approach. This weight depends crucially on the size of the
population. Accordingly, the material payoﬀs are the same. Only the utility of the
players diﬀers. In the indirect evolutionary approach according to Leininger (2009)
the utility is smaller as long as we do not face overdissipation of the contested prize.
The reason for this is that the material payoﬀ of the opponent is not subtracted
and that the prize is overvalued. The individuals feel better because of their desire
to win and they are not depressed by their fear of losing. Although, they invest
more compared to a contest where all value the prize equally and correctly. In ﬁnite
populations this yields an evolutionary advantage. Accordingly, it is shown that all
three approaches lead to more eﬀort put in to appropriate wealth that other people
created. This makes the problem of unwanted investments even more severe. It was
our aim to show that delegation can be a tool to decrease such wasteful investments.
Wa¨rneryd (2000) showed that mandatory delegation may decrease eﬀorts invested
in a two-player Tullock rent-seeking contest. Because the contested prize is split
up between principal and agent, the agent acts not as aggressively as the principal
would do. Accordingly, eﬀorts made are reduced and expected payoﬀs for the prin-
cipals are increased. But this is not the end of the story. On the one hand, the
contract space is limited, and on the other hand, the principal has only the contract
to gain inﬂuence on the contest.
In fact, the result of Wa¨rneryd only holds true for no-win-no-pay contracts. In this
book it is shown that no-win-no-pay contracts are only one example of a broader
class of contracts. In fact, a ﬁne and a reward, both depending on the contested
prize, are introduced. Any principal can punish his delegate for a defeat. In equilib-
rium the share oﬀered as a reward and the share used as a ﬁne must add up to one.
By using appropriate contracts, the principal can eradicate the eﬀect of the split
up of the prize on the incentives of the agent. The expected payoﬀ for the agents
in equilibrium is always zero, but the payoﬀ for any principal is positive and is as
high as in a situation without delegation. Accordingly, the principals are indiﬀerent
between delegating or not and therefore delegation does not need to be mandatory.
There may also be asymmetric equilibria.
Introducing mandatory delegation alone is not beneﬁcial, but introducing manda-
tory delegation and restricting the possible contracts combined with law enforcement
is. If the contract space is limited, for example by law, then wasteful investments in
contests can be reduced. An example is the lawyers’ compensation act (Rechtsan-
waltsvergu¨tungsgesetz) in Germany. By introducing upper bounds, even a positive
payoﬀ for the agent is possible.
Another important result is the inﬂuence of negatively interdependent preferences
on the side of the principal on the chosen contract. These preferences are created
by evolution in ﬁnite populations. The incentives of a principal with negatively
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interdependent preferences to win the contest are higher than for a principal with
individualistic preferences. But the participation constraint keeps the ﬁrst principal
from transferring the increased incentive to the agent. Accordingly, the negative
eﬀect of interdependent preferences is mitigated and delegation can indeed decrease
eﬀorts invested, even with the broader contract set.
In Chapter 3, we also consider individualistic principals that contract agents with in-
terdependent preferences. the agents are concerned with the outcome for the agent,
but not for their principal or the principal of the other agent. We show that dele-
gation can also decrease the eﬀort invested if agents have negatively interdependent
preferences. Because of his wish of defeating the other agent, the agent is intrinsi-
cally motivated to invest. The principal therefore reduces the total incentives. In
fact, he reduces the ﬁne and the reward. This reduction is high enough to make
the agent invest less compared to a situation without agents with negatively inter-
dependent preferences. The material payoﬀ of any agent is zero, but the material
payoﬀ of the principal increases.
If the agent is intrinsically motivated by his negatively interdependent preferences,
the principal can increase his share of the prize.
In Chapter 4 we have look at a special form of contracts that are also used in the
literature: relative contracts. Interdependent preferences are assumed in this chap-
ter. It is shown that by delegating the players are better oﬀ in a two-player Tullock
contest in this particular situation. We assume that the delegates do not have a
particular concern regarding the opponent. Accordingly, the result from Chapter 3
also holds for relative contracts. With prescribed delegation, each player can do at
least as well as if he was in a group consisting only of individualistic payoﬀ max-
imizing players, i.e. “spiteful” preferences are “neutralized” in the contract game.
No-win-no-pay contracts can even overcompensate the negative eﬀects of weighted
relative payoﬀ maximizing behavior. But since interdependent preferences yield an
advantage in equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with contracts that reward the
delegate according to his relative success, these are developed and used by the prin-
cipals. In essence, the economic institution of contracting delegates can completely
oﬀset the ineﬃciency caused by negatively interdependent preferences. This result
also holds for relative contracts. In theory, delegation may have an even better
eﬀect, but is held back by the same competitive forces at contracting level. More
aggressive contracts drive out more moderate ones.
It is shown for relative contracts that there is a ﬁxed amount the principal has to
pay to hire a delegate in the equilibrium of the contract choice game. The ﬁxed
amount does not alter the invested eﬀort but is necessary in order to make an agent
willing to sign the contract. A game-structure like in a prisoners’ dilemma prevents
the delegate from acting as a free rider.
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Again, one policy implication of the above analysis is that mandatory delegation
combined with a limited contract space should be introduced.
The possibility that a principal can intervene into the contest is addressed in Chap-
ter 5. It is considered that the principal may inﬂuence the weight the eﬀort exerted
by the agent has in the contest. This approach is used to model that the principal
can train his delegate. This also includes the possibility of supporting the delegate.
The principal pays for the training. The costs of training are dependent on the
contested prize. At the ﬁrst stage the principal contracts the agent and determines
to what extent the skills of the delegate are improved. At the second stage, the
contest is played by the delegate and after they invested, the winner is determined
and payments take place.
This means that the principal can inﬂuence the outcome of the contest in two ways:
He can use the terms of the contract, and, additionally, he can decide on how to im-
prove the skills of the agent. We considered two approaches of how training aﬀects
the outcome. In the ﬁrst approach the terms of the contract determine the eﬀort
the agent puts in. But the impact of the eﬀort is inﬂuenced by the principal. In the
second approach the unit costs of eﬀort are decreased by using training. Accord-
ingly, the eﬀort exerted by the agent is determined by the amount of training and
the terms of the contract. Whether the principal uses training or not depends on
the costs of training and on the marginal eﬃciency of eﬀort. If the costs of training
are high, then the principal may not use training. Accordingly, the beneﬁcial eﬀect
of mandatory delegation is still intact. But if the costs are low, then the principal
uses training and therefore increases the weight of his delegate’s eﬀort.
The marginal eﬃciency of eﬀort inﬂuences the decision on the use of training and it
inﬂuences the amount of training that is used. If the decision on the winner is more
like a coin ﬂip (푟 is close to zero), then the principal will use training only if the
costs are very low. He will also use only a small amount of training. If the marginal
eﬃciency is high, then training is used even if the costs are high. The principal will
also use a large amount of money to improve the skills of the agent.
But the use of training inﬂuences the payoﬀ of the principal negatively. It is also
possible that the principal is worse oﬀ compared to a situation without delegation.
Accordingly, giving the principal the opportunity to gain inﬂuence on the decision
leads to an increase in total investment. And therefore the desired eﬀect of delega-
tion is only present if the principal cannot intervene into the contest. The principals
are kept in a kind of prisoners’ dilemma. Not using training is disadvantageous if the
opponent uses training and therefore increases his probability of winning. On the
other hand, the payoﬀs of the agents do not change. In the approach that considers
an increased weight, his decision on eﬀort to put in is determined by the contract.
The contract is the same as in the situation without training and therefore they
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do not invest more. They also do not pay for training. Accordingly, the payoﬀ in
the symmetric equilibrium is the same as without training. In the second approach,
training increases the eﬀort exerted by the agents because the unit costs are de-
creased. The reduction in unit costs is positive for the agent. In equilibrium both
eﬀects cancel each other out and the payoﬀs of the agents do not change compared
to a situation without training. Note that we only considered one single contest.
We do not consider the eﬀect of training on contests played in the future.
In essence, it is shown that delegation can indeed reduce the wasteful investments.
The negative eﬀect of negatively interdependent preferences is neutralized by dele-
gation. Because the delegate is only interested in his material outcome, he does not
act as aggressively as the principal would do. This holds true despite the fact, that
the principal can incentivize the agent with the full objective value of the contested
prize by using an appropriate contract. The positive eﬀect of delegation may also
be mitigated if the principal has the opportunity to train his delegate.
6.2 Future Research
In the last decades, there has been an increasing interest in introducing concepts of
various sciences into economic literature. In Chapter 2, we explained how ﬁndings
from biology were introduced. Another ﬁnding that enriches economics, is also of
interest for delegation and therefore for research. In an article, written in 2000,
Akerlof and Kranton introduced identity into the economic analysis. They deﬁne
identity as a person’s sense of self. Akerlof and Kranton state that “Identity can
account for many phenomena that current economics cannot well explain.” (p.715).
Examples are the economics of poverty and exclusion. A person thinks in social cat-
egories. The categories the individual is in, or sometimes chooses to be in, deﬁne the
identity of this person. A social category is gender, for example. For the individual
there are ways the people in each social category should behave. An individual has
a disutility if he is not able to behave like his social category tells him to do. He also
has a disutility if other individuals do not behave like they should do. A woman,
for example, feels a discomfort if another woman next to her dresses and talks like
a male construction worker. Or a manager does not like it when another manager
collects bottles on the street. And it is also not right to the manager if he collects
bottles because such a behavior is attributed to poor and unemployed people.
In 2005 Akerlof and Kranton extended their model to organizations. In their intro-
duction they use the drill at West Point as an example. They write about the army:
“They wish to inculcate non-economic motives in the cadets so that they have the
same goals as the U.S. Army.”(p.9)
That means, they introduce another way how the behavior of individuals can be
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inﬂuenced. Namely by changing the experienced identity.
It is an interesting endeavor to transfer this topic to a contest with delegation. So
far, a principal can use the contract to inﬂuence the behavior of the delegate, but
now he can also inﬂuence the behavior by changing the way the delegate sees him-
self. That means, the principal might convince the agent that they have a common
goal. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) state this for the Army. In Chapter 5 we saw how
training can aﬀect the weight the eﬀort invested by the agent has. But we neglected
the eﬀect on identity. To incorporate this additional eﬀect in the future, we want
to use a three stage model to show the consequences of the introduction of identity.
We will use a two-player Tullock-contest. At the ﬁrst stage, both principals choose
to delegate or not to delegate. If at least one principal delegates, the delegate is
contracted at the second stage. The contract consists of a monetary component and
training. The monetary component is a share of the contested prize the delegate
gets if the contest is won. Training increases the ability of the delegate, on the one
hand, on the other hand, it makes the delegate also regard the payoﬀ of the prin-
cipal. Training is paid for by the principal. At the last stage the contest is played
and payments take place.
In the game there are four subgames: No one delegates, both delegate or only one
principal delegates. We want to explain shortly the mutual delegation subgame to
demonstrate the model. The model is again solved by backward induction. 푟 = 1 is
assumed to ease calculus. The payoﬀ of the delegate of principal 푖 (푖 = 1, 2) is given
by
휋퐷푖 =
(1 + 휃푖)푑푖
(1 + 휃푖)푑푖 + (1 + 휃−푖)푑−푖
훼푖푉 − 푑푖 + 휃푖 (1 + 휃푖)푑푖
(1 + 휃푖)푑푖 + (1 + 휃−푖)푑−푖
(1− 훼푖)푉.
휃푖 (휃푖 > 0) represents, on the one hand, to what extend the delegate identiﬁes himself
with the principal (shown by his principal’s payoﬀs). On the other hand the change
of identity is due to training. As in West Point, this training may also increase
abilities. Accordingly, 휃푖 increases the weight the eﬀort of the delegate 푑푖 has in the
Contest-Success-Function. This is the way Baik and Kim (1997) modeled abilities
of delegates. Like in the chapters above, 훼푖 represents the share of the contested
prize the principal pays to the delegate if the contest is won.
Without identity the prize is split up. Principal and delegate only cared for their
share. The introduction of training reversed this split up. The equilibrium amount
of training and the according degree of reversal is determined in the second stage of
the game and crucially depends on the costs of training.
The equilibrium at the third stage is given by the winning probability
푝푖 =
(1 + 휃푖)(훼푖 + 휃푖(1− 훼푖))
(1 + 휃푖)(훼푖 + 휃푖(1− 훼푖)) + (1 + 휃−푖)(훼−푖 + 휃−푖(1− 훼−푖)) .
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(1 + 휃푖) gives the eﬀect of the increased ability. 훼푖 + 휃푖(1 − 훼푖) gives the total
incentive of the agent. As stated above, a positive 휃푖 mitigates the split up of the
prize. For 휃푖 = 1, a delegate is incentivized with the whole prize and the share 훼푖
does not matter anymore. We can also think of a delegate that thinks that he and
his principal share the same goals.
At the second stage, principal 푖 determines the contract. His problem is
max
훼푖,휃푖
(1 + 휃푖)(훼푖 + 휃푖(1− 훼푖))
(1 + 휃푖)(훼푖 + 휃푖(1− 훼푖)) + (1 + 휃−푖)(훼−푖 + 휃−푖(1− 훼−푖))(1− 훼푖)푉
− 휃푖(1− 훼푖)푉
푐
,
wrt 휋퐷푖 ≥ 0.
휃푖(1 − 훼푖)푉푐 stands for the costs of training. (1 − 훼푖) was included to express a so
called “real-world” phenomenon: It is easier to convince someone that your mo-
tives are good when you are not greedy. A commander that eats the same things
his soldiers eat and sleeps in the same tents has more motivated soldiers than a
commander that sleeps in the hotel far away from the enemy. Also soldiers tend to
follow commanders more glowingly that share the glory and the money they get with
their soldiers. And a commander that gives away everything he earns can convince
soldiers at low costs.
푐 was introduced to ensure that there are no extreme solutions. If the costs of
training are too high, then the standard model without identity results. If the costs
of training are too low, then the soldier may believe in the aims of the principal
more than the principal does. This case is given for 휃푖 > 1. Religious leaders whose
followers are willing to die for their beliefs, but the leader is not willing to die and
prefers negotiations, are an example. 푐 = 1.5 is an example for a situation with a 휃
between one and zero. We want to solve the given model for all four subgames and
determine under which circumstances this kind of training is used.
Another shortcoming of this research at hand so far is the assumption that there
is an objective value of the prize. Individuals have diﬀerent valuations for the same
thing. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) show for coin auctions on ebay that even if there
is a book value for the coin, the paid price can diﬀer considerably from this value.
Accordingly, it is worthwhile to introduce heterogeneity to the valuation of the prize.
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